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Summary
Schizotypy as a research framework for schizophrenia emphasizes a link 
between the symptoms of the disorder and schizotypal traits in the non-clinical 
population, and argues for a symptom orientated approach to the field. One such 
symptom area concerns that of unusual experiences, such as hallucinations and 
delusions that occur in both schizophrenia and in the normal population, but differ in 
intensity and frequency. Hallucinations and delusions are affected by the 
environment in which they occur, such as a perceptually ambiguous environment. 
However, given that both hallucinations and delusions are misinterpretations of the 
current environment, the content of both could also be influenced by previous 
experiences, where properties of previous experiences interact with the current 
environment to produce such experiences. One factor that could influence 
hallucinations and delusions in this way is time. That is, it could be that those 
individuals more prone to hallucinations and delusions have stronger temporal links 
with the properties of previous experiences that facilitate hallucinatory and 
delusional experiences.
The current thesis explores the relationship between the influence of 
environmental properties on hallucinatory reports and the possibility of differences in 
timing between individuals scoring high or low in schizotypy through tasks that 
incorporate temporal elements for optimum performance, such as time based 
schedules of reinforcement, or measure timing more directly, such as temporal 
bisection tasks. Findings from the thesis show that high schizotypy scorers make 
more hallucinatory-like reports than low scorers and that those reports are linked to 
properties of the environment in which they occur. In addition, there is some 
evidence that high scorers differ in timing across both schedule and temporal 
bisection tasks, but only under very specific circumstances.
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Chapter 1: Introduction.
The present thesis concerns the topic of hallucinations and their underlying 
causes within the framework of schizotypy. The underlying causes are discussed in 
terms of the currently present environment, as well as previous experiences, in a 
manner similar to that suggested by several theories of hallucinations and delusions 
(e.g. Frith, 1979; 1987; Grossberg, 2000; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Tonneau, 2004). 
Although these topics are explored in terms of schizotypy, there is also a focus on the 
relevance for hallucinations and delusions as they occur in individuals diagnosed 
with schizophrenia. An approach focusing on increasing the understanding of the 
underlying processes involved with cognitive functioning similar to those involved in 
hallucinatory experiences within schizotypy may increase understanding for similar 
experiences in a clinical population, where such experiences are more serious. This 
approach may shed light on differences between high and low schizotypy scorers in 
these processes that further extend to more severe schizophrenia. Alternatively, it 
could be that different processes are involved in hallucinatory-like experiences in the 
non-clinical population than those involved in schizophrenic patients. Either way 
however, increasing the understanding of the underlying mechanisms of 
hallucinatory-like processes in the non-clinical population will in turn reveal relevant 
information that contributes to the understanding of hallucinations.
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1. Schizophrenia
1.1 Symptoms, diagnosis, and prevalence
The modem day view of schizophrenia argues that the disorder is a 
dimensional one consisting of a group of brain disorders known as schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders (APA, 1994; Kety, Rosenthal, Wender, Schulsinger, & Jacobsen, 
1975; Bentall, 2003e; Jablensky, 2002). For the majority of this section, a broad view 
of schizophrenia will be the focus of discussion encompassing the spectrum as a 
whole or relating to schizophrenia as outlined in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), with the 
related and subtype categories included where applicable.
Schizophrenia consists of a combination of symptoms from a set of five 
symptom categories including hallucinations, delusions, disorganized behaviour and 
speech, and negative symptoms such as affective flattening (American Psychiatric 
Association; APA, 1994). Diagnosis requires three diagnostic criteria to be met; 
firstly, the presence of two or more symptoms from the above symptom categories 
for at least one month, secondly, social or occupational dysfunction, and finally, the 
persistence of the above two criteria for a period of six months or more (APA, 1994). 
In addition, the diagnosis for schizophrenia included exclusion criteria that cover the 
DSM-IV highlights several related and similar disorders such as schizoid and 
schizotypal personality disorders, schizophreniform disorder, and schizoaffective 
disorder (APA, 1994), some of which are identified as exclusion criteria for 
schizophrenia and each of which include their own criteria for diagnosis as separate 
disorders (APA, 1994). Prevalence rates for schizophrenia range from approximately 
four to seven per 1,000 people depending on the type of prevalence estimate used 
(see Saha, Chant, Welham & McGrath, 2005 for a review of prevalence studies). 
Prevalence studies for related disorders remain largely unexplored, or are
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incorporated within reviews of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (e.g. Jablensky, 
2002). The traditional view of schizophrenia is that of diathesis -stress, whereby an 
underlying biological predisposition interacts with stressful life events allowing for 
the emergence of the disorder (Zubin & Spring, 1977). For example, one theory 
argues that schizophrenia is a result of an over-activity of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine in the mesolimbic (positive symptoms) and mesocortical (negative 
symptoms) pathways of the brain that result in the emergence of the disorder, 
(Buchanan, Freedman, Javitt, Abi-Dargham & Lieberman, 2007; Crow, 1981; Davis, 
Kahn, Ko & Davidson, 1991; Meltzer & Stahl, 1976; Walter, Kammerer, Frasch, 
Spitzer & Abler, 2009). This theory stems from the general findings that drugs that 
either increase or inhibit dopamine reuptake exacerbate or suppress the symptoms of 
schizophrenia accordingly (Abi-Dargham & Moore, 2003; Carlsson & Lindqvist, 
1963; Carlsson, Waters, Waters & Carlsson, 2000; Walter et al 2009).
Despite the popular view that schizophrenia is a “brain disease” (see Read, 
2004a), there is much evidence to suggest that such a perception of the schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders as physical illnesses, is both theoretically, and, in particular, 
methodologically flawed (see Bentall, 2003a; Read 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Read, 
Mosher & Bentall, 2004). Stemming from research covering broad conceptual areas, 
such as: the history o f ‘madness’ in society (e.g., Foucault, 1965), genetics (see Read 
& Mason, 2004 for an overview), medication (see Bentall & Morrison, 2002), 
adverse life events (e.g., Warner, 1985), and the methodological flaws underlying the 
demonstrations of the validity and reliability of schizophrenia (see Read, 2004c, for 
an overview), as well as its classification (see Bentall, 2003b), there appears to be 
enough evidence to suggest that the view of schizophrenia as a biological disorder is, 
at the least, questionable.
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One of these problematic areas concerns the manner in which diagnoses are 
made, which, according to the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, requires 
the presence of two, or more, symptoms, taken from a set of five symptom 
categories, and which have to be present over a 6-month period (APA, 1994). The 
symptom categories required for diagnosis of schizophrenia are: hallucinations, 
delusions, disorganized speech, disorganized behaviour, and negative symptoms 
(such as affective flattening). The total range of symptoms that fall into these 
categories include delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, and grossly 
disorganised or catatonic behaviour; whilst the negative symptoms include: lack of 
emotion and/or interest in life, low energy and/or motivation, affective flattening, 
alogia, avolition, a lack of interest in socializing, inappropriate social skills, inability 
to care about having, making or keeping friends and social isolation (APA, 1994). 
Given that any two of five symptom categories are required, it is worth noting that 
this gives ten distinct ways in which an individual can be diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, and this is without considering further symptom specifics (e.g. 
paranoid delusions or delusions of grandeur). However, diagnosis procedures do 
attempt to account for such differences in symptom structures between patients by 
identifying related disorders such as schizoaffective disorder, schizophreniform 
psychoses, process-non process, catatonic, disorganized, residual and paranoid 
schizophrenia (APA, 1994), but these in turn also present the possibility of different 
symptom combinations (APA, 1994; see Bentall, 2003e for a discussion). Adding to 
the confusion also is the classification of disorders that, although not falling under a 
subtype of schizophrenia, fall along the same spectrum, such as schizotypal 
personality disorder, where the symptoms presented are similar to schizophrenia but 
are focused on the negative symptom type (APA, 1994). Despite some efforts then
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to account for within-patient symptom differences by classifying subtypes of 
schizophrenia and related disorders along the same spectrum, there remains some 
degree of confusion and within-patient differences in symptoms also for specific 
forms of the disorder.
A further issue that questions the traditional view of schizophrenia concerns 
prevalence rates, chiefly due to inconsistencies, and misinterpretations, presented in 
cross-cultural studies (see Bentall, 2003c). For example, Torrey (1987) reported a 
“ten-fold range of schizophrenia”, despite finding a fifty-five fold difference in 
prevalence between the highest and lowest prevalence rates across two different 
countries. Moreover, there is also evidence that the incidence of schizophrenia 
varies depending on rural or urban environments within countries. For example, 
Mortensen et al (1999) found that a greater risk for the development of schizophrenia 
in urban areas of Denmark than in rural ones, whilst similar trends have been 
reported in the Netherlands (Marcelis, Navarro-Mateu, Murray, Selten & van Os, 
1998), England and Wales (Takei et al, 1995), and Sweden (Lewis, David, 
Andreasson & Allebeck, 1992), although the overall effect on the type of 
environment have not shown significant results in more detailed analysis of 
prevalence (Saha et al, 2005).
The findings of varied incidence and prevalence rates, dependent on rural or 
urban environments, highlights the importance of an environmental contribution 
toward the formation and maintenance of schizophrenia perhaps beyond that offered 
by the ‘traditional’ biological approach. Indeed, historically, the term ‘madness’ has 
been argued to have been interchangeable with ‘treatment of the mad’; meaning that 
the symptoms of mental illness exhibited by “the mad” were in fact a response to the 
kind of environment or treatment methods these individuals were exposed to that
5
were thought to alleviate such symptoms (see Foucault, 1965; Tuke, 1813; Pinel, 
1801). For example, the inoculation of abscesses and scabies and the force-feeding of 
chimney soot, woodlice and soap, were taken as effective for the treatment of 
madness in some institutions, despite the obvious distress that could be caused by 
such grim methods (Foucault, 1965; Read, 2004d). In light of this, it would not be 
surprising if those patients exposed to such distressing treatment methods responded 
in a way akin to that taken to be evidence of madness. Moreover, modem research 
into schizophrenia has found that the occurrence, and content, of symptoms are 
associated with, for example, levels of stress, and the contents of the current 
environment (Skirrow, Jones, Griffiths & Kaney, 2002; Spivak, Trottem, Mark, 
Bleich, & Weizman, 1992). Some of these issues however will be discussed in the 
following sections within the framework of schizotypy (Meehl, 1962, 1989).
1.2 The history of schizophrenia
Emil Kraepelin (1913) began the attempt to categorise all types of mental 
illness with the belief that correct categorisation would precede discovery of an 
underlying physiological cause for “madness”; a view, in part, supported by the 
discovery of syphilis, and its underlying physiological causes (Bayle, 1822, cited in 
Read, 2004d). Taking groupings of symptoms defined at the time as catatonia 
(abnormal body postures), hebephrenia (deterioration of mental functioning onset in 
adolescence) and dementia paranoides (characterized by unusual fears or 
persecution), Kraepelin (1913) grouped them further to classify the illness dementia 
praecox, or a severe mental deterioration onset in adolescence (see Bentall, 2003b, 
2003d).
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The term ‘schizophrenia’ was later coined by Eugen Blueler (1911, cited in 
Bentall 2003d) in a continued attempt to categorise several ‘abnormal’ behaviours 
under one banner, albeit with some re-defining, resulting from inconsistencies of the 
severity of the mental deterioration between patients, and age of onset, as implied by 
dementia praecox (Bentall, 2003d). In an attempt to clarify the term ‘schizophrenia’, 
or, more specifically, aid psychiatrists in making a correct diagnosis of the disorder, 
Schneider (1959) identified what he believed to be the “first-rank symptoms” of 
schizophrenia, which included “audible thoughts, voices heard arguing, voices 
commenting on ones actions, experiences of influences on the body, thought 
withdrawal, thoughts as ascribed to other people who intrude their thoughts upon the 
patient, thought diffusion, delusional perception, feelings, impulses (drives) and 
volitional acts that are experienced by the patient as the work of influence of others” 
(Schenider, 1959, cited in Bentall, 2003d, p. 32-33). These first-rank symptoms are 
still relied upon heavily within the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia (APA, 1994; 
see section 1.1 above). It is also worth noting, here, that they relate largely to the 
hallucination and delusion symptom areas, which will become a focus of the current 
thesis.
Moving away from a categorical approach to schizophrenia, the 1960’s and 
70’s saw a move toward a more dimensional approach to the disorder (Meehl, 1962;; 
Kety et al, 1975). Stemming from Meehl’s (1962) argument for “schizotaxia” - that 
individuals hold a predisposition to develop schizophrenia, and exhibit personality 
traits associated with schizophrenia symptomology -  the consideration of 
schizophrenia began to move toward a more dimensional entity, largely due to the 
work of Kety et al (1975). Following research into the genetic underpinnings of the 
disorder amongst family members of diagnosed patients, Kety et al (1975) reported
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that, although finding very little evidence of suffering from psychotic illness in the 
relatives of patients with schizophrenia, the study suggested that these relatives 
showed many unusual and eccentric personality characteristics such as supernatural 
beliefs. As a result, “schizophrenia spectrum disorder” was proposed as a new 
approach to the diagnosis of schizophrenia, whereby such related characteristics 
could be accounted for in related but different disorders as well as in terms of latent 
schizophrenia or a predisposition toward it (Kety et al, 1975; Bentall, 2003e; 
Jablensky, 2002). As a result of this research, schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
along a multi-axial system (psychiatric diagnosis along axis I and personality 
disorders along axis II) were subsequently included in the following revisions of the 
DSM, where they remain (APA, 1994; DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). However, the use 
of axis II as a diagnostic criteria for disorders such as schizotypal personality 
disorder remains somewhat problematic, with the reliability for the categories 
included within axis II proving to be low (Bentall 2003e; Mellsop, Varghese, Joshua 
& Hicks, 1982). This means that, although a dimensional approach to schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders accounts for some of the shortfalls in variability between patients, 
symptoms and biology, pinning down these disorders to distinct disorders with a 
definitive set of symptoms, aetiology and outcomes remain unclear (McDonald & 
Schulz, 2008; Tsuang, Stone, & Faraone, 2000).
1.3 Problems with the classification
The classifications made by the pioneers of schizophrenia (e.g., Bleuler,
1911, cited in Bentall 2003d; Kraepelin, 1913) have continued to be further redefined 
(see Bentall, 2003b; Read, 2004b). However, these redefinitions, themselves, have
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suffered from an inability to successfully incorporate a consistent set of symptoms, 
outcomes, an observable cause, or time of onset, and have, as a result, seen 
redefinitions include groupings of behaviours seemingly ‘made-to-fit’ the disorder or 
spawning related disorders with varied symptoms (Read, 2004b). For example, a 
recent review highlights the differences in the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia 
included across versions of the DSM, and in a paper entitled “Toward Reformulating 
the Diagnosis o f Schizophrenia”, the conclusion is made that success in treating 
and/or preventing the disorder: “will depend to an important extent on an accurate 
understanding o f its causes''1 (Tsuang, Stone, & Faraone, 2000, p. 1041), arguing 
that research is needed to establish the possibility of “schizotaxia with psychosis 
(schizophrenia) and schizotaxia alone as distinct diagnostic conditions” (Tsuang, 
Stone, & Faraone, 2000, p. 1041).
Thus, without covering all of the research area, it is clear that there is still 
much debate surrounding schizophrenia spectrum disorders, as is evident in the 
variability of the possible diagnostic criteria for the schizophrenia alone; just 
considering the five symptom categories without the individual symptoms, however, 
gives fifteen possible ways that two people meeting these criteria could be diagnosed 
as schizophrenic, yet without having any symptoms in common (Read, 2004c). Such 
variations of symptoms in the definitions of schizophrenia raise questions of 
reliability and validity from a scientific standpoint (Bannister, 1968; Bentall, 2003a, 
2003b; Bentall et al., 1988; Boyle, 1990; Ross & Pam, 1995).
In terms of the reliability of the construct of schizophrenia, no significant 
relationship between clinical and research diagnoses have been demonstrated 
(Whaley, 2001). Moreover, a study that specifically examined the reliability of the 
schizophrenia construct, by examining the use of sixteen different classification
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systems for schizophrenia, has shown a dramatic variation, of between 1/248, and 
203/248, patients being diagnosed with the disorder (Herron, Schultz, & Welt, 1992).
In turn, the concept of ‘schizophrenia’ has been argued to show low levels of 
validity due to a large degree of symptom co-morbidity with other disorders (Craig & 
Hwang, 2000; Crow, 1990; Ellason & Ross, 1995; Torgalsboen, 1999a), and a lack 
of common prognosis; with psycho-social factors contributing to, and, in some cases, 
being argued to be the best predictors of outcomes as opposed to the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Doering et al., 1998; Harrison et al., 2001; Malmberg, Lewis, David 
& Alleback, 1998; McGlashan, 1988; Mueser et al., 1990; Torgalsboen, 1999b). 
Furthermore, as Read (2004a) points out, the three arguments that are used to justify 
the view that schizophrenia has a biological basis; uniform frequency throughout the 
world, abnormal brain features and a genetic predisposition, are all flawed to some 
extent. This is due, firstly, to evidence to the contrary, or, at least, to the evidence 
being misinterpreted, or questionable, especially that which shows great variation in 
prevalence across cultures (Torrey, 1987; but see also Read, 2004a).
In addition, a biological basis for schizophrenia has been identified in terms 
of biochemical and anatomical theories, to name but two (see Read, 2004a). One 
such theory is the ‘dopamine hypothesis’, which argues that schizophrenia is caused 
by over-activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the brains of schizophrenic 
patients (Buchanan et al, 2007; Crow, 1981; Davis et al, 1991; Meltzer & Stahl,
1976; Walter, et al 2009). However, evidence for this theory has been argued to be 
inconclusive and over-simplistic as a result of more recent research implicating other 
neurological mechanisms, such as the influence of serotonin and the neurotransmitter 
glutamate, removing the focus away from the influence of dopamine alone, and 
toward more complex interactions (Coyle, Tsai & Goff, 2003; Kapur & Remington,
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1996; Laruelle, Kegeles & Abi-Dargham, 2003). The existing evidence pertaining to 
alterations in dopamine levels could also be a result of schizophrenia, as opposed to a 
cause (Snyder, 1974). Similarly, although research into the genetic underpinnings of 
schizophrenia, through adoption studies, have provided support for the genetic 
argument (Kety et al, 1975; Tienari et al, 1987; Tienari, 2000; Wender et al, 1974), a 
number of critical reviews of these studies have highlighted some major 
methodological issues in the criteria used, such as broadening the criteria to include 
non-psychotic schizophrenia disorders, inadequate definitions of schizophrenia and 
failure to strictly control or account for degrees of relatedness between relatives 
(Bentall, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Read, 2004a).
2. Schizotypy
2.1 Deyelopment of the concept and its implications
The word “schizotypy” was first used by Rado (1953) as an abbreviation for 
the term “schizophrenic phenotype”, and to refer to a sub-clinical predisposition to 
schizophrenia. This notion was later elaborated by Meehl (1962), who argued that, 
due the inconsistent evidence accrued from genetic research into schizophrenia, the 
disorder itself could not be assumed to be inherited. Rather, the term ‘schizotypy’ 
could be used to conceptualise a predisposition toward the development of 
schizophrenia, which may have some genetic component triggered by exposure to 
particular environmental conditions. Thus, the development of the concept of 
schizotypy can be viewed, in part, as a reaction to inadequacies in the construct 
validity of schizophrenia as an “illness”.
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As a result of these problems, a dimensional approach using schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders (Kety et al, 1975) has become the dominant approach to 
diagnosis. In line with this, a growing body of researchers have argued for a more 
symptom-orientated approach to examining schizophrenic symptoms using sub- 
clinical populations, which may be more beneficial in understanding and helping 
those who exhibit bizarre behaviours and suffer from abnormal experiences (Bentall, 
2003e). This approach argues for a continuum of psychosis-like behaviour, on which 
every individual, clinical or non-clinical, falls (Chapman & Chapman, 1980; 
Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, & Zinser, 1994; Claridge, 1990). This in turn 
compliments the notion of a spectrum of schizophrenia disorders that vary in 
symptom type, intensity and clustering, such as schizoaffective disorder, which 
emphasizes the influence of affective states (depression and anxiety) alongside the 
classic symptom groups of schizophrenia, into which those patients who do not meet 
the classical schizophrenia criteria may be included (Blacker & Tsuang, 1992). A 
dimensional approach argues that every individual differs in the degree to which they 
have experiences associated with schizophrenic symptoms, but lacking in the clinical 
severity to warrant clinical treatment (McCreery & Claridge, 1996a, 1996b;
Verdoux, van-Os, Maurice-Tison, Gay, Salamon, & Bourgeois, 1998).
The clinical implications of schizotypy and a dimensional approach to 
schizophrenia centre largely on the identification of “at-risk” individuals and the 
potential for developing interventions and treatment therapies for those most prone to 
the development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Faraone, Green, Seidman & 
Tsuang, 2001). In line with this, a large number of longitudinal studies have 
identified task types where poor performance predicts development of schizophrenia 
or related disorders on follow-up, such as motor functioning (Fish, Marcus, Hans,
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Auerbach, & Perdue, 1992; Olin & Mednick, 1996; Erlenmeyer-Kimling, Adamo, 
Rock, Roberts, Bassett, Squires-Wheeler, et al, 1997; Walker & Lewine, 1990) and 
poor psychosocial skills (Olin & Mednick, 1996; Erlenmeyer-Kimling et al, 1997; 
Walker & Lewine, 1990; Hans, Marker, Henson, Auerbach & Mirsky, 1992). 
However, more work needs to be done in establishing the predictive validity of these 
tasks for the onset of schizophrenia spectrum disorders along with the course of these 
disorders before reliable and valid interventions can be developed (Faraone et al, 
2001). In addition, although the development of interventions for those deemed most 
“at-risk” would be beneficial, it is also important, from a clinical perspective, to 
consider how intervention types may interact with the disorder. For example, family- 
focused interventions may be affected by relatives responses to the individuals 
symptoms and affect their relationship accordingly (Faraone et al, 2001). Indeed, in 
the study of expressed emotion, the relationship between a patient experiencing 
psychosis and family members has been shown to increase the likelihood of relapse 
(Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998; Pilling, Bebbington, Kuipers, Garety, Geddes, Orbach & 
Morgan, 2002). Moreover, considering the heterogeneity of schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, the relatives of patients with schizophrenia may not be the best proponents 
of a familial intervention, given that they may exhibit some bizarre behaviour and 
experiences associated with schizophrenia themselves (Faraone et al, 2001). In terms 
of the clinical implications of schizotypy then, the potential for the identification of 
“at-risk” individuals and the development of intervention approaches in these 
individuals accordingly is highly desirable, but more research is currently required 
into the predictive validity of the behavioural deficits already thought to be 
associated with the schizophrenia spectrum, the course of these disorders and the
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potential interaction of these behavioural deficits with the mechanics of intervention 
approaches.
2.2 Predictive validity of schizotypy.
Another feature of a dimensional approach to schizophrenia and the concept 
of schizotypy concerns the possibility of identifying individuals “at-risk” to develop 
the disorder (Meehl, 1962). With this in mind, a number of studies have sought to 
examine the predictive validity of schizotypy and its methods of measurement in the 
development of more severe psychosis over time (Cannon, Cadenhead, Cornblatt, 
Woods, Adlington, Walker, Seidman, Perkins, Tsuang, McGlashan & Heinssen, 
2008; Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994; Gooding, Tallent & 
Matts, 2005; Horan, Reise, Subotnik, Ventura & Nuechterlein, 2008; Erlenmeyer- 
Kimmling, Cornblatt, Rock, Roberts, Bell & West, 1993; Kwapil, 1998; Miller, 
Lawrie, Byrne, Cosway & Johnstone, 2002; Miller, Byrne, Hodges, Lawrie, Owens 
& Johnstone, 2002). The majority of research into predictive validity focuses on 
specific methods of assessment (e.g. Miller, Byrne et al, 2002) or questionnaire 
measurement (e.g. Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994) but taken 
together these studies illustrate the value of schizotypy as a predictive tool for 
identifying individuals at-risk to develop schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Cannon 
et al, 2008; Gooding et al, 2005; Kwapil, 1998; Miller, Byrne et al, 2002) or at least 
show evidence for an increased level of psychotic-like experiences over time 
(Chapman et al, 1994; Erlenmeyer-Kimmling et al, 1993; Gooding et al, 2005). 
Indeed, the use of schizotypy as a tool that can identify those most “at-risk” of 
developing schizophrenia is, in part, a driving force behind the development of the 
concept (Meehl, 1962; Bentall, 2003e). However, it is important to note here that, in
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terms of the kinds of longitudinal research required for accurate studies into 
predictive validity, and this, accompanied by the large volume and focus on specific 
measurements of the concept (see section 2.2), means that, in a broad sense, research 
into the predictive validity of schizotypy for schizophrenia is still relatively young 
and therefore requires more research to obtain a more complete picture of the 
longitudinal relationship between the two. Moreover, studies of predictive validity as 
outlined above tend to show some inconsistencies of the extent of intensity of 
symptoms at follow-up, with findings falling somewhere between a schizophrenia 
diagnosis and simply more intense psychotic-like experiences (e.g. Chapman et al, 
1994; Gooding et al, 2005), a more refined and standardised approach then be a 
might shed more light on the predictive validity of schizotypy.
2.3 M easurement of schizotypy
Schizotypy is measured through self-report questionnaires; of which there are 
a variety and each with their own particular view on the construct (Bentall, Claridge 
& Slade, 1989; Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976; Chapman, Chapman, &
Raulin, 1978; Claridge & Broks, 1984; Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman & Mishlove, 
1982; Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995; Neilson & Peterson, 1976; Raine, 1991; 
Venables, Wilkins, Mitchell, Raine & Bailes, 1990; Williams, 1993). For example, 
the full and brief versions of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 
1991; SPQ-B; Raine & Benishay, 1995) relates directly to schizotypal personality 
disorder, which is distinct from but related to schizophrenia, and measures those 
schizotypal traits that relate directly to that particular disorder. The Kings 
Schizotypy Questionnaire (Williams, 1993) measures schizotypy with a focus on 
“familial liability to schizophrenia”. Other questionnaires measure schizotypy in
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terms of positive or negative trait clusters; such as the Body Image Aberration Scale 
(Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1978) and the Physical and Social Anhedonia Scale 
(Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976), are designed to tap into specific symptom 
types; such as the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), and the 
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981). Alternatively, 
they can cover a broad range of symptoms related to schizotypy, such as; the 
Combined Schizotypy Personality Questionnaire and Schizophrenism scale (Bentall, 
Claridge & Slade, 1989). Still other questionnaires related to the topic include the 
Schizophrenism Scale (Neilson & Peterson, 1976), the Schizoidia Scale (Golden & 
Meehl, 1979), the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale (Chapman, Chapman, Numbers, 
Edell, Carpenter & Beckfield, 1984), the Schizotypal Questionnaire (Claridge & 
Broks, 1984), the Schizotypy Scale (Venables et al., 1990), the Wisconsin 
Schizotypy Scales (Eckblad et al, 1982), and those scales measuring Intense 
Ambivalence (Raulin, 1984), Social Fear (Raulin & Wee, 1984), Cognitive Slippage 
(Miers & Raulin, 1985), Delusion Proneness (Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004), 
and elements of the Minnesota Multiple Personality Questionnaire that may be 
related to schizotypy (see Golden & Meehl, 1979).
One of the most popular psychometric questionnaires used for measuring 
schizotypy is the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (OLIFE; 
Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995), which was developed to measure psychosis 
proneness in normal individuals, and has since been reduced to a brief version of the 
scale (OLIFE-B; Mason, Linney & Claridge, 2005). Both the OLIFE, and OLIFE-B, 
can be broken down into four subscales that are designed to measure four trait 
clusters of schizotypy; three of which are related to the previously identified 
symptom clusters of schizophrenia, and a fourth is related cluster identified through
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development of the OLIFE and OLIFE-B (Mason et al, 1995, 2005; see also Mason 
& Claridge, 2006). Each question of both scales takes the form of a YES/NO 
question, and relates directly to experiences of the individual; for example, “Have 
you ever thought that you had special, almost magical powers?” The answer to each 
question then carries a mark of “1” or “0” (for either “yes” or “no” answers 
depending on the direction for each question), and accumulate to give a score for 
each subscale on: Unusual Experiences (UE), relating to instances of bizarre thinking 
and perceptual experiences (hallucinations and delusions); Cognitive Disorganisation 
(CD), measuring issues of concentration, attention or decision-making; Introvertive 
Anhedonia (IA), measuring degrees of social enjoyment; and Impulsive 
nonconformity (IN), measuring reckless, antisocial and self-abusive behaviours 
(Mason et al, 1995). Each score therefore contributes to the severity of experiences 
based on these four subscales with higher scores taken to mean a higher degree of 
psychosis-proneness (Mason et al, 2005). Advantages of using the OLIFE-B to 
measure hallucination-like experiences within a schizotypy framework centre on the 
resemblance of the cognitive experiences measured by the scales items to the 
symptoms of schizophrenia. This similarity falls in line with the notion of a 
schizotypal continuum, where “normal” cognitive experiences are deemed to relate 
to schizophrenic symptoms but at a lesser intensity (Mason et al, 2005). This scale 
holds an advantage over similar scales as it provides an overview measurement of 
schizotypy as a whole, as opposed to those scales more directly related to specific 
schizophrenia-associated disorders (e.g. SPQ; Raine, 1991) or those focused on one 
set of symptoms (e.g. LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981). With this in mind, examination 
of the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B in particular would be useful in exploring the 
relationship between schizotypy and the cognitive processes most associated with
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these symptoms. The OLIFE-B is particularly useful in the current context as it was 
specifically designed to measure the psychotic characteristics of healthy individuals 
(Mason et al, 1995, 2005; Mason & Claridge, 2006). In addition, the full version of 
the OLIFE is based on the largest factor-analytic study to date on schizotypal traits, 
taken from fifteen measures of psychosis-proneness (Claridge et al, 1996), whilst the 
reduced number of items in the brief version is more convenient whilst maintaining 
reliability, for use in a research environment (Mason et al, 2005). Moreover, the 
OLIFE-B breaks down and categorizes those psychotic characteristics in healthy 
individuals directly associated with psychosis, namely hallucinations and delusions, 
in the form of the unusual experiences (UE) subscale (Mason et al, 2005). This 
allows for the detailed examination of specific effects of UE levels on task 
performance.
Despite the wide degree of usage, the self-report approach to schizotypy is 
not without its limitations. In terms of clinical diagnosis, self-report measures have 
been reported as less likely to identify familial vulnerability and even futile if 
participants have little insight into the behaviours they are, or are not, reporting 
(Kendler, Thacker & Walsh, 1996), and even when they are reported, self-report 
symptoms may not be clinically relevant (Verdoux & Van Os, 2002).
As well as the clinical limitations however, self-report measures also face 
more general limitations. In general terms, social desirability could play a role in the 
self-reporting of feelings and experiences in that each individual responds according 
to perceived cultural norms (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). As a result, it could be that 
some bizarre experiences and abnormal thoughts and feelings are subsequently 
under-reported by individuals when completing psychometric questionnaires.
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More specifically, it could be that the types of characteristics of symptom 
clusters measured by schizoptypal questionnaires in turn affect participants responses 
across items not directly related to those particular clusters; for example, the IN 
subscale of the OLIFE-B measures the tendency of participants to rebel against 
social norms or act impulsively, characteristics that may result in participants giving 
the opposite responses to their true feelings and experiences across all of the OLIFE- 
B subscales. In addition, participants responses could be affected by characteristics 
associated with schizotypy but not directly measured by the psychometric 
questionnaires employed, such as where a reduced outward expression of emotion 
may mean that participants are unable to accurately report their thoughts, feelings 
and experiences (Kring, Kerr, Smith & Neale, 1993). Similarly, self-report 
questionnaires are unable to measure automatic motor and behavioural characteristics 
associated with schizophrenia such as aloofness, poor eye contact and restricted 
affect and could therefore blur the similarities between schizophrenia and schizotypy 
(Battaglia, Cavallini, Macciardi, & Bellodi, 1997; Kendler, Thacker & Walsh, 1996; 
Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000). Moreover, the self-report nature of psychometric 
measures reflect subjective experiences of these behaviours and experiences and as a 
result may not be an accurately objective reflection of schizotypy, or the specific 
characteristic/symptom cluster as an objective entity. In addition, if the same 
mechanisms involving self-awareness and insight into their experiences are present 
as they are in schizophrenia, where schizophrenia sufferers are unable to screen out 
irrelevant stimuli during task performance (Light & Braff, 2000), unusual 
experiences may be over reported. Furthermore, Light & Braff, (2000) also argued 
that self reports may not accurately reflect the “automatic” behaviours that 
accompany schizotypy, thus masking schizotypal individuals, but not to a degree that
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these subjects are capable of self-reporting so. Finally, and with reference to the 
OLIFE-B directly, although the items are worded so as to include a general sense of 
frequency, the nature of the measure does not account for marked differences in the 
frequency of which a respondent performs a behaviour or has the experiences they 
report due to the simple “yes” versus “no” responses for each item, thus, an 
individual that answers “yes” to having experienced an item such as “When in the 
dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there is nothing there?” scores 
the same point for having this experience a handful of times as someone who has had 
the same experience every day for considerable period of time.
2.4 Schizotypy and schizophrenia
Factor analytic studies have shown that schizotypal traits are linked to 
schizophrenic symptoms (Bentall, Claridge, & Slade, 1989; Claridge & Beech, 1995; 
Claridge, McCreery, Mason, Bentall, Boyle, Slade, & Popplewell, 1996); in that both 
schizotypal traits and schizophrenic symptoms fall into the same three categories; 
positive, negative, and cognitive disorganisation (see Bentall, 2004).
This approach has led to a variety of findings with regard to these symptom 
clusters, with high scorers on measures associated with these clusters showing 
heightened performance on measures such as creativity and responsivity to 
threatening stimuli (Fisher, Mohanty, & Herrington, 2004), as well as an increase or 
decrease depending on the symptom cluster in performance on tasks such as verbal 
perceptual tasks (Tsakanikos & Claridge, 2005) and latent inhibition (Shrira & 
Tsakanikos, 2009). Such findings have been shown to hold across a diverse range of 
topics, including, but certainly not limited to, areas pertaining to neuropsychology
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(Fisher et al, 2004; Folley & Park, 2005), verbal and visual perception abilities (van 
Strien & van Kampen, 2008; Tsakanikos & Claridge, 2005), creativity (Green & 
Williams, 1999; Nettle, 2006), lifestyle correlates (Wan, Friedman, Boutros, & 
Crawford, 2008), experimental and cognitive task deficits (Applegate, El-Deredy & 
Bentall, 2009; Shirra & Tsakanikos, 2009), and other psychometric measures 
(Lewandoski, Barrantes-Vidal, Nelson-Gray, Clancy, Kepley, & Kwapil, 2006; Rossi 
& Daneluzzo, 2002).
Moreover, research into a number of topic areas have shown both 
schizophrenic patients and high schizotypy scorers to show the same performance 
effects on the same tasks depending on the type of task and dominant trait or 
symptom cluster (i.e. positive, negative or cognitive disorganization; Shrira & 
Tsakanikos, 2009; Lubow, 2005). These topic areas include latent inhibition (Shrira 
& Tsakanikos, 2009; Lubow, 2005), false memory (Dagnall & Parker 2008; Moritz 
& Woodward, 2006), and attention (Bergida & Lenzenweger, 2006), as well as in 
areas such as, dissociation and sleep-related disturbances (see Koffel & Watson,
2009 for a review), unorganized speech (Kiang, 2009), and creativity (Claridge & 
Blakey, 2009; Keefe & Magaro, 1980). However, of most interest to the current 
thesis is the positive cluster of symptoms associated with hallucinations and 
delusions.
2.5 Schizotypy as a research tool
Given the above findings, there is certainly a case to be made that schizotypy, 
at the very least, can be used as a model to understand schizophrenia. Additionally, 
comparing the psychotic symptoms of patients to similar experiences in typical 
subjects may give a better understanding of the nature of these differences between
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the normal processes at work in normal experiences and the associated deficits in 
similar processes in psychotic patients. For example, understanding normal 
performance on tasks in non-clinical individuals may shed light on the symptom 
clusters that effect task performance in patients with schizophrenia. Indeed, research 
examining latent inhibition within a schizotypy framework has shown the differing 
influence of both positive and negative trait clusters in high scorers on these clusters, 
a finding which may extend to, and have implications for, schizophrenic patients 
with dominant positive or negative symptoms (Shrira & Tsakanikos, 2009). 
Moreover, the use of schizotypy as a framework for schizophrenia may also be 
useful in identifying the needs of patients, and enhancing their future outcomes 
through the development of early interventions that prevent full-blown psychosis in 
those most at risk (Johns & van Os, 2001; McGrath & McGlashsan, 1999; van Os & 
Verdoux, 2003).
Moreover, the use of schizotypy as a model for research into schizophrenia 
allows for the avoidance of potential confounds associated with research into a 
clinical population, such as the effects of medication, symptom severity and patient 
distress (Dagnall & Parker 2009; Mitropoulou, Harvey, Zegarelli, New, Silverman & 
Siever, 2005; Raine & Lencz, 1995; Tsakanikos & Reed 2005a), which may mask or 
lead to false results, such as in instances where motor responding in tasks may be 
effected by the side-effects of medication, such as tardive dyskinesia (Kane, 2006) or 
where the symptoms presented are so severe that the patient may not respond to task 
requirements or become distressed. Examples of the disruption to research caused by 
these types of events include involuntary movement by participants in tasks that 
require motor-responding or periods of no movement (such as experimental 
computer tasks or those involving neurological techniques) or in an experimental
22
situation in general, where paranoid symptoms may be exacerbated by the fact that 
the participants is being experimented on.
3. Hallucinations and Delusions
One trait cluster that has attracted much attention in the research literature is 
that associated with positive schizophrenic and schizotypal traits; hallucinations and 
delusions (e.g. Bentall, 1990; Garety & Freeman, 1999). Hallucinations and 
delusions were heavily implicated amongst Schneider’s (1959) “first-rank 
symptoms” of schizophrenia and are highly influential in the diagnostic process of 
the disorder, where the presence of hallucinations or delusions alone is enough to 
reach a diagnosis of schizophrenia, provided that delusions are bizarre, or that 
hallucinations are made up of a voice keeping a running commentary on the 
individuals actions of thoughts, or if two or more voices are heard in conversation 
with one another (APA, 1994; see section 1.2 above).
The DSM-IV definition of a hallucination is: “A sensory perception that has 
the compelling sense o f  reality o f  a true perception but that occurs without external 
stimulation o f the relevant sensory organ” which can occur across all five-sense 
modalities (APA, 1994, as cited by Bentall, 2003f). However, this definition does 
not accommodate all types of hallucination, especially those perceived as coming 
from outside the body, or those attributed internally (see Bentall, 2003). Slade and 
Bentall (1988: 23) attempted to give a more precise definition of a hallucination in 
terms of: “any percept-like experiences which (a) occurs in the absence o f an 
appropriate stimulus (b) has the fu ll force or impact o f  the corresponding actual 
(real) perception, and (c) is not amenable to the direct control or voluntary control 
o f the experience.” This definition holds an advantage over the DSM-IV criteria, as
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it draws attention to the use of an appropriate stimulus - allowing for hallucinations 
to occur alongside certain environmental stimulation (e.g., auditory input; Margo, 
Hemsley, & Slade, 1981), lack of control of the individual, and the apparent reality 
of the experience (Bentall, 1990; Bentall, 2003f); although, it should be noted that 
this definition, too, is limited to some extent (see Bentall, 2003f).
Similarly, the DSM-IV definition of a delusion may be regarded as 
problematic: “A false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external 
reality and firmly sustained in spite o f  what almost everyone else believes and in 
spite o f  what usually constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof o f  evidence to 
the contrary” (APA, 1994). Bentall (2003g) notes that it is unclear exactly what 
“incorrect inference”, “external reality”, and “incontrovertible and obvious proof’, 
actually means. In an attempt to define delusions outside of the diagnostic criteria of 
the DSM-IV, researchers have, in practice, identified delusions as being held with 
high conviction, resistant to evidence and reason, and to fit one or more of the 
content criteria presented in diagnostic manuals (Garety & Freeman, 1999), but, 
again, this definition could be regarded as vague, with problems such as determining 
when a delusion is false, bizarre, incorrigible, or sub-culturally deviant, or 
distinguishing delusions from obsessions (see Garety & Hemsley, 1994) . 
Fortunately, this lack of specific criteria in defining delusions has not held back a 
recent rise in research into delusions but, as is also the case with hallucinations, a 
resultant variation in approaches to delusion research has emerged, which is not 
restricted to research as a topic aligned to psychopathology (Garety & Freeman,
1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
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3.1 Bizarre experiences in schizophrenia and schizotypy
Despite being considered a key component toward the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, the prevalence rate of hallucinatory experiences in ‘normal’ 
individuals, at approximately 13%, is approximately ten times greater than the 
population that will be diagnosed with schizophrenia across most countries (see 
Bentall, 2003c, 2003e). Research into the prevalence rates of hallucinations have 
found reports of hallucinatory experiences to have been experienced by otherwise 
healthy, non-clinical individuals in studies of undergraduate students (Barrett & 
Etheridge, 1992; Bentall & Slade, 1985; Posey & Losch, 1983), and in more 
extensive samples of the general populations of different countries (van Os, Hanssen, 
Bijl & Ravelli, 2000; Poulton, Caspi, Moffitt, Cannon, Murray, & Harrington, 2000).
Although prevalence rates of delusions have been less thoroughly studied, 
both Poulton et al. (2000), and van Os et al. (2000), reported up to one fifth of the 
population had experienced delusions, whilst Verdoux et al. (1998) reported that 
between 23.4% and 69.3%, of the 750 (approx) participants studied with no history 
of psychiatric disorder, reported having delusional beliefs, relating to beliefs about 
others and events, persecution, magical powers, or supernatural forces.
Moreover, research into hallucinatory occurrences have shown that both 
schizophrenic patients (Gallagher, Dinin & Baker, 1994; Margo, Hemsley & Slade, 
1981; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Young, Bentall, Slade & Dewey, 1987), and high 
schizotypy scorers (Celia, Taylor & Reed, 2007; Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005a, 2005b; 
Tsakanikos, 2006), report a greater degree of hallucinatory-like experiences on 
experimental tasks than non-clinical controls and low schizotypy scorers. For 
example, Mintz and Alpert (1972) used the ‘‘White Christmas” task to examine the 
vividness and accuracy of understanding of their false auditory perceptions by asking
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participants to close their eyes and imagine hearing the song “White Christmas” and 
then measuring the degree to which participants believed that they had actually heard 
the song. Hallucinating schizophrenic patients reported more intense mental imagery 
of hearing the song as well as less ability in accurately describing the nature of their 
experiences (i.e. imagined the song being played versus actually hearing it) than both 
non-hallucinating schizophrenic patients and a non-psychotic control group (Mintz & 
Alpert, 1972). Similarly, Celia et al (2007) employed a visual word-detection task 
that required participants to report actual words presented amongst non-words on a 
computer-screen, and examined the occurrence of falsely reported words between 
high and low schizotypy scorers. Celia et al (2007) found that high schizotypy 
scorers made more false-word reports than low schizotypy scorers, and also that the 
number of false reports made was somewhat dependent on the violation of the 
expected stimuli to be presented, particularly in high schizotypy scorers.
3.2 Hallucination and delusions in other disorders
Experiences of hallucinations and delusions are not limited to schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders and schizotypy, but are also related to other environmental, 
neurological, and emotional factors also, as well as other psychiatric disorders (see 
Bentall, 2003e, 2003f). For example, hallucinations have been the topic of interest in 
Parkinson’s Disease, and Charles Bonnet syndrome patients (Barnes & David, 2001; 
Gold & Rabins, 1989), and have been studied within neurological, (Weiss &
Heckers, 1999), and treatment research contexts (Shergill, Murray & McGuire,
1998). Research into delusions span topic areas such as Alzheimer’s disease (Rao & 
Lyketsos, 1998), specific types of delusion, such as paranoia (Bentall, Corcoran,
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Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001), and parasitosis (Wykoff, 1987), and both 
hallucinations and delusions have been considered together alongside topics such as 
cognitive-behavioural treatment approaches to both symptoms (Haddock, Tarrier, 
Spaulding, Yusupoff, Kinney, & McCarthy, 1998), and in line with heightened levels 
of emotional stress, anxiety and trauma (Freeman & Garety, 2003; Honig, Romme, 
Ensink et al., 1998; Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003; Read & Argyle, 1999) in 
hallucination sufferers. Prevalence rates for hallucinations range from 8 to 40 % in 
Parkinson’s disease patients (Barnes & David, 2000), from 11 to 15% in Charles 
Bonnet syndrome patients (Menon, Rahman, Menon & Dutton, 2003), from 25 to 
94% in schizophrenic patients (Shergill et al, 1998) and from 10 to 39% in the 
general population (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Posey & Losch, 1983; Slade & Bentall, 
1988; Tien, 1991), whilst prevalence rates for delusions range from 16 to 22% in 
Alzheimer’s patients (Bassiony, Steinberg, Warren, Rosenblatt, Baker & Lyketsos, 
2000; Bums, Jacoby & Levy, 1990), and between 20 and 69.3% in individuals with 
no history of a psychiatric disorder (Poulton et al, 2000; van Os, 2000; Verdoux et al,
1998). These prevalence rates highlight the degree to which hallucinations and 
delusions can occur beyond the domain of schizophrenia and with reference to other 
disorders and cognitive problems that may help to shed light on these types of 
experiences in general. In addition, the specific relationships between hallucinations 
and delusions and the populations mentioned above have also been shown, such as 
the prominence of visual hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease and Charles Bonnet 
syndrome patients (Bames & David, 2000; Menon et al, 2003), persecutory delusions 
in Alzheimer s patients (Bums et al, 1990), or the relationship between anxiety and 
the content of both hallucinations and delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Such a 
variety in the way in which hallucinations and delusions occur and the differing
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prevalence and type of presentation alongside other disorders then has led to a 
number of causal theories as to how these experiences arise.
3.3 Theories of bizarre experiences
There are a number of theories as to why hallucinations and delusions occur 
therefore, with different underlying mechanisms and processes argued to be 
involved. However, although the existing theories are outlined below, the current 
thesis is not concerned with which of the existing theories is correct, but instead 
wishes to point out a number of factors important in the generation of bizarre 
experiences that may be relevant here, such as sub-vocalization as implicated in 
theories of hallucinations (Gould, 1948, 1949, 1950; Green & Preston, 1981; 
McGuigan, 1966) or a “jumping to conclusion bias” as a theory of delusions (Fear & 
Healey, 1997; Peters, Day & Garety, 1997; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988; Garety, 
Hemsley & Wesseley, 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
3.3.1 Theories o f  hallucinations
In a review of the hallucination literature, Bentall (1990) described several 
hallucination theories, grouping them into four types of theory, which are mentioned 
briefly in the following section. Firstly, ‘simple conditioning theories’ give evidence 
that false-perceptions can be trained through classical conditioning (Davies, 1974a, 
1974b, 1976; Davies, Davies, & Bennett, 1982), but are let down by an inability to 
explain why hallucinations vary depending on stress or environmental stimulation 
(Bentall, 1990), a symptom regarded as a significant contributor to psychotic 
disorders (APA, 1994). Secondly, ‘seepage theories’ postulate that hallucinations 
occur due to a breakdown in the filtering process, and the subsequent interference of
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preconscious material with the contents of consciousness. Such views rely on 
environmental stimulation as a facilitator for hallucinations (Frith, 1979; West, 1962, 
1975). Unfortunately, the predominant existing theories contradict one another in 
terms of whether, or not, more or less environmental stimulation should lead to 
increased hallucinatory occurrence and, in both cases, the relationship between 
environmental stimulation and hallucinatory experiences seems to be too complex 
for either theory to handle (see Bentall, 1990).
Thirdly, theories derived from ‘imagery’ studies, which postulate that 
hallucinations occur as a result of the misinterpretation of unusually intense normal 
mental imagery, have tended to produce conflicting results (Heilbrun, Blum, & Haas, 
1983; Slade, 1976), or have produced findings that could arguably be attributed to 
others factors (Bentall, 1990). Finally, ‘subvocalisation theories’, attempt to link the 
processes of inner speech with hallucinatory experiences, and have provided some 
evidence linking the processes involved in these two areas together (Gould, 1948, 
1949, 1950; Green & Preston, 1981; McGuigan, 1966), and further to neurological 
deficits in the brain (Green, Hallett & Hunter, 1983; Jaynes, 1979), but account only 
for one modality, namely auditory, as a forum for hallucination occurrence.
A more recent theory is that of Grossberg (2000), which argues that normal 
learning and memory contributes to a system that learns to match incoming 
perceptual (bottom-up) information of the immediate environment with self­
generated (top-down) sensory mental representations, to achieve the accurate 
interpretation of that environment. However, a breakdown, through “hyperactivity” 
of the system, in the modulation in perception of top-down or bottom-up 
information, is thought to lead to hallucinatory experiences. That is, hallucinations 
occur as a result of the diminished ability to distinguish self-generated information
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from that incoming from the environment; with a bottom-up interpretation wrongly 
attributed to a top-down processing of events (Grossberg, 2000). In addition, this 
model accounts for individual differences in hallucinatory content, arguing that 
varying vigilance across trials where these matching processes are learned, leads to 
differing degrees of generalization of stored exemplars, and hallucinatory content can 
then differ accordingly (Grossberg, 2000). For example, if vigilance is low, then the 
stored exemplar will be more general, such as of a type of person (male or female), 
however, if vigilance is high during learning, then this exemplar will be more 
specific, such as being a specific person (e.g., the individual’s brother).
Hallucinatory content is, then, thought to be linked to these generalizations, being 
more specific, or general, accordingly, such as hearing a relative, or a random voice 
(Grossberg, 2000).
An alternative approach to understanding hallucinations, delusions, and the 
processes that produce them comes from the neo-realism theory of consciousness 
(Tonneau, 2004). Tonneau (2004) argues that bizarre experiences occur as a product 
of past experiences where previously experienced objects or events are recombined 
with the current environment. This recombining occurs as a result of similar 
properties of previous experiences, where those properties can relate to those 
physical in nature such as colour and shape, or more abstract properties such as when 
the experience occurred and the co-occurrence of other events, having strong 
temporal links to those present in the current environment, which then leads to a 
mismatched interpretation of current experiences (Tonneau, 2004). Although not as 
widely researched as the above views (see section 3.3.1), there does seem to be some 
evidence to support the neo-realist account.
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3.3.2 Theories o f  delusions.
Theories of delusions fall into three main categories (Garety & Freeman,
1999), theories of: probabilistic bias (Garety & Hemsley, 1994); attributional style 
(Bentall, Kaney, & Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Kinderman 
& Bentall, 1996); and theory of mind (Frith, 1992). Older theories incorporate 
memories, affective moods, wishes of the individual (Freeman, 1981, 1990; Nelki, 
1988), and abnormal explanations of experiences (Maher, 1974; Matussek, 1952; see 
also, Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002).
The theory of a probabilistic reasoning bias was developed by Garety and 
colleagues (Garety, 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994), and argued while all delusions 
were unlikely to share a common cause; probabilistic reasoning was likely to 
contribute to their formation and maintenance. This approach incorporated past 
experience, affect, self-esteem, motivation, perception, judgement, selective attention 
and confirmation bias, arguing these factors, and interactions between them, as 
influential in delusion formation and maintenance, although the influence of these 
factors may differ in degree, depending on the type of delusions (see Garety & 
Freeman, 1999).
In exploring the theory, probabilistic reasoning tasks were implemented, 
following a Bayesian framework - incorporating elements of prior beliefs and 
information on the current environment, and participants were measured on the 
degree to which they “jumped to conclusions” within these tasks (Fear & Healey, 
1997; Peters, Day & Garety, 1997; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988; Garety, Hemsley 
& Wesseley, 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994). In general, deluded participants 
tended to make earlier judgements, with more confidence, than controls (Fear &
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Healey, 1997; Peters, Day & Garety, 1997; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988; Garety, 
Hemsley & Wesseley, 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
While similar tasks have supported the probabilistic theory (John & Dodgson, 
1994; Kemp, Chua, McKenna, & David, 1997; Young & Bentall, 1995), studies that 
have provided more information to participants have shown that, when information is 
available to participants, they are equally as able to use it as controls (Bentall & 
Young, 1996; Dudley, John, Young & Bentall, 1997). Overall, it appears that 
deluded subjects seem to acquire less information in decision-making when left to 
their own devices in data gathering, but, when more information is available, the 
tendency to jump to conclusions disappears.
Another attempt at explaining delusion formation and maintenance came 
from Bentall and colleagues, extending an earlier notion that delusions are a form of 
defence mechanism (Neale, 1988), and employing an attributional bias as a function 
of a self serving bias specifically orientated toward protecting the individual’s self­
esteem (see Bentall, Kaney, & Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). According to this theory, delusions are formed to 
maintain the self-esteem of the individual in order to avoid discrepancies between 
how they perceive themselves and how others perceive them (Bentall, Kaney, & 
Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). 
The result is the exaggeration of the self-serving bias (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 
1994); attributing negative events to external sources and positive events to the self 
(internal; Miller & Ross, 1975).
Experimental findings regarding this approach view have been mixed. Some 
results have shown that deluded subjects are more likely to attribute negative events 
externally, especially toward other people. However, they are not more likely to
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attribute positive events internally; suggesting the presence of an attributional bias, 
but not necessarily as a defence mechanism, and possibly more likely to serve the 
shaping of delusional content, as opposed to being a cause (see Garety & Freeman,
1999).
A third theory attempts to explain delusions as a deficit in theory of mind 
(Frith, 1992), focusing specifically on delusions of reference and persecution as an 
inability to correctly infer the beliefs, thoughts, or intentions of others (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). This theory stems from earlier work that argues that delusions arise 
from the processing of information within the current environment that normally 
would not be attended to (Frith, 1979; 1987). Normal thought processes then seek to 
explain these perceptions. Although there is some evidence to support the theory, 
such as poorer performance on theory of mind tasks in schizophrenic patients over 
controls (Corcoran, Cahill, & Frith, 1997; Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Doody, 
Gotz, Johnstone, Frith, & Cunningham-Owens, 1998; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; 
Langdon, Michie, Ward, McConaghy, Catts, & Coltheart, 1997; Mithchley, Barber, 
Gray, Brooks, & Livingstone, 1998; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche, & Widlocher, 
1997), this theory is largely un-investigated, and requires further research (Freeman 
& Garety, 1999).
3.4. Similarities between hallucinations and delusions
Given the difficulty in producing a specific definition of hallucinations and 
delusions, it is perhaps better to explain each symptom in terms of the research 
methods used in each field, and the theories that guide them. The difference between 
hallucinations and delusions lies in the interpretation of abnormal perceptual 
experiences, with some instances giving rise to reports of bizarre perceptual reports,
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whilst others see bizarre explanations given for events. This approach argues that 
hallucinations and delusions are the product of the same underlying mechanism, and 
postulates that hallucinatory experiences help to facilitate delusions. Such a notion 
has some empirical support (e.g., Ellis & Young, 1990; Ellis et al., 2000; Escher et 
al., 2002; Slade, 1972; 1973; Tarrier, 1987). In addition, clinical hallucinations are 
often reported as having the same underlying themes for each experience (Bentall, 
1990), suggesting that the interpretation of hallucinatory experiences contributes to 
the maintenance of a particular underlying belief.
In addition to an apparent contribution to the formation and maintenance of 
delusions by hallucinations, there is also evidence to suggest that the relationship 
operates in the opposite direction; with delusional beliefs facilitating the occurrence 
of hallucinations (Haddock, Slade & Bentall, 1995; Krabbendam, Arts, van Os and 
Aleman, 2004). Several studies regarding auditory hallucinations have highlighted a 
link between suggestibility and hallucinatory occurrence (Barber & Calverly, 1964; 
Haddock, Slade & Bentall, 1995; Jakes & Hemsley, 1986; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; 
Young, Bentall, Slade & Dewey, 1987). For example, Mintz and Alpert (1972; see 
also Young et al., 1987) used the ‘White Christmas’ task, where participants were 
told to listen to a recording of the song, which was not in actually played. Subjects 
who reported previous experiences of hallucinations were found to respond to the 
suggestion that the song was played, by reporting that they actually heard it. The fact 
that participants hallucinated in accordance with their beliefs implies that 
hallucinatory experiences can be influenced by expectancies about the environment, 
and, given that delusions reflect the understanding of the environment (Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994), it is perhaps not surprising that delusional beliefs can facilitate 
hallucinatory experiences.
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4 Similarities between theories of bizarre experiences
Although there are a number of different theories of how hallucinations and 
delusions occur (see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) there are also a number of similarities 
between these theories that contribute to bizarre experiences. For example,
Tonneau’s (2004) theory of consciousness argues that properties of previous 
experiences can interact with similar properties of the current environment to allow 
for hallucinatory occurrences. Similarly, Grossberg (2000) argues that hallucinations 
occur through a breakdown in the ability to accurately match incoming perceptual 
information of the current environment with self-generated sensory mental 
representations, and therefore resulting in a diminished ability to distinguish between 
self-generated information and that incoming from the current environment. In 
addition, seepage theories argue for the breakdown in the filtering process that leads 
to preconscious material interfering with the contents of consciousness (Bentall, 
1990; Frith, 1979; West, 1962, 1975), imagery theories argue for the contribution of 
unusually intense mental imagery (Bentall, 1990; Heilbrun, Blum, & Haas, 1983; 
Slade, 1976) and subvocalisation theories that argue for the influence of the 
interpretation and interference of inner speech on hallucination occurrence (Bentall, 
1990; Gould, 1948, 1949, 1950; Green & Preston, 1981; McGuigan, 1966), all of 
which seem to give some acknowledgment to the role of the interaction between 
internal processes and the current environment, albeit in varied specific forms.
Theories of delusions also argue for the interaction between the current 
environment and mental representations, including elements of previous experiences 
included in the theory of probabilistic reasoning (Garety, 1991; Garety & Hemsley,
1994), the perception of the self associated with the self-serving bias theory of 
delusions (Bentall, Kaney, & Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994;
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Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Miller & Ross, 1975), and the incongruence between 
the understanding and ability to infer the beliefs, thoughts or intentions of others as 
argued by the theory of mind approach to delusion occurrence (Frith, 1979, 1987, 
1992; Garety & Freeman, 1999).
Although there are some variety in the specifics of each of the theories 
attempting to account for hallucinations and delusions, there does seem to be some 
similarities regarding factors such as the influence of previous experiences, the 
current environment and the interaction between the two.
4.1 Previous experience
Firstly, in terms of occurrence, poor social adjustment and social anxiety have 
been found to be precursors for schizophrenia (Jones, Rodgers, Murray & Marmot, 
1994; Kugelmass et al, 1995; Malmberg, Lewis, David & Allebeck, 1998), whilst 
psychosis has been linked to previous periods of depression, anxiety and irritability 
(Birchwood, Macmillan & Smith, 1992; Docherty, Van Kammen, Siris & Marder, 
1978; Yung & McGorry, 1996a, 1996b; Freeman & Garety, 2003). This suggests 
that some elements of an individual’s previous experiences predict later hallucinatory 
occurrences.
Secondly, in terms of content, episodes of hallucinations in the clinical 
population are reported as following consistent themes (Bentall, 1990; Romme & 
Escher, 1993), argued to reflect previous experiences (Chadwick & Birchwood,
1994, 1995), be the product of disruption in the integration of memories and events 
in the current environment (Flemsley, 1993), or, specifically regarding auditory
36
hallucinations, the interference of stored linguistic information on current language 
production (Hoffman, 1986; Hoffman & Rapaport, 1994).
Freeman and Garety (2003) argue that the most common types of delusion 
are linked to emotional themes, and suggest that delusions are formed through the 
combination of an underlying bias associated with delusion formation and the 
emotional state of an individual. This latter point is also applied to hallucination 
formation, although to a lesser extent than delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
Although the majority of research into previous histories and the content of 
hallucinations and delusions, has focused on the relationship between content and 
underlying emotions, or content and trauma, Morrison et al. (2003) suggest that, 
although there appears to be a causal link between trauma and psychosis, this link 
may not be directly related to trauma per se, but to an individual’s personal 
developmental experiences in general. This would seem to suggest that previous 
experiences could indeed influence current hallucinatory experiences regardless of 
the specific topic.
In more detailed approaches regarding specific underlying themes of bizarre 
experiences, the relationship between content and underlying emotional factors, such 
as neuroticism, and previous traumatic experiences, have been highlighted (Freeman 
& Garety, 2003; Honig et al., 1998; Morrison et al, 2003; Read & Argyle, 1999). 
Some studies suggest the occurrence of hallucinations and delusions result from 
either a traumatic experience (Read & Argyle, 2003), or their memory (Honig et al, 
1998; Morrison et al, 2003), particularly events such as sexual abuse and childhood 
physical abuse (Read et al., 2002; Heins, Gray & Tennant, 1990; Sansonnet-Hayden, 
Haley, Marriage & Fine, 1987). In addition, both somatic delusions, such as 
parasitosis, and sex delusions, have been linked to previous experiences of sexual
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abuse and childhood incest (Beck & van der Kolk, 1987; Oruc & Bell, 1995), 
although these themes are less direct in terms of specific content.
4.2. Bizarre experiences and memory
An obvious research perspective to include when considering the content of 
hallucinations and delusions as being a product of past events would be memory 
research. While, high and low schizotypy scorers have not differed in performance 
on working memory and verbal recall tasks (Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000), some 
tasks have highlighted deficits in performance in high schizotypy scorers. Heilbrun 
(1980) found that individuals, prone to hallucinations, were less able to recognise 
their own statements taken in a previous interview than controls. Similarly, 
Morrison and Haddock (1997) showed that ‘hallucinators’ gave lower confidence 
ratings to words as being their own, especially when the words were emotionally 
salient. In addition, individuals prone to hallucinations have also been shown to 
mistake items (word-pairs) presented during a test phase, as being present during the 
presentation phase of a word-pair recall tasks (Bentall, Baker & Havers, 1991; 
Brebion, Amador, David, Malaspina, Sharif & Gorman, 2000a; Brebion, Smith, 
Amador, Malaspina, & Gorman, 1998; Brebion, Smith, Gorman, Malaspina, Sharif, 
& Amador, 2000b; Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995), and have reported the distorted 
playback of their own statements as being that of others (Allen, Freeman, Johns & 
McGuire, 2006; Johns & McGuire, 1999).
Perhaps of most interest when considering a neorealist approach to 
hallucinations, however, comes from research into prospective memory (PM), such 
as that reported by Wang et al. (2008). PM concerns remembering to perform an 
action in the future when a specific event occurs in the environment (event based
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PM), at a particular time (time based PM), or following the completion of another 
task (activity based PM). This is important in everyday situations, such as managing 
appointments, moving on to the next task following completion of another in work, 
and remembering to take medication at the correct time (Wang et al., 2008). Wang et 
al. (2008) found that high schizotypy scorers suffered from impaired performance 
across all three types of PM task. Although the majority of research into 
hallucinations and delusions consider the interpretation of events at the time of the 
experiences, the fact that high schizotypals show a deficit for remembering to 
perform intended actions under certain later circumstances, suggests that memory for 
past events may influence current behaviours or environmental interpretations. For 
example, forgetting to perform an action based on some previous experiences 
outright has obvious implications for important events, such as remembering to take 
medication. Moreover, if, in line with the neorealist account for consciousness, there 
is a deficit regarding the basic mechanisms in memory for previously experienced 
properties (of whatever nature) and their relationship to the current environment, 
then these deficits could lead to the misinterpretation of the current environment, in 
terms of sensory experiences, such as hallucinations, or more complicated 
experiences, such as delusions. Indeed, as discussed above, subjects prone to 
hallucinations have shown difficulty in remembering where items were presented in 
experimental tasks as well as recognising their own responses (Bentall, Baker & 
Havers, 1991; Brebion et al, 1998; Brebion, et al, 2000a; Brebion, et al, 2000b; 
Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995). It could be argued that in the instances described above, 
there is deficit in memory for hallucinating subjects for some properties of the task 
(the parts of the tasks where the stimuli were presented), whilst other properties of 
the tasks remained, such as remembering that the stimuli were present.
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4.3 Current environment
Support for the influence of the current environment on hallucinatory content 
comes from studies of the relationship between content and the dominant news 
stories in the media at the time (Skirrow et al, 2002), and in cross-cultural differences 
in the reports of hallucinatory content (Kent & Wahass, 1996). In addition, Garety 
and Hemsley (1994) argue that delusion sufferers relate objects in “some significant 
way”, and that these “feelings of relatedness, based on temporal or spatial contiguity 
between experiences, may proceed to an assumption of a causal relationship between 
them”. Furthermore, studies showing hallucinatory reports to be influenced by 
suggestion, propose that beliefs about current environments influence both 
hallucination occurrence and content (Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Young et al, 1987; 
Haddock et al., 1995).
Experimental tasks examining hallucinations in the non-clinical population 
have shown hallucinatory experiences to be related to expectancies of the current 
environment (Reed, Wakefiled, Harris, Parry, Celia, & Tsakanikos, 2008), 
environmental stimulation (Celia, Taylor & Reed, 2006; Skirrow et al, 2002), and 
prior suggestibility (van de Ven & Merckelbach, 2003; Young et al, 1987).
In addition, delusional experiences have been argued to be the result of a 
breakdown in the perceptual processing of experiences, which are then explained 
through normal thought processes (cf. Chapman & Chapman, 1988; Freeman, 1981; 
1990; Frith, 1979, 1987, 1992; Hemsley, 1987; Maher, 1974; Matussek, 1952; Nelki, 
1988; Salzinger, 1984). In this context, delusion formation is suggested to result 
from either, a breakdown of the perceptual context of experiences (Mattusek, 1952; 
Salzinger, 1984), explaining unusually intense sensory input (Chapman & Chapman,
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1988; Maher, 1974), or attending to stimuli that would not normally be attended to 
(Frith, 1979; 1987; 1992).
4.4 Combination of past and present
Although several current theories of hallucinations and delusions agree that 
previous experiences interact with the current environment to contribute to formation 
of bizarre experiences, reasons why specific past events and properties of the current 
environment give rise to hallucinations and delusions are less agreeable. However, 
one approach to hallucinations, through the neo-realist account for consciousness 
(Tonneau, 2004), suggests that temporal links between the past and present 
environment may play a role, with these temporal links between past experiences and 
the current environment, in individuals who suffer from hallucinations, being 
stronger than in individuals who do not experiences hallucinations.
Taken together then, this implies that properties of previous experiences and 
the current environment somehow compete, and in the case of properties of previous 
experiences emerging dominant, misinterpretations in the form of hallucinations 
subsequently occur. This raises the issue concerning how and why particular 
properties are favoured. Moreover, if the strength of the temporal link to properties 
of previous experiences contributes to hallucination formation, as well as the 
properties of the previous experiences themselves, then this might suggests that some 
previous experiences should have stronger temporal links to the present, allowing for 
the competition between properties of previous experiences and the current 
environment to take place. Taking the latter point from the neorealist account for 
consciousness, that hallucinations are influenced by stronger temporal links between 
properties of the current environment and previous experiences, it would be expected
41
that individuals more prone to hallucinatory experiences, such as high schizotypals, 
would show differences in timing compared to those less prone to such experiences. 
This is because, if the occurrence of hallucinatory experiences according to the 
neorealist account depends on the strength of the temporal link between properties of 
previous experiences and properties of the current environment, then these strong 
temporal links should be evident in individuals prone to hallucinations and could 
manifest in one of two ways. Firstly, it could be that the strength of the temporal link 
may be a result of a shorter subjective time having passed between the properties of 
previous experiences and those of the current environment. Secondly, it could be that 
properties of previous experiences are simply judged to have occurred later on the 
temporal path, and thus misjudged to have occurred closer to events in the current 
environment, in individuals prone to hallucinations. This would have implications for 
the neorealist account for hallucinations by highlighting the nature of the temporal 
links between properties of previous experiences and the current environment as 
manifesting as either a result of a physical timing mechanism difference between 
individuals or as an issue of memory or decision-making. Either way, the outcome 
would be that individuals prone to hallucinations subjectively experience the 
properties of previous experiences as closer to the events occurring within the current 
environment.
5. Timing
The implications for hallucinations described by the neorealist approach to 
consciousness therefore suggest a role for previous experiences along the “temporal 
path” on current environmental interpretations (Tonneau, 2004). That is, properties 
of an individual’s previous experiences somehow interact with those of the current
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environment to produce misinterpretations of that environment. This approach 
implies that mechanisms of timing contribute toward the occurrence and content of 
hallucinations, through some form of interaction between common properties of 
previous experiences and the current environment, and the strength of the temporal 
link between the current environment and previous experiences. Given this 
possibility it would be useful then to examine timing within the context of 
schizotypy, as this may illuminate differences in timing processes between high and 
low schizotypy scorers, and allow for further investigation of hallucinations within 
this context. In addition, although timing has been examined in schizophrenia 
sufferers (e.g. Densen, 1977; Freedman, 1974; Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Sieg, 1980; 
Carroll, Boggs, O’Donnell, Shekhar & Hetrick, 2008; Elevag, McCormack, Gilbert, 
Brown, Weinberger & Goldberg, 2003; Waters & Jablensky, 2009), and in non- 
clinical individuals (Lee, Dixon, Spence & Woodruff, 2006; Penney, Meek, Roberts, 
Gibbon, Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 2005), it remains a relatively untouched field of 
research. Moreover, exploration of a timing influence on hallucinatory and 
delusional content may also help to shed light on how and why content arises along 
recurring themes (Bentall, 1990), in line with underlying beliefs, or in understanding 
of the current environment (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1994). For 
example, strong temporal links between the occurrence of hallucinations and 
delusions may facilitate the reoccurrence of particular content or reflect underlying 
beliefs or environmental understanding.
5.1 Hallucinations, past experience and timing
Hallucinatory and delusional experiences vary in content between individuals 
(Bentall, 1990; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Romme, 1993; Skirrow et al, 2002), and, in
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the case of hallucinations, even occur across different sensory modalities (APA, 
1994). This seems to suggest that the individual, which for the case of the neo-realist 
account for consciousness, would suggest that the properties of previous experiences 
that are prevalent during current misperceived events differ between individuals, 
defines hallucinatory content. The temporal element of hallucinations, however, 
could also contribute to the understanding of the reasons why hallucinatory and 
delusional experiences occur, with a stronger link between previous experiences and 
current events inducing, and interacting, with the relevant properties, to facilitate 
hallucinatory and/or delusional experiences.
One way in which the strength of the temporal link between previous experiences 
and current events could be affected is through a slower timing mechanism. In 
these terms, a slower timing mechanism would mean a shorter subjective temporal 
link between an individuals previous experiences and the current environment. 
Alternatively, it could be that properties of previous experiences are simply 
judged, perhaps due to the memory or decision-making processes associated with 
timing (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden, 1991a, 1991b), to have occurred later on the 
temporal path and thus closer to events in the current environment without a direct 
involvement of a timing mechanism. If this is the case then the strength of the 
temporal link between previous experiences and the current environment would 
take the form of issues involving memory and decision-making processes. Either 
way however, properties of previous experiences would have stronger temporal 
links with the properties of the current environment, which would, in turn, lead to 
an increased likelihood of integration between these past and present properties. 
Hallucinations and delusions would then occur in the form of misinterpretations
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of the current environment, resultant of an integration of the properties of 
previous experiences with those of the current environment.
5.2 Timing and schedules
Many theories of timing stem from the work of B.F. Skinner (see Ferster & 
Skinner, 1957; Skinner, 1938), and subsequent followers of the behavioural 
approach, through the development of operant conditioning and, more specifically, 
schedules of reinforcement that incorporate a temporal element (see Lejeune, 
Richelle, & Wearden, 2006). Schedules of reinforcement produce reliable and 
distinctive patterns of responding (see Ferster & Skinner, 1957), and deviations from 
these distinctive patterns can offer insight into processes, and deficits, that determine 
behaviour. Fixed-interval (FI) schedules of reinforcement, as a function of equal 
temporal spacing of reinforcement availability, typically produce, after training, 
response patterns characteristic of little or no responding earlier in the period leading 
to reinforcement with an increase in responding leading to the time that 
reinforcement is made available (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Important to note, here, 
is that non-reinforced responses made during the period leading to reinforcement 
have no bearing on the availability of reinforcement. In contrast, a differential- 
reinforcement of low rate responding (DRL) schedule allows for potentially equal 
spacing of reinforcement availability, but only when there is no responding during a 
pre-set temporal period on the schedule (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). For example, a 
DRL-10s schedule would require a period of no responding for ten seconds before 
the next response would be reinforced, whilst an FI-10s schedule would reinforce the 
first response made after ten seconds regardless of prior responding. Examples of 
research using these schedules has covered detailed manipulations of the schedules
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such as how reinforcement signalling (Reed, 1989; Reed, 2003; Reed, Strachtman & 
Hall, 1988), and reinforcement magnitude shapes responding (Reed & Wright,
1988), and how response sequencing can be shaped by schedule parameters 
(Schwartz, 1982).
However, experiments examining human performance on schedules of 
reinforcement often produce varied and different patterns of behaviour to those 
exhibited by nonhumans; with verbal rule formation, and a variety of learning 
histories outside the laboratory, thought to contribute to these differences (see 
Raia, Shillingford, Miller, & Baier, 2000). For example, Lippman & Meyer 
(1967) illustrated how instructions administered to participants prior to exposure 
to a FI reinforcement schedule subsequently produced both high and low rate of 
response, with a response pattern of a high constant rate without post­
reinforcement pause exhibited when subjects were told that reinforcement (in the 
form of points) was dependent on a certain number of responses, whilst a pattern 
of low rate responses with a post reinforcement pause was exhibited when 
participants were told that reinforcement would be received after a certain amount 
of time had passed since the previous reinforcement (see also, Weiner, 1969). 
Moreover, Lippman & Meyer (1967) also showed that when participants were not 
given prior instructions, those that produced high response rate patterns with no 
post-reinforcement pause verbally stated that they believed a certain number of 
responses were required to obtain reinforcement whilst those that produced low 
response rate patterns with a post-reinforcement pause (correctly) stated that a 
certain amount of time was required to pass before they would receive 
reinforcement. As well as the influence of verbal rule formation and instructions, 
reinforcement histories are also thought to contribute to between species
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differences in reinforcement schedule response patterns. This line of thinking 
extends to the numerous potential exposures to reinforcement schedules 
throughout everyday human experience, but has also been shown directly in 
experiments where prior exposure to different reinforcement schedules act as 
controlling variables for later responding on a FI schedule of reinforcement (see 
Weiner, 1969). As well as reinforcement histories and verbal rule formation, other 
factors have also been argued to potentially contribute to reasons why human 
performance on reinforcement schedules differ from that of nonhumans, such as 
age, gender, socio-economic status, educational background and personality 
(Baron, Perone & Galizio, 1991), all of which have led some researchers to 
question the usefulness of human subjects in the study of the principles of 
behaviour analysis (e.g. Davey, 1988; Lowe, 1979; Wearden, 1988).
One potentially important, and little investigated, factor that might contribute 
to the apparent variety of human schedule performance are individual differences in 
specific personality characteristics (Baron et al, 1991); in this case, with regard to 
schizotypy (see Chapter 1 and 2). Schizotypal characteristics could affect basic 
schedule behaviour in a number of ways, for example, high scores in introvertive 
anhedonia, or impulsive non-conformity, could produce lower rates of responding as 
these subscales are associated with a lack of motivation, and a tendency to rebel 
against the norm respectively (Mason et al, 1995). In addition, identifying 
differences in schedule performance between high and low schizotypy scorers could 
aid the understanding of the basic mechanisms underlying schizotypal 
characteristics.
The pattern of behaviour produced by FI schedule performance is temporally 
differentiable, that is, the pattern is dependent on the temporal element of the
47
schedule, as evident in the response patterns produced by the FI schedule, with less 
responding toward the start of each trial which subsequently increases toward the end 
of the period before reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Schwartz, 1982). As 
Lejeune et al. (2006) point out; this suggests that there is some sort of discrimination 
occurring between the earlier and later at each point on the schedule. It seems, then, 
that the temporal element plays a role in producing response rates on schedules of 
reinforcement, but the exact nature of how time is regarded has been the source of 
much debate, especially in terms of what the timing mechanism actually is (Dragoi, 
Staddon, Palmer & Buhusi, 2003; Gibbon, 1977; Killeen & Feterman, 1988; Lejeune 
et al 2006; Machado, 1997; Staddon & Higa, 1999; Staddon, Chelaru , & Higa, 
2002).
To give an example, in discussing the development of the FI schedule, 
Skinner (1938) suggests that periods of no responding may be reinforced, a notion 
which subsequently led to the development of differential-rate-of-other-behaviour 
and fixed-time schedules of reinforcement, among others, which vary in the degree 
that responding is connected to reinforcement and, in fact, require periods of 
diminished, or no, responding in order for reinforcement to be made available (see 
Lejeune et al., 2006). This idea has led further to the study of periods of other 
indirect behaviours, or periods of no responding, and their relationship with timing; 
following the notion that responding and periods of no-responding or other 
behaviours are grouped in such a way that provides for temporal discrimination (e.g. 
Dragoi et al., 2003).
However, although the origins of the existing literature on timing can be 
attributed to the development of temporally controlled schedules, it is also worth 
noting that some previous researchers have argued that timing should be examined
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beyond the context of schedules of reinforcements (Platt, 1979; Stubbs, 1979). In 
addition, although the radical behavioural approaches to timing mentioned above 
provide a compelling argument for a theory of timing, theories arguing from an 
internal process standpoint are equally compelling and make use of experimental 
tasks beyond the schedule context. Indeed, the dominant theory within the timing 
literature is that of scalar expectance theory (SET), which argues for the presence of 
an internal clock, in the form of a pacemaker-accumulator mechanism, alongside a 
role for memory and decision making processes (Gibbon, 1977). Given this 
fundamental debate between the incorporation of an internal mechanism, it would be 
useful here to outline the existing theories of timing.
5.2.1 Behavioural timing theories
Killeen and Feterman’s (1988) Behavioural Timing Theory (BeT) argues that 
adjunctive behaviours (behaviours judged to be a result of the schedule, but not 
directly related to the delivery of reinforcement), controlled by a pacemaker, act as 
cues for responding on a schedule of reinforcement, with the reinforcement rate 
defining the pacemaker speed (Killeen & Feterman, 1988). However, the theory also 
highlights the possibility of other factors influencing the behavioural state transitions, 
other than the pacemaker speed, which could then result in revisited states, or even 
states that are not activated long enough for the associated behaviour to be emitted 
(Killeen & Feterman, 1993; Lejeune et al., 2006).
Machado (1997) constructed the learning to time (LeT) model, in an attempt 
to move away from the influence of an internal pacemaker. Instead, the LeT model 
argues that following reinforcement, a “time-marker”, such as the prediction of a 
significant biological event (or the event itself), cues the activation of a series of
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consecutive behavioural states that each entail their own level of activation and 
association to the operant response (Machado, 1997; Machado & Keen, 1999). 
Responding then occurs when the level of activation of the current behavioural state 
and the associative link between that state and the operant response is sufficiently 
strong (Machado, 1997; Machado & Keen, 1999).
The adaptive timer model (ATM; Dragoi et al, 2003) argues that interval 
timing emerges as a product of non-temporal learning processes, through the 
competition between reinforced and other behaviour. As a result of this competition, 
sequences of reinforced, or other, behaviours occur, depending on the strength of the 
previous reinforcement history for each, and upon a decay parameter that controls the 
alternation between both behaviours, the strength of which is affected by the rate of 
reinforcement (Dragoi et al., 2003).
Finally, a theory of timing that moves away for the notion of an internal 
clock, but instead argues for the influence of another internal process, namely 
memory, is Staddon and Higa’s (1999), Multiple Time Scale model (MTS), and it’s 
derivative, the Tuned-Trace model (TTM; Staddon et al, 2002). Taken together, the 
MTS argues that, through incorporating habituation and short-term memory, interval 
timing is a product of the memory for reinforced and non-re inforced responses, 
whilst the TTM adds a decay element of the memory trace in applying the model to a 
series of schedule tasks (Staddon et al, 2002).
In summary then, one of the existing theories of timing, the LeT model 
(Machado, 1997), argues that temporal functioning from a purely behavioural 
viewpoint, stating that timing is a product of transitions between behavioural states 
and associated links with the required responses. The remaining theories however, 
although similar, argue the case for some form of internal timing mechanism but
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disagree on the details of this process, with some form of memory or pacemaker 
process the common point of debate.
5.2.2 Scalar expectancy theory
As noted above, the most dominant theory within the timing literature, 
however, is that of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET; Gibbon, 1977, 1991). This 
theory argues for the presence of a mechanism, much like that of an internal clock; 
that is; a pacemaker mechanism that sends “pulses” to an accumulator, and also 
incorporates a memory and decision-making components that compares the value in 
the accumulator to previously stored representations of time (Gibbon, 1977). This 
theory also emphasizes a scalar property defined as a form of Weber’s Law; where 
the standard deviation of time increases as a function of the mean, although 
considerations of this are also included within other theories (Dragoi et al, 2003; 
Gibbon, 1977; Killeen & Feterman’s, 1988; Lejeune et al., 2006; Machado, 1997; 
Staddon & Higa, 1999; Staddon et al, 2002).
Advantages for the SET model over other theories comes from the ability of 
SET to provide more detail in the nature of timing differences between populations 
and in research that illustrates and manipulates the speed of the internal clock (Droit- 
Volet & Wearden, 2002; Droit-Volet, Clement & Wearden, 2001; Meek, 1983; 
Penton-Voak, Edwards, Percival & Wearden, 1996; Treisman, Faulker, Naish & 
Brogan, 1990; Wearden, 1992; Wearden, Denovan, Fakhri, & Haworth, 1997; 
Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995; Wearden, Wearden & Rabbitt, 1997; but see also 
Wearden, 2003). For example, Wearden (2003) illustrates how SET can be used to 
show not only that there are differences in performance on a temporal generalization 
task between age groups but also shows how these groups differ thus providing
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“theoretically meaningful comparisons of the behaviour of different groups, thus 
going much further than the usual final conclusion that different groups differ in 
performance” (Wearden, 2003: 4).
More specifically, SET also provides an explanation of the kinds of processes 
that are occurring when humans and non-humans are performing on timing tasks by 
using statistical modelling that mathematically reflects the components of the timing 
process (i.e. clock speed, memory and decision making; Gibbon, 1977; Meek, 1983; 
Wearden, 1991a, 1991b, 2003). Meek (1983) illustrated how pharmaceutical 
manipulations through several types of drug could illustrate the changes in the 
various components of SET to effect timing in rats, by employing a “state-change” 
paradigm that trained rats to discriminate between two signals presented for a “short” 
and “long” amount of time whilst either under the influence of a particular drug or 
having been administered a saline injection. Subjects were then tested either under 
the same conditions or with the drug or saline administration reversed for half the 
subjects (see Meek, 1983). Application of SET to the results allows for the 
discrimination between the underlying processes, namely internal clock speed or 
memory storage of times, as the relevant process of the results under each of the 
pharmaceutical conditions (Meek, 1983). This is because, where clock speed is the 
relevant process, when trained in a normal state (saline condition) the subjective time 
measured by the internal clock (t) directly reflects the objective time (T) and the 
reference memory for reinforced times (M) accurately stores t values for later use 
during the decision-making stage, whilst the clock constant (K) and memory constant 
(Y) are equal to 1 (Meek, 1983). Then, when later tested under a condition where 
clock speed has increased, the relationship between t and T alters so that t > T, but 
the previous trained relationship between M and T remains unaffected, as a result,
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when comparisons during testing are made between M and t, an overestimation of 
objective time occurs (Meek, 1983). Similarly, when clock speed is decreased during 
the testing phase, the relationship between t and T becomes t < T and an 
underestimation of objective time then occurs (Meek, 1983). Alternatively, under 
conditions that alter the memory for timed periods, when an increase in the memory 
constant (Y) occurs the relationship between M and t will change so that M < t and 
an underestimation of t therefore occurs, whilst a decrease in Y would lead to M > t 
and an overestimation of t would occur (Meek, 1983). Statistical modelling of SET to 
the results across four experiments showed that methamphetamine and haloperidol 
can effect clock speed, increasing and decreasing clock speed respectively, whilst 
vasopressin, oxytocin and physostigmine can selectively decrease the remembered 
durations of reinforced times and that atropine can selectively increase those 
durations (Meek, 1983).
Research into temporal bisection and temporal generalisation tasks with 
human subjects have also explored the underlying processes of the comparisons 
between the standard and experimental phase stimuli presentation lengths (Wearden 
& Ferrara, 1995, 1996). These tasks involve typically, although not always (Wearden 
& Ferrara, 1995), a training phase, where a stimulus is presented for a length of time 
defined as a standard (typically the shortest and longest of a range in bisection 
experiments and the mid-point of a range in generalisation experiments) followed by 
an experimental phase where the rest of the range is presented (Allan & Gibbon, 
1991; Wearden, 1991a, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995). Participants are then 
required to choose between “short” or “long” options in relation to which standard 
they feel that the current presentations length is closer to in bisection experiments, or 
“same” or “different” options in relation to the standard for the current presentation
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length for generalisation experiments (Wearden, 1991a). Analysing the results of 
these experiments in accordance with SET have shown that, for example, participants 
may not be comparing the current presentation length with the shortest and longest 
standards on temporal bisection tasks, but some average of the two instead 
(Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995). In addition, SET includes an 
assumption that the pacemaker component of the model generates pulses at random 
but that the rate at which this occurs is on average accurate (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden, 
Edwards, Fakrhi & Percival, 1998). As a result, slower pacemaker rates have been 
shown to produce more variable temporal estimates from trial to trial and can 
therefore be used as an index of pacemaker speed provided that this assumption is 
maintained (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden et al, 1998). This notion can be specifically 
applied to temporal bisection tasks as these tasks allow for the calculation of specific 
indices of timing behaviour, such as the Weber ratio which is an index of the 
variability of participants “short” or “long” responses and thus providing an 
indication of individual differences in clock speed (Ferrara, Lejeune & Wearden, 
1997; Wearden, 2004; Wearden, Rogers & Thomas, 1997).
5.2.3 Timing and schizophrenia
Although the primary aim of the present thesis is to examine potential timing 
differences between those who score high on self-reports of hallucinatory and 
delusional experiences, it is worth considering the factors from the above theories 
that have already been shown to differ between schizophrenia sufferers and controls, 
and between individuals differing in levels of schizotypy.
In terms of the memory component included in the SET, MTS and TTM 
models, differences in memory performance have been found between individuals
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differing in proneness to hallucinations across a variety of memory tasks (Bentall, 
Baker, & Havers, 1991; Brebion et al, 1998; Brebion et al 2000a, 2000b; Rankin &
O’Carroll, 1995; Wang et al., 2008). Similarly, hallucinations have recently been 
associated with deficits in directed forgetting tasks (see Soriano, Jiminez, Roman, & 
Bajo, 2009), which may have some scope for research in line with the decay 
elements of the ATM, MTS, and TTM timing models.
Research into habituation, over a variety of tasks, such as the acoustic startle 
response (Takahashi, Iwase, Ishii, Ohi, Fukumoto, Azechi et al., 2008), and pre-pulse 
inhibition (Moriwaki, Kishi, Takahashi, Hashimoto, Kawashima, Okochi et al., 
2009), have shown that schizophrenia sufferers, and individuals with a higher degree 
of psychosis proneness, hold a deficit in habituation on these tasks (Allen, Freeman, 
& McGuire, 2006; Kunugi, Tanaka, Hori, Hashimoto, Saitoh & Hironaka, 2007; 
Moriwaki et al., 2009; Taiminen, Jaaskelainen, Ilonen, Meyer, Karlsson, Lauerma et 
al., 2000; Takahashi et al., 2008). If this effect of habituation extends to those 
processes associated with timing, as described by the MTS and TTM models, then 
high scorers on unusual experiences may hold a timing deficit accordingly.
Deficits in decision making and their contribution to delusions and 
hallucinations have already been discussed here (see section 3.3.2), but within the 
SET context, if deficits in decision-making do exist, then it could be that timing in 
high scorers in schizotypy is similarly difficult when making decisions between 
present and past interval comparisons.
In terms of behavioural states, the strength of the arousal component of the 
LeT model could extend to findings of increased arousal in those highly prone to 
hallucinations, in the same way that stressful life events, such as bereavement of a 
loved one, or involvement in military conflict, have brought on hallucinatory
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episodes in previously unaffected individuals (Belenky, 1979; Comer, Madow, & 
Dixon, 1967; Cooklin, Sturgeon, & Leff, 1983; Grimby, 1993, 1998; Reese, 1971; 
Siegel, 1984; Toone, Cooke, & Lader, 1981). Interestingly here, emotional arousal is 
also implicated in altered perceptions of time (see Droit-Volet & Meek, 2007; 
Wearden, 2001). Similarly, the associative links implicated between behavioural 
states and responding as part of the LeT model also draws parallels with research 
regarding hallucinations and delusions linking unusual experiences with existing 
underlying beliefs and emotional states (e.g. Freeman et al., 2002; Grimby, 1993, 
1998; Heilbrun et al., 1986).
Although the above discussion points toward some similarities between some 
factors of the existing models of timing and findings from hallucinations, delusions, 
schizotypy, and schizophrenia, the links are still tenuous, and without further 
research into the similarities between these processes remain speculative. A starting 
point, however, given that the one thing that all of the above models have in common 
is an account for timing, would be to examine the potential differences in timing 
between high and low scorers in unusual experiences, across several tasks.
Clinical observations of schizophrenic patients have noted a tendency to 
report some degree of time distortion (Freedman, 1974; Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Sieg, 
1980). Early research with schizophrenic patients reported differences in time 
estimation between schizophrenic patients and controls (Lhamon & Goldstone, 1956; 
Rabin, 1957; Weinstein, Goldstone & Boardman, 1958; Dilling & Rabin, 1967; 
Normington, 1967; Densen, 1977; Waters & Jablensky, 2009). However, such early 
experiments did not pay attention to consistent methodologies and terminologies, 
meaning that the generalizations of these findings are somewhat limited or are in 
need of stricter controls for further exploration.
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Several studies that took these factors into account, have shown that 
schizophrenic patients, and those at risk of developing schizophrenia, hold a 
tendency toward overestimating the passage of time across different types of tasks 
(Tysk, 1983; Wahl and Sieg, 1980). Although it should be noted that these findings 
are dependent on the modality through which the experimental stimuli are presented; 
with those defined as high-risk to develop schizophrenia showing an increased 
tendency toward shorter time estimations for visual stimuli, when compared to 
auditory stimuli presented for the same duration (Penny et al, 2005).
6. Aims of Current thesis
Given these findings, it seems that there is some scope for further research 
into timing differences between high and low schizotypy scorers, particularly in line 
with hallucinations and delusions as measured by the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B, 
in order to better understand the influence of timing processes within a schizotypy 
framework. Moreover, developments in theories of timing, and the methodologies 
used to explore them, allow for more detailed analysis of these differences, and for 
more detailed exploration of the underlying processes that influence timing, and that 
may, subsequently, be found to differ between high and low schizotypy scorers. For 
example, the use of chronometric counting, which examines timing below the 
threshold of counting seconds (see Wearden, 1991a). The present thesis therefore 
sought to explore the potential for differences in timing between high and low 
scorers on a self-report measure of schizotypy, the OLIFE-B, with particular focus 
on the unusual experiences (UE) subscale, within the context that hallucinations and 
delusions may occur within a neo-realist like framework of consciousness, albeit at a 
foundation level.
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Chapter 2 aimed to illustrate the usefulness of the OLIFE-B, within the 
current context, by examining differences between high and low scorers on the UE 
subscale, and the degree to which they made false reports when listening to a series 
of words played against a background of white noise. This chapter also incorporated 
a contextual element with regard to the words (abstract or concrete) to give an extra 
dimension, namely, whether or not false reports of words would relate to the 
underlying context of the words actually presented.
Chapter 3 examined differences in performance between high and low 
schizotypy scorers on a yoked RR-RI schedules of reinforcement, taking into account 
differences in response patterns that may be a product of a lack of temporal element 
within the RR schedule, as opposed to the RI schedule. This chapter also 
incorporated a measure of the degree to which participants were aware of the 
contingency on which they were performing, that is; the optimal strategy on which to 
gain reinforcement. Chapter 4 sought to expand on this analysis by exploring two 
schedules of reinforcement with a strong temporal element (FI and DRL), to further 
explore the influence of level of UE score on timing performance within the schedule 
context.
Chapter 5 then sought to explore the already established differences in timing 
performance based around the temporal element of schedules of reinforcement by 
removing the schedule context, and exploring differences within performance in a 
pure timing task, namely temporal bisection. Incorporation of this experiment was 
particularly useful as it allowed for more exploration as to the nature of the timing 
differences between high and low UE scorers, in terms of a slower or faster timing 
mechanism in high schizotypy scorers or a result of memory and/or decision-making 
processes.
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The present thesis then aimed to show that high schizotypy scorers, more 
prone to reporting hallucinatory and delusional experiences, would show differences 
in timing compared to low scorers and that this difference would manifest either in 
the form of a slower timing mechanism or in line with memory and decision-making 
processes associated with timing, with a view to providing a foundation for future 
research into the potential influence of timing on hallucinations and delusions.
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Chapter 2: The Effect o f Local Environmental Context in
Individuals Scoring High in Schizotypy.
2.1 Introduction
Given the correspondence between schizotypal traits and schizophrenic 
symptoms, as noted in Chapter 1, using schizotypy as a model for researching 
schizophrenia may be useful; particularly in avoiding the confounds encountered in 
schizophrenia sufferers (e.g., medication, etc.), and in allowing the examination of 
specific characteristics, or symptoms, on any number of behavioural or cognitive 
phenomena. One measure of schizotypy is the OLIFE which focuses on personality 
characteristics associated with the symptoms of schizophrenia in healthy individuals 
(see chapter 1, section 2.2; Mason et al, 1995) across four subscales relating to 
positive (UE), cognitive (CD), negative (IA) and impulsive non-conformist (IN) 
characteristics. Similarly, the OLIFE-B measures these characteristics in the normal 
population, but across a reduced number of items than the full OLIFE and, like the 
OLIFE, high scores on the OLIFE-B are taken as a higher degree of psychosis- 
proneness in individuals (Mason et al, 2005; Mason & Claridge, 2006).
A substantial number of non-clinical individuals report hallucinatory 
experiences (Posey & Losch, 1983). In particular, those non-clinical individuals 
scoring highly on the unusual experiences sub-scale of the OLIFE scale reported 
elevated numbers of such experiences (e.g., Celia, Taylor & Reed, 2007), which 
potentially allow for detailed experimental analysis regarding hallucinations, without 
interference from other confounding variables associated with schizophrenia.
In experimental investigations of auditory hallucinations, participants are 
exposed to auditory stimuli, and their reports of words, or sounds, which are not
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actually present are noted (Barber & Calverley, 1964; Bentall & Slade, 1985; Johns 
& McGuire, 1999). Although the factors linking the likelihood of hallucinatory 
experiences occurring have been examined (e.g., Reed, Wakefield, Harris, Parry, 
Celia & Tsakanikos, 2008), the underlying factors related to specific hallucinatory 
content are less well understood (Slade & Bentall, 1988). In part, the relative lack of 
experimental investigation may be attributed to the fact that hallucinatory 
experiences often differ between individuals (Hamilton, 1984), thus, providing 
content inconsistencies that make empirical research difficult.
Obviously, the mechanisms concerning hallucination manifestation involve 
an interaction between the individual and the environmental characteristics. Skirrow 
et al. (2002) found that hallucinatory content reported by patients in an intensive care 
unit were directly linked to the predominant media events at the time. However, the 
occurrence of such vivid, specific, and complex hallucinations in the laboratory, 
using a non-clinical population, is unlikely. Moreover, a procedure that could be 
used for the environmental control more specifically than through noting 
relationships to current media-reported events, would be desirable.
An additional issue regarding the interaction between the individual and 
environmental characteristics more specifically is that of imagery. Although some 
previous research, such as that by Skirrow et al (2002), suggest that the environment 
facilitates the occurrence of hallucinations through invoking intense mental imagery, 
the relationship between imagery and hallucinations across other modalities, such as 
in the auditory form, is less well understood. For example, words differ in the degree 
to which they are associated with mental imagery, the most obvious example being 
names of objects that therefore have additional visual representations. However, 
auditory hallucinations often occur in the form of meaningful sentences (Stephane,
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Thurras, Nasrallah, Georgopoulos, 2003) which require the use of a variety of word 
types, varying in the degree of association to additional visual representation, in 
order to make grammatical sense. More complex mechanisms may be at work when 
auditory hallucinations occur therefore, in terms of the relationship between word 
imagery and hallucinatory content. In addition, the level of imagery, such as names 
of objects that are strictly stimulus-bound (e.g. “chair”), or words that are not 
stimulus bound but nevertheless provoke high imagery (e.g. “love”; Paivio, Yuille & 
Madigan, 1968), may also affect hallucinatory content differently, although the 
influence of imagery on hallucinatory content has been called into question 
previously (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Merckelbach and van de Ven, 2001; Mintz & 
Alpert, 1972; Posey & Losch, 1983). Nonetheless, further exploration into the 
relationship between concreteness and imagery on hallucinatory content in line with 
the context in which these words are presented (concrete versus abstract, high versus 
low imagery) would benefit from further exploration.
Of the tasks that have been used to study hallucinations, one that offers good 
potential to study the content of hallucinations produced in different contexts, is an 
adaptation of the verbal summator. Skinner (1936) used the “verbal summator” to 
play vowel sounds, barely audible, or set against background noise, to psychiatric 
patients who then made meaningful responses, in the form of words or sentences, 
when hearing the stimuli. The summator paradigm holds an advantage over previous 
paradigms as it: avoids leading participants in terms of content, as in the “White 
Christmas” task (Barber & Calverely, 1964); focuses solely on hallucinatory content 
as opposed to source (Johns & McGuire, 1999); uses several items of stimuli as 
opposed to one (Bentall & Slade, 1985); and uses meaningful, as opposed to 
ambiguous, stimuli (Skinner, 1936).
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The present study, therefore, hoped to accomplish two main objectives.
Firstly, it is hoped to develop a technique for the examination of hallucinations in a 
non-clinical population, specifically to show that those with high schizotypal scores 
exhibit a greater proneness to hallucinations than those with low scores in schizotypy 
(thus, helping to validate the OLIFE-B as a measurement instrument). Secondly it is 
hoped to experimentally examine the relationship between environment and 
hallucinatory content; specifically to investigate if the predominate content of the 
environment has an impact on the types of hallucinations that are produced, 
regarding concreteness (Experiment 1), or visual-imagery (Experiment 2).
2.2 General Methodology
2.2.1 Measures
2.2.1.1 Schizotypy. The 43-item version of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (OLIFE-B; Mason et al, 2005) assessed hallucination- 
proneness through the unusual experiences (UE) subscale. The OLIFE-B also 
measures cognitive disorganisation (CD), introvertive anhedonia (IA), and impulsive 
nonconformity (IN) and has an internal reliability (Cronbach a ) of between 0.62 & 
0.8, and a concurrent validity of between 0.9 and 0.94 (UE a  = 0.8, validity = 0.94; 
CD, a  = 0.77, validity = 0.93; IA, a  = 0.62, validity = 0.91; IN, a  = 0.63, validity = 
0.9; Mason et al, 2005. For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal 
reliability (Cronbach a) of the OLIFE-was comparable to the range outlined above 
a  = 0.69.
2.2.1.2 Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) was administered. The BDI is a 21-item questionnaire with
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a four-point scoring scale (0-3) per question and a total range of 0-63. The internal 
reliability (Cronbach a).of the scale is between 0.73 & 0.92, and a concurrent 
validity of between 0.55 to 0.73 for non-psychiatric subjects (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 
1988). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the BDI was comparable to the range outlined above, a  = 0.75.
2.2.1.3 Anxiety. The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
1983) rates the affective, cognitive, and physiological manifestations of anxiety in 
terms of their long-standing patterns (i.e., trait anxiety). Each item is scored between 
1 (not at all) and 4 (very much so) with regard to item intensity, and the total score 
can range from 20 to 80. The internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the scale is 0.93, 
and a concurrent validity = 0.52 to 0.8 (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). 
Measures of depression and anxiety were included as a controlling measure for 
statistical analysis on hallucinatory reports and schizotypy scores, given that both are 
associated with hallucination formation (Freeman & Garety, 2003). For the current 
thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the STAI was 
comparable to that outlined above, a  = 0.89.
2.2.2 Experimental Task
The experimental task was programmed using Fruity Loops Studio-Express, 
which is a computer programme that enables the user to record, mix, and edit several 
sound recordings into one. Ten one-minute recordings of white noise were made for 
each experiment, two contained concrete words and two contained abstract words in
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Experiment 1, whilst two contained high imagery words and two contained low 
imagery words in Experiment 2, embedded at an average of 9s intervals (ranging 
between 6 and 16 seconds). In both experiments, the recordings containing words 
were presented during trials 3, 4, 7, and 8, with the types of words (concrete/abstract, 
Experiment 1; low/high visual imagery, Experiment 2) counterbalanced across these 
trials (see Figure 2.1). The remaining 6 recordings were white noise only. The 
recordings were played through Windows Media Player, on a Hewlett Packard 
Pavilion MX70 computer (1.4GHz processing speed). Participants listened to the 
recordings at a moderate volume through J-Win earphones.
ite noise with 
concrete words.  >
(Counterbalanced).
White noise with 
non-concrete words.
I I  2 I  3 I  A I  5 I  6 I  1 I  8 9 1  10
A \ A \
30 Second Break White Noise Only
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the procedure, where presentations 3 & 4 
and 7 & 8 represent the recordings in which concrete or abstract words were 
embedded in the white noise, whilst presentation 1 & 2, 5 & 6 and 9 & 10 were white 
noise only.
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2.3 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with concrete words (e.g., desk, 
arm, letter), and abstract words (e.g., myth, abyss, sorrow), which have been shown 
to be differentiable on various cognitive tasks (Paivio, 1971; 1978). Concrete and 
abstract words were chosen to allow for a basic, dichotomous, examination of 
whether the environmental content impacts on hallucination formation, and in order 
to examine any differences in hallucinations when the context was more (concrete), 
or less (abstract), stimulus-bound. It was predicted that: (1) more reports of abstract 
words not actually present would be made then concrete words overall (2) 
participants scoring highly in UE would report more words not actually present; and 
(3) that the type of word falsely reported would be related to the trial type (i.e., more 
false reports of concrete words in the concrete condition, etc.).
2.3.1 Method
2.3.1.1 Participants
Forty-six undergraduate students from Swansea University (19 male, 27 
female), with a mean age of 23.33 (+ 4.54) years (range 18 to 35), were employed, 
having responded to an advert posted through the university subject-pool system. 
The participants received course credit for their participation, and reported no 
previous history of psychosis or depression.
2.3.1.2 Procedure
Following giving their informed consent, the participants were tested 
individually in a quiet, distraction-free room, and told that they would hear 10, one-
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minute recordings of white noise, which may contain words embedded within them. 
Participants were given response sheets for each recording, where they noted each 
time they heard a word, and wrote that word. Participants were asked not to guess 
what they believed a word to be if they were unsure, but simply just to tick that they 
had heard a word. This instruction was stressed as very important. As a result, a 
record could be kept of falsely reported words in two ways: firstly, participants’ 
reports of the presence of words; and secondly, the specific words heard.
For each word reported, the concreteness or abstractness was judged based on 
whether or not the word was linked to a physical object (e.g., desk). For example, for 
the concrete recordings, names of objects were used, such as; field, table, coin, knife, 
arm, apple and chair, whilst for the abstract recordings the words chosen were not 
names of objects, such as; myth, detail, deep, age, effect, lose and recognise. For the 
purposes of this study it was the specific words, rather than the report of the presence 
of a word, that was of interest, in order to provide a specific focus on hallucinatory 
content, as opposed to occurrence.
Participants were then presented with the 10 recordings (trials) as outlined 
above (see Figure 2.1). The words were randomly formulated by the experimenter, 
with the only common features of each set being their concrete, or abstract, 
characteristics. The average frequency of use for concrete words was 91, whilst for 
the abstract words this was 151 (Hofland & Johansson, 1982). Finally, all 
participants completed the above measures before receiving a full debriefing.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
Five participants were removed from the analysis for either having 
incomplete questionnaire scores (n — 3), or for falling as outliers within the dataset (n
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= 2). The numbers of falsely reported words (either concrete or abstract) were 
calculated across all four experimental trials of the study in relation to whether not 
they were (concrete) or were not (abstract) stimulus-bound (i.e. names of objects).
Participants were then divided into high and low scorers for each of the 
scales, based on a median split of the scores For UE, 22 participants were grouped 
into the low UE group (mean = 0.86 + 0.83), whilst the remaining 19 participants 
were placed in the high UE group (mean = 5.63 + 2.17). For CD, 21 participants 
were grouped into the low CD group (mean = 1.78 + 1.09), whilst the remaining 20 
participants were placed in the high CD group (mean = 7.1 ± 2.37). For IA 20 
participants were grouped into the low IA group (mean = 0.64 + 0.49), whilst the 
remaining 21 were placed in the high IA group (mean = 3.72 + 1.6). For IN, 23 
participants were grouped into the low IN group (mean = 1.83 + 1.11), whilst the 
remaining 18 were placed into the high IN group (mean = 5.61 +2). For BDI scores, 
21 participants were placed into the low BDI group (mean = 2.44 + 1.73) whilst the 
remaining 20 were placed in the high BDI group (mean = 13 + 6.88), and for STAI- 
T, 20 participants were grouped into the low STAI-T group (mean = 32 + 3.61) 
whilst the remaining 21 were placed into the high STAI-T group (mean = 47.21 + 
8.26).
This method was used in preference to a regression technique; firstly, due to 
the sample size, and secondly, because it was not known if the impact of the various 
traits on hallucination reports would have a linear- or step- function. In addition, a 
group design is neutral with regard to this issue, but a regression analysis assumes a 
linear relationship which is not certain to be obtained between psychometric 
functions and performance (see Osbome, McHugh, Saunders, & Reed, 2008). For 
example, rather than a relationship between traits and hallucinations where
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hallucinatory reports increase as a linear function of higher trait scores, it could be 
that hallucinatory reports increase as a step function whereby when a certain trait 
score is reached, hallucinatory reports increase sharply. One way around these issues 
could be to either perform a linear transformation of the data prior to linear 
regression analysis or to perform a nonlinear regression, but these approaches also 
have their limitations. For example, performing a linear transformation of the data 
distorts the experimental error and some transformations alter the relationship 
between X (the independent variable) and Y (the dependent variable), violating the 
assumption that all the uncertainty in the data lies with Y (see Motulsky & Ransnas, 
1987 for a discussion). Although nonlinear regression is another alternative, the 
calculation involved requires the relationships between the predictor variables 
(psychometric scores in our case) to be identified, in terms of an equation, prior to 
calculation of the model, in order for the nonlinear regression calculation to be built 
upon (Motulsky & Ransnas, 1987). However, this would require a knowledge of how 
the OLIFE-B subscales interact with one another to affect false perceptions, beyond 
that of UE, a relationship which is currently unclear, and could result in the nonlinear 
regression calculation converging upon the wrong regression model, or not reaching 
convergence at all (Motulsky & Ransnas, 1987). Moreover, the later experiments in 
the current thesis present data from experimental tasks where the relationship 
between the OLIFE-B subscale scores and the data in those experiments are 
uncertain or unknown and as a result exacerbate the issues mentioned here; it would 
thus be more beneficial to the thesis as a whole avoid linear (with or without 
transformation) and nonlinear regression analysis then and to utilise the same 
approach to the data for each experiment. A median-split approach is adopted then to 
avoid confounds of assuming the linear or step relationship between the OLIFE-B
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subscales and the data throughout the thesis, thus providing a theoretically 
conservative approach. Moreover, a median-split approach is in-keeping with much 
of the literature on the interaction between levels of schizotypy and the experimental 
task that have adopted a categorical approach (e.g. Celia, Taylor & Reed, 2007; Reed 
et al, 2008; Tsakanikos, Sverdrup-Thygensen & Reed, 2003; Langdon & Coltheart, 
2004).
There were no instances of participants reporting the presence of words in the 
non-experimental white noise trials.
High UE LowUE High CD Low CD High IA LowlA High IN Low IN
Figure 2.2: Mean number of concrete and abstract false perceptions (FP’s) 
experienced by participants scoring high or low on each of the subscales of the 
OLIFE-B in Experiment 1.
Figure 2.2 shows the number of false reports of both types of words reported 
by low and high scorers in each of the sub-scales of the OLIFE-B, with more abstract 
FP’s made for both high and low scorers across all four subscales, but with high UE 
and high IN scorers showing the largest differences. These data were analysed using
5
■ Concrete FP's 
□ Abstract FP's
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a series of two-factor mixed-model analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with word 
type (abstract versus concrete) as a within-subject variable, and subscale group (high 
versus low) as a between-subject variable (one analysis for each scale), and 
depression and anxiety as covariates. This analysis showed a statistically significant 
main effect for the UE scale, F(l,25) = 17.15,/? < 0.001; and the IN scale, F(l,25) = 
4.81, p  < 0.05, but no significant main effects or interactions for the CD or IA 
subscales, F < 1.
Planned comparison analysis of these data showed statistically significantly 
more false reports overall in high UE scorers than low UE scorers (n = 22, mean =
0.86 + 0.83), F( 1,50) = 27.47; p  < 0.01, significantly more abstract false reports in 
high UE scorers, (n = 19, mean = 5.63 ±2.17) than in low UE scorers F(l,50) = 
13.44; p  < 0.01, and significantly more abstract reports than concrete ones in high 
scorers F(l,50) = 11.37;p  < 0.01. In addition, there were significantly more abstract 
reports for high IN scorers (n = 18, mean = 5.61 ± 2 ) than concrete reports for low IN 
scorers(?i = 23, mean = 1.83 + 1.11), F(\ ,50) = 9.51;p  < 0.01, and significantly more 
abstract reports than concrete ones in both low, F(l,50) = 5.34;p  < 0.025, and high, 
F(l,50) = 4.64;p  < 0.05, IN scorers.
3 - 1 ■  C on crete  
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Figure 2.3: Mean number of concrete and abstract FP’s made by participants in the 
trials where concrete and abstract words were played in Experiment 1.
Figure 2.3 shows the number of abstract and concrete false reports within 
their respective contexts, with more abstract FP’s made than concrete ones in both 
the concrete and abstract trials. These overall data of word-type reports within each 
word-type context were analysed by a two-factor repeated measures AN OVA, with 
word type and context as within-subjects variables, and showed a statistically 
significant main effect of word type, with more abstract word reports overall than 
concrete ones, F(l,40) = 22.14; p  < 0.01, but no significant effect of the abstract or 
concrete contexts in which each type of word was reported or an interaction between 
the two, both p > 0.1.
These results fulfilled some of the aims set out for this experiment, but also 
provided some complications for others both overall and specifically to Experiment
1. Firstly, the experimental technique proved useful in producing hallucination-like 
experiences in a non-clinical population. Secondly, high UE scorers reported more 
false word reports than low UE scorers overall. Thirdly, significantly more abstract 
false reports were made overall than concrete false reports, a finding that was more 
prominent in high UE scorers than low UE scorers as significantly more abstract 
words were reported in high UE scorers than in low UE scorers, and significantly 
more abstract words were reported than concrete ones in high UE scorers. Fourthly 
however, the number of false reports were not shown to relate to the environmental 
context within which words were presented, that is, there were no significant 
differences between abstract or concrete word reports in the concrete or abstract
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trials overall or between high and low UE scorers. These results suggest a 
predisposition to report hallucination-like experiences in high UE scorers more so 
than low UE scorers and that abstract words are more likely to be falsely reported 
than concrete words regardless of the abstract or concrete context within which 
words are presented.
2.4 Experiment 2
For Experiment 2, high- and low-imagery words were chosen to allow for 
further examination of content precedence in hallucination formation. Imagery has 
been implicated in both hallucination and delusion formation previously, where 
abnormally intense mental imagery is thought to lead to bizarre interpretations of 
experiences (Bentall, 1990; Freeman et al, 2002; Maher, 1974; Slade, 1976). As a 
result, it would be interesting to examine the effect of imagery associated with 
particular words on hallucinatory content, as words that have an added dimension of 
imagery may influence hallucinations. Considering that imagery appears to be 
related to concreteness in some regard (Paivio, 1963, 1965), and also that imagery 
and concreteness can differ in the degree of relatedness depending on associated 
word-type factors (Paivio et al, 1968), it may be that imagery would provide an extra 
insight into the relationship between hallucinations and word-type, moving away 
from the more rigid dichotomy involved with regard to concreteness.
2.4.1 Method
2.4.1.1 Participants
Fifty-four undergraduate students from Swansea University (23 male, 31 
female), with a mean age of 22.02 (±3.15) years (range 18 to 34), were employed,
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having responded to an advert posted through the university subject-pool system.
The participants received course credit, and reported no previous history of psychosis 
or depression.
2.4.1.2 Measures -  Delusions In addition to the measures of schizotypy, anxiety 
and depression outlined in section 2.2.1, the Peter’s Delusional Scale (PDS; Peters et 
al., 2004) was also added for Experiment 2. The PDS measures delusional ideation in 
the normal population. The 21 items explore experiences by asking an introductory 
question, for example “do you ever feel as if...” to which subjects are required to 
respond yes or no. If participants answer yes to these questions there follows a 5- 
point Likert scale on the question regarding the degrees of distress, preoccupation, 
and conviction. The PDS produces a total score of delusional ideation, and the 
internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the PDS is between 0.78 and 0.81, concurrent 
validity = 0.61. The PDS was included in as an additional means of measuring 
characteristics associated with, and in support of, the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B, 
specifically, delusions.
2.4.1.3 Procedure
Following being given informed consent, participants were tested as in 
Experiment 1, except for the words presented in the recordings. These words were 
chosen from a list of 925 words, rated on a 7-point Likert-scale for the degree to 
which they evoked imagery (Paivio et al., 1968). Twelve words, scoring between 
1.98 and 2.97 (mean = 2.65), were included as low imagery words (e.g. excuse, 
concept, increment), and twelve words, scoring between 6.27 and 6.8 (mean = 6.51), 
were included as high imagery (e.g. policeman, strawberry, elephant; see appendix
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A). The only common features of the word sets were their high, or low, imagery 
characteristics. Average frequency of use for high imagery words was 185, whilst 
for the low imagery word this was 386 (Hofland & Johansson, 1982). Finally, 
participants were given a full debrief.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
For each word reported, an imagery score was taken from a separate sample 
of participants (N=  50) who graded each word on the same 7-point likert scales as 
used by Paivio et al. (1968) originally. The average imagery scores for each word 
were then used to calculate an average imagery score for the words reported by each 
participant for each of the high or low imagery trials. In addition, these imagery 
scores were used to categorise each falsely reported word into high or low imagery 
groups based on their score relative to the mean (above or below).
As in Experiment 1, a median split was performed on each subscale of the 
OLIFE-B. For UE, 29 participants were grouped into the low UE group (mean = 1.23 
+ 1), whilst the remaining 25 were placed into the high UE group (mean = 6.24 + 
2.09). For CD, 24 participants were placed into the low CD group (mean = 1.54 +
1.25), whilst the remaining 30 were placed in the high CD group (mean = 7.03 + 
2.06). For IA 24 participants were grouped in the low IA group (mean = 0.52 ±0.51) 
whilst the remaining 30 were placed in the high IA scorers (mean = 2.57 + 1.65).
For IN, 34 participants were placed in the low IN group (mean = 1.69 ± 1.11) whilst 
the remaining 20 were placed in the high IN group (mean = 5.1 + 1.29) and 38 
participants were grouped into the low PDS group (mean = 6.03 + 5.53) whilst the 
remaining 16 were placed in the high PDS scorers (mean = 96.31 + 48.03).
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Figure 2.4: Mean number of high and low imagery FP’s made by participants scoring 
high or low on the UE, CD, IA and IN subscales of the OLIFE-B, and the PDS in 
Experiment 2.
Figure 2.4 shows the number of occurrences of imagery word-types for each 
of the OLIFE-B subscales and the PDS. These data were analysed using two-factor, 
mixed-model ANCOVAs, with the number of high or low falsely reported words 
(high or low) as a within-subjects factor, subscale split (low versus high for each 
scale separately) as a between-subject factor, and depression and anxiety scores as 
covariates. These analyses found a statistically significant interaction between the 
type of word reported and the UE scale, F(l,32) = 6.32, p < 0.025, as well as a 
statistically significant interaction between the type of word reported and the IN 
subscale, F( 1,32) = 5.58, p  < 0.05, but no significant main effects or interactions for 
the PDS scale or the CD and IA subscales, F<  1.
Planned comparison analysis showed significantly more low imagery words 
than high ones in high UE scorers F(l,32) = 4.27;p  < 0.05, whilst the same was not 
true for low UE scorers p  > 0.05. However, planned comparisons failed to show any
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significant differences in the type of words reported in both high and low UE scorers, 
and in high and low IN scorers.
■  High Im a g e ry  
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Figure 2.5: Mean number of high and low imagery FP’s made by participants in the 
trials where high and low imagery words were played in Experiment 2.
Figure 2.5 displays the mean number and type of falsely reported words made 
during the high and low imagery trials. There were more low imagery false reports 
made during the low imagery trials, than high imagery false reports; and there were 
more high imagery false reports made during the high imagery trials, than during the 
low imagery ones. A two-factor, repeated-measures ANOVA (word type x trial 
type) conducted on these data revealed a statistically significant main effect of word 
type, F(1,54) = 7.49, p < 0.001, but no statistically significant main effect of trial 
type, F  < 1, or an interaction between the two factors, p  > 0.1.
Planned comparisons revealed that there were statistically significantly more 
low imagery false reports made during low imagery trials than during high imagery 
ones, /^(l,54) = 6.15,p < 0.05, and significantly more low imagery word reports in 
the low imagery trials than there were high imagery words in the low imagery trial,
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F(l,54) = 5.27, p <  0.05.
These results supported some of the findings from Experiment 1, and the 
aims overall, but also showed some insight into the context within which low or high 
imagery words were reported. Firstly, the experimental technique again proved 
useful in producing hallucination-like experiences in a non-clinical population. 
Secondly, high UE scorers reported more low imagery false word reports than low 
UE scorers, supporting the similar findings of the concrete and abstract words in 
Experiment 1. Thirdly, significantly more low imagery false reports were made 
within the low imagery trials than both low imagery words reported in the high 
imagery trials and high imagery words in the low imagery trials. These results 
suggest a predisposition to make more low imagery false reports than high ones in 
high UE scorers and that low imagery word reports are facilitated within a context 
where words of the same type are presented experimentally more so than both high 
and low imagery reports made within high imagery experimental contexts.
2.5 General Discussion
The current study examined the impact of immediate environmental context 
on false reports of stimuli made within those contexts, and examined the impact of 
psychometrically-defined traits on the tendency to make false reports. The number 
of hallucinatory reports suggests that the current method is useful in studying the 
occurrence of auditory hallucinations in the non-clinical population. In addition, 
similar patterns between the OLIFE-B and other psychometric scales, with regard to 
findings using the full OLIFE (e.g. Mason et al., 1995), and the fact that high UE 
scorers make more false-reports overall than low scorers, support the validity of the 
OLIFE-B in this experimental context.
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The OLIFE-B subscale most associated with hallucinations was unusual 
experiences (Mason et al., 1995); high UE scorers made more false reports, 
regardless of type, than low UE scorers in Experiment 1 (see Bentall & Slade, 1985; 
Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005a, 2005b). However, there were no significant differences 
between high and low UE scorers in the total number of false reports, regardless of 
type, in Experiment 2. This could be due to the overall low number of false reports 
made by the sample in Experiment 2, a function of the median split approach to the 
dataset, or differences between the characteristics of concrete/abstract word and 
high/low imagery words.
Experiment 1 showed that abstract false reports were more likely to be made 
than concrete ones overall, suggesting a bias in hallucinatory content toward more 
abstract events. Experiment 2 however, showed more low imagery word reports 
over high ones, but only when presented within the low imagery trials. In addition, 
in both experiments, there were more abstract or low imagery hallucinatory reports 
than concrete or high imagery ones, suggesting that abstract or low imagery words 
are more likely to be emitted regardless, than concrete or high imagery ones. These 
results support previous findings that question the influence of imagery on the 
occurrence and content of hallucinations as the majority of false reports made here 
were abstract or low in imagery scores (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Heilbrun et al, 1983; 
Merckelbach and van de Ven, 2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Posey & Losch, 1983; 
Slade, 1976).
However, the increased tendency to report abstract or low imagery words 
was facilitated somewhat by different experimental manipulations between both 
experiments, namely abstract/concrete or high/low imagery classification. This 
suggests that the classifications of these types of words may influence hallucinatory
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content differently, and in relation to the type of context (abstract/concrete versus 
high/low imagery) in which these types of words are presented, with low imagery 
word reports more sensitive to the environmental context (i.e. low imagery word 
presentations) than abstract words. With regard to this, it is worth noting that Paivio 
et al. (1968) reported several types of word that scored higher in imagery than 
concreteness, despite not being object orientated, and, similarly, in the present study, 
words such as “love” were given a high imagery score, on average, in Experiment 2, 
but would have been included in the abstract condition in Experiment 1. Such 
differences could possibly account for the cross-experimental findings involving the 
number of false reports overall, and abstract ones in particular, in high over low UE 
scorers, through the more dichotomous method of word classification in Experiment 
1 (i.e. stimulus bound or not) -  with Experiment 2 losing some abstract words to the 
high imagery category and thus reducing any differences.
Nevertheless, both experiments showed significantly more abstract/low 
imagery words than concrete/high imagery ones in high UE scorers, suggesting that 
differences between the likelihood of abstract/low imagery false reports occurring 
over concrete/high imagery ones is particularly probable in high UE scorers, in turn 
suggesting a bias toward more abstract or low imagery content when particularly 
prone to hallucinatory experiences. Without over-generalizing, this could be useful 
as a basis of future research in understanding hallucinations, as it is often the case 
that hallucinations are more likely to occur in the presence of little or ambiguous 
environmental stimuli (Bentall, 1990); in the presence of words that do not provoke 
high imagery, or are not stimulus bound, possibly due to an inability to ignore 
irrelevant stimuli in terms of latent inhibition (Shrira & Tsakanikos, 2009).
Although the environmental stimuli employed here were words, the words
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themselves could be perceived as ambiguous with the interference of the white noise, 
and abstract or low imagery words in particular could be considered more ambiguous 
than concrete or high imagery words as they are not accompanied by specific object 
imagery. It may be that concrete or high imagery words are less likely to be emitted 
without the presence of the particular stimulus to which each word is bound, or 
alternatively, the increased likelihood for the emission of abstract words could be 
associated with possible differences in word frequencies, an interaction between UE, 
latent inhibition and abstract words (see Shrira & Tsakanikos, 2009), or another 
audio-graphic dimension. In addition, the majority of research into auditory 
hallucinations cites their characteristics as being meaningful words and/or sentences 
directed to the individual experiencing them (see Bentall, Haddock, & Slade, 1994). 
Such conclusions should be approached with caution however, as cross-experimental 
differences involving concrete/abstractness versus high/low imagery show a need for 
more thorough examination involving these two types.
With regard to environmental context, these data suggest that there exists a 
bias toward emitting a particular type of word, regardless of context in Experiment 1, 
with more abstract false reports than concrete ones overall, but, in Experiment 2, 
environmental context seems to play more of a role with the number of low imagery 
words reported overall in the low imagery trials being more than high imagery words 
in the same trial, and the number of low imagery words reported in the high imagery 
trial being more than high imagery words reported in the low imagery trial. Again 
this could be due to the differences in word classification between the experiments 
and a product of some abstract words being included as high imagery words in 
Experiment 2. In addition, it may be useful to consider how context-dependent 
hallucinations may relate to state-dependent memory - where information is best
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recalled within the environmental context in which it was first learnt (Overton,
1964); the fact a particular word is more likely to emerge, may be resultant of the 
context in which it was first learnt.
Although the study produces some interesting findings, there are also some 
limitations to consider. Firstly, there were more female participants than males 
giving a gender bias for the study. This may be particularly pertinent considering 
female subjects have shown an increased frequency of hallucinatory experiences 
over males (Sharma, Dowd, & Janicak, 1999). Secondly, there is an ethical issue 
with regard to using a technique to induce hallucinations in healthy subjects, 
especially when hallucinatory experiences contribute significantly to schizophrenic 
diagnosis, being one of the symptom categories that must occur alongside another for 
the majority of 1 month (DSM-IV criteria, APA, 1994). However, in answer to these 
two issues, the present study merely looked to establish a technique that could be 
used to examine auditory hallucinations within a simple and specific context, not as a 
means to manipulate the hallucinatory frequencies, rendering the gender bias of the 
sample somewhat irrelevant. In addition, the types of hallucinations under scrutiny 
here were simple instances of one-word auditory presentations within in a particular 
context, a scenario in which participants were not likely to come across often, and 
even if hallucinatory experiences were to occur in similar situation anyway, their 
very nature, accompanied with that of schizotypy, suggests that they would have 
occurred anyway. Furthermore, participants were not given feedback as to their 
correct or incorrectly heard words; making it unlikely that distress resultant of a 
hallucinatory experience would occur.
The present study therefore met the objectives set out in the introduction. 
Firstly, the technique is useful as a means to examine the formation and content of
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hallucinations in a non-clinical population. Secondly, similar patterns were found 
concerning both concreteness and imagery with regard to the hallucination- 
environment relationship, but cross-experimental differences suggests that 
concreteness may be more useful in research into hallucinatory content, although 
more detailed research into concreteness versus imagery words is essential. The 
present study suggests then, that the formulation of auditory hallucinations, and their 
content, is dependent on individual schizotypy subscales scores, and also that 
abstract/low imagery hallucinatory content is somewhat more likely to emerge than 
concrete/high imagery content.
2.6. Appendix A: List of Experimental Words.
2.6.1. Experiment 1 Concrete recording 1
Field, Cloud, Letter, Chair, Glove, Box.
2.6.2. Experiment 1 Concrete recording 2
Table, Coin, Knife, Desk, Apple, Arm.
2.6.3. Experiment 1 Abstract recording 1
Myth, Abstract, Detail, Deep, Age, Sorrow.
2.6.4. Experiment 1 Abstract recording 2
Abyss, Rhythm, Lose, Recognise, Effect, From.
2.6.5. Experiment 2 High Imagery Recording 1
Headlight, Photograph, Arrow, Magazine, Slipper, Policeman.
83
2.6.6. Experiment 2 High Imagery Recording 2
Strawberry, Letter, Avalanche, Valley, Elephant, Pepper.
2.6.7. Experiment 2 Low Imagery Recording 1
Mastery, Event, Magnitude, Exclusion, Belief, Figment.
2.6.8. Experiment 2 Low Imagery Recording 2
Attitude, Method, Position, Increment, Excuse, Concept.
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Schizotypy on Responding Maintained by 
Free-Operant Schedules of Reinforcement
3.1. Introduction
Schedules of reinforcement produce reliable and distinctive patterns of 
responding (see Ferster & Skinner, 1957), and deviations from these distinctive 
patterns can offer insight into processes, and deficits, that determine behaviour. For 
example, variable ratio (VR) schedules produce a high rate of responding, whereas, 
variable interval (VI) schedules have a lower rate of responding than ratio schedules 
(Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Peele, Casey, & Silberberg, 1984). This difference in 
response rate between VR and VI schedules has been taken to reflect learning about 
specific aspects of the behaviour-environment interaction engendered by exposure to 
the schedule contingency. For example, it is suggested that ratio schedules produce 
high rates of responding as the response-reinforcement relationship relies solely on 
the behaviour of the subject: the faster the subject responds, the greater will be the 
rate of reinforcement obtained. Thus, there is a direct action-outcome relationship on 
a ratio schedule. In contrast, interval schedules produce a lower rate of responding, 
in part due to the action-outcome relationships not being linear; increases of 
responding do not necessarily lead to an increase in the rate of reinforcement 
obtained as the elapsing of a particular interval of time is also required for 
reinforcement to become available (see Baum, 1973; Dickinson, 1989; Reed, 2007; 
Roberts, Tarpy, & Lea, 1984).
However, experiments examining human performance on schedules of 
reinforcement often produce varied and different patterns of behaviour to those
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exhibited by nonhumans; with verbal rule formation, and a variety of learning 
histories outside the laboratory, thought to contribute to these differences (see Raia, 
Shillingford, Miller, & Baier, 2000). One potentially important, and little 
investigated, factor that might contribute to the apparent variety of human schedule 
performance are individual differences in specific personality characteristics; in this 
case, with regard to schizotypy (see Chapter 1 and 2). Schizotypal characteristics 
could affect basic schedule behaviour in a number of ways, for example, high scores 
in introvertive anhedonia, or impulsive non-conformity, could produce lower rates of 
responding as these subscales are associated with a lack of motivation, and a 
tendency to rebel against the norm respectively (Mason et al, 1995). In addition, 
identifying differences in schedule performance between high and low schizotypy 
scorers could aid the understanding of the basic mechanisms underlying schizotypal 
characteristics.
Schizotypy as measured by the O-LIFE scale (Mason et al, 1995) consists of 
four subscales: unusual experiences (UE), consisting of items concerning unusual 
perceptual experiences or thinking; cognitive disorganization (CD), concerning 
attention and decision-making difficulties; introvertive anhedonia (IA), reflecting 
lack of enjoyment in social contact; and impulsive non-conformity (IN), which 
concerns impulsive, violent and reckless behaviours, and each of these factors could 
potentially influence schedule performance. However, Chapter 2 showed 
experimental effects with regard to the UE subscale and, given that the focus of this 
thesis is on hallucinatory and delusional experiences as measured by the UE 
subscale, it is this subscale that will receive the most focus here also.
In other experimental tasks, UE has been associated with the mediation of 
latent inhibition (Gray, Fernandez, Williams, Ruddle & Snowden, 2002), whilst IN
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has been linked to deficits in logical reasoning (Tsakanikos, 2004). Given that 
performance on an experimental task arguably involves perceptual (interpretation of 
stimuli), attentional (attention to relevant stimuli), and motivational (engagement in 
task), factors, as well as compliance with the experimental instructions, it is 
reasonable to assume that high scorers across all four subscales of schizotypy could 
show differing response patterns on a schedule of reinforcement.
The present study aimed to examine any individual difference in behavioural 
patterns on two schedules of reinforcement. A random-ratio (RR) and a random- 
interval (RI) schedule were chosen in order to examine any basic differences in a 
schedule associated with individual responding alone and a schedule where 
reinforcement also relies on the passage of time.
3.2. General Methodology
3.2.1 Measures
3.2.1.1 Schizotypy.
The Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences - Brief Version 
(OLIFE-B; Mason et al., 2005) is a 43 item scale consisting of four subscales (UE, 
CD, IA & IN) designed to measure schizotypy in the normal population. The scale 
has an internal reliability (Cronbach a) of between 0.62 & 0.8, and a concurrent 
validity of between 0.9 and 0.94 (UE a  = 0.8, validity = 0.94; CD, a  = 0.77, validity 
= 0.93; IA, a  = 0.62, validity = 0.91; IN, a  = 0.63, validity = 0.9; Mason et al, 2005). 
For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability (Cronbach a) 
of the OLIFE-B was comparable to the range outlined above a  = 0.69.
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3.2.1.2 Delusions
The Peter’s Delusional Scale (PDS; Peters et al., 2004) measures delusional ideation 
in the normal population. The 21 items explore experiences by asking an 
introductory question, for example “do you ever feel as if...” to which subjects are 
required to respond yes or no. If participants answer yes to these questions there 
follows a 5-point Likert scale on the question regarding the degrees of distress, 
preoccupation, and conviction. The PDS produces a total score of delusional 
ideation, and the internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the PDS is between 0.78 and 
0.81, concurrent validity = 0.61. The PDS was included in as an additional means of 
measuring characteristics associated with, and in support of, the UE subscale of the 
OLIFE-B, specifically, delusions.
3.2.1.3 Depression
The Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item questionnaire 
that assesses the clinical symptoms of depression through asking about feelings over 
the past week. The score is a sum of the positive answers, ranging from 0 to 63. The 
internal reliability (Cronbach a).ofthe scale is between 0.73 & 0.92, and a 
concurrent validity of between 0.55 and 0.73 for non-psychiatric subjects (Beck et al, 
1988). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the BDI was comparable to the range outlined above, a  = 0.75.
3.2.1.4 A nxiety
The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983) rates the 
affective, cognitive, and physiological manifestations of anxiety in terms of long­
standing patterns (i.e., trait anxiety). Scores for each question range from 1 = never, 
to 4 = almost always, and the total score can range from 20 to 80. The internal 
reliability (Cronbach a) of the scale is 0.93, and a concurrent validity = 0.52 to 0.8 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Measures of depression and anxiety were 
included as a controlling measure for statistical analysis on hallucinatory reports and 
schizotypy scores, given that both are associated with the hallucination formation 
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the 
internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the STAI was comparable to that outlined above, 
a  = 0.89.
3.2.1.5. Mood
The Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988) is a 20-item questionnaire designed to measure participants’ mood. 
Participants are required to choose the number that corresponds to the intensity of 
their feeling concerning the item, ranging from 1 = very slightly to 5 = extremely), 
and the total scores can range from 20-100. The internal reliability (Cronbach a) is 
0.85, concurrent validity = 0.51 to 0.74 (Watson et al, 1988). The PANAS was 
included as exclusion criteria, should subjects score highly negatively on the 
subscale. This was done to avoid the potential confounds of data given by subjects 
who may respond adversely due to external negative circumstances.
3.2.2. Experimental Task
The experimental task was programmed in Visual Basic (6.0), and 
incorporated two main features. Firstly, the program incorporated an RR schedule,
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whereby reinforcement (points) would be delivered for any response with equal 
probability between one response and twice the number of responses specified by the 
mean schedule value. Secondly, the program incorporated an RI schedule, whereby 
reinforcement is delivered for the first response following the elapse of the specified 
period of time. The two schedules were yoked together, whereby the reinforcer in 
the RI schedule would be delivered only following the passing of the amount of time 
that it took for the corresponding reinforcer to be delivered in the RR schedule.
Thus, the two schedules only differed on the rule relating responding to 
reinforcement, not the rate at which reinforcement was delivered. The presentation 
of each schedule was 4 minutes long, and the program always presented the RR 
schedule immediately before the corresponding yoked RI schedule, and each pair of 
schedules (RR then RI) were presented four times.
Before the experiment began, the participants were presented with a set of 
minimal instructions for the experimental task: “The next part o f the experiment 
involves completing a computer task. On the screen you will see a coloured box, a 
box showing how many points you have and a command button stating “Click here ”. 
Your task is to click the command button in order to gain as many points as you can. 
On each click o f the button you will either gain or lose points. Begin when you are 
ready \
3.3. Experiment3
For Experiment 3, an RR-8, and a yoked RI schedule were used. In the RR 
schedule, participants received reinforcement, comprising the delivery of 10 points, 
between every 1 and 16 clicks of the button (mean = 8). During the yoked-RI 
schedule, participants received 10 points (reinforcement) on the first click that
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followed the passing of time that accompanied the corresponding reinforcement 
delivered in the RR-8 schedule. In addition, participants lost 1 point for every click, 
regardless of whether that click was reinforced (see Reed, 2001).
3.3.1 Method
3.3.1.1 Participants
The participants were a convenience sample of 73 undergraduate Psychology 
students (46 males and 27 females), recruited through the Psychology Department 
subject-pool system. The age range of participants was 19 to 38 with an average age 
of 25.16 (SD = 4.28). No participants reported any history of psychiatric problems.
3.3.1.2 Procedure
All participants were seated in a quiet room, in front of a desk and computer 
(60cms from the monitor), and gave written consent for their participation. Firstly, 
participants were required to complete the series of questionnaires; this was done to 
avoid any adverse effects caused by the task influencing participant responses. In 
Experiment 3, the OLIFE-B, STAI-T, BDI, and PDS questionnaires were 
administered and counterbalanced across participants.
Participants were then presented with the instructions, before continuing with 
the computer task. During the computer task, participants were exposed to a RR-8, 
Rl-yoked pair of schedules four times each. Finally, participants were fully 
debriefed, and paid in subject pool credit.
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3.3.2. Results and Discussion
One participant was removed from the analysis due to extreme values in 
response rate. After exclusion of this participant, the mean response rate for the RR 
schedule was 181.51 (+ 101.42) responses per minute, and for the RI schedule it was 
136.38 (+ 117.97), t(71) = 5.91, p  < 0.01. This replicates this basic RR versus RI 
response rate difference in the sample (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Reed, 2001).
The remaining participants were split above and below the mean on all four OLIFE- 
B subscales, and for the total score of the PDS. For UE, 47 participants were 
grouped into the low UE group (mean = 1.14 + 0.83), whilst the remaining 25 
participants, were placed in the high UE group (mean = 5.68 + 2.22). For CD, 43 
participants were grouped into the low CD group (mean = 2.23 + 1.25), whilst the 
remaining 29 participants were placed in the high CD group (mean = 6.53 + 1.25). 
For IA, 44 participants were grouped into the low IA group (mean = 0.98 + 0.73), 
whilst the remaining 28 participants were placed in the high IA group (mean = 4.54 + 
1.78). For IN, 35 participants were grouped into the low IN group (mean = 1.46 + 
0.98), whilst the remaining 37 participants were placed in the high IN group (mean = 
5.26+1.31). For proneness to delusion, as measured by the PDS, 20 participants 
were grouped into the low PDS group (mean = 32.9 + 16.91), whilst the remaining 
30 participants were grouped into the high PDS group (mean = 99.61 + 33.88). The 
remaining 23 subjects were removed due to having incomplete PDS questionnaire 
scores.
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Figure 3.1: Average response rates for high and low scorers on each OLIFE- 
B subscale and total PDS score in each trial of both the random interval and random 
ratio schedules (Experiment 3).
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The mean response rates across all RR and RI trials, for each of these groups, 
are shown in Figure 3.1. For each subscale of the OLIFE-B and the PDS, an analysis 
of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with trial and schedule (RR or RI) as the 
within-subjects factor, high and low scorers on each scale as the between subjects 
factor, and STAI-T and BDI scores as covariates. Following the initial ANCOVAs, 
which showed no significant effects of STAI-T (p > 0.1) or BDI (p > 0.5) scores, the 
pooled error term from each analysis was used in the calculation of planned 
comparisons to test for specific differences between the high and low scorers on each 
OLIFE-B subscale and the PDS. Significantly higher response rates were found in 
the RR than for the RI schedule for low scorers in UE, F(3,37) = 7.42,/? < 0.01; d = 
0.59, but not in high UE scorers,/? > 0.10 d=  0.48. Significantly higher response 
rates were found for RR than RI schedules for both high, F(3,72) = 3.50, p  < 0.05; d  
= 0.87, and low CD scorers, ^(3,83) = 10.50,/? < 0.01; d -  0.39, for high, F{3,83) = 
8.27, p  < 0.01; d=  0.78, and low IA scorers, F(3,83) = 9.78,/? < 0.01; d=  0.67 for 
high, F(3,83) = 10.86,/? < 0.01; d=0.77, and low IN scorers, F(3,85) = 4.78,/? < 
0.01; <7= 0.53. and for high, F(3,54) = 8.55,/? < 0.01; d = 0.77, and low PDS scorers, 
F(3,54) = 3.69,/? < 0.05; d = 0.62.
In summary, this experiment showed that participants typically responded 
faster on the RR schedule than on the RI schedule, and this replicates numerous 
demonstrations of this schedule effect in nonhumans (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Peele 
et al., 1984), and humans (e.g., Raia et al., 2000; Reed, 2001). That this effect was 
noted suggests that the current procedure was sensitive to any schedule-induced 
differences in performance that might emerge. However, this pattern of results was 
not noted for the participants scoring high on UE.
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3.4. Experiment 4
The findings from Experiment 3 suggest that high scorers in UE are unable to 
distinguish between RR and RI schedules of reinforcement. A finding that stands in 
contrast to the more typical RR advantage in response rate observed in most 
participants. Prior to further discussion of these findings, Experiment 4 attempted a 
systematic replication of this novel result, using a higher schedule value for the RR 
trial, and a higher number of points per reinforcement, in order to extend the 
generality of the parameters over which the effect was observed.
3.4.1. Method
3.4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 72 undergraduate psychology students (33 males and 39 
females) recruited through the Psychology Department subject pool system. The age 
range of participants was 18 to 47 with an average age of 21.66 (SD = 4.83). No 
participants reported any history of psychiatric problems.
3.4.1.2. Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 4 was the same as that described for 
Experiment 3, except that only the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B was analyzed, as 
this produced the result of interest in Experiment 3, and different RR and RI 
schedules values were used. In addition, the PANAS was included in order to 
exclude any participants scoring negatively in mood, motivation and engagement of 
the task, this was done in order to avoid any experimental confounds that may result 
from negative values in these factors. All questionnaires were counterbalanced across 
participants, except for the PANAS, which was always completed first; this was to
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allow for an accurate as possible measure of the participants’ mood before the 
experiment began.
In Experiment 4, participants were exposed to a RR-30 schedule (whereby 
reinforcement was delivered between 1 and 60 clicks of the button), yoked to an RI 
schedule (where delivery of reinforcement occurred in the same ways as in the RI 
schedule in Experiment 3). In addition, participants received 40 points per 
reinforcement. All other details were as described in Experiment 3.
3.4.2. Results and Discussion
Six participants were removed from the analysis; four due to having extreme 
values in either their interval or ratio response rates, and two for having extreme 
negative scores on the PANAS. After exclusion of these participants, the mean rate 
of the response for the RR schedule was 59.25 (+ 81.75) responses per minute, and 
for the RI schedule the mean rate of response was 42.19 (+ 68.26), t{66) = 2.9,/? < 
0.01, which replicates the RR versus RI response rate difference (see Experiment 3), 
although with slightly lower rates of response, probably due to the increased ratio 
value.
For UE, 43 participants (mean = 0.96 + 0.8) were grouped into the low UE 
group, whilst 23 participants (mean = 4.67 + 1.88) were placed in the high UE group. 
For PDS, 37 (mean = 22.5 ± 8.11) were grouped into the low PDS group, whilst the 
remaining 29 participants (mean = 60.8 + 23.68) were placed in the high PDS group.
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Figure 3.2: Average response rates for high and low scorers on the PDS and UE 
subscale of the OLIFE-B in each trial of both the random interval and random ratio 
schedules (Experiment 4).
Figure 3.2 shows the mean response rates for the RR and RI schedules for 
each group. For the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B, and the PDS, an ANCOVA was 
performed, with trial and schedule (RR or RI) as the within-subjects factor, high and 
low scorers on the UE subscale, and PDS, as the between subjects factor, and with 
STAI-T and BDI scores included as covariates. As for Experiment 3, following the 
initial ANCOVAs, which did not show a significant effect of the covariate BDI (p > 
0.3) and STAI_T (p > 0.8) scores, the pooled error term for each was used in the 
calculation of planned comparisons to test for specific differences between the high 
and low scorers on the UE subscale, and the PDS. Significantly higher response 
rates were found in the RR schedule than in the RI schedule for low scorers in UE, 
F(3,70) = 15.46, p  < 0.01; d = 0.86, but this was not found in high scorers, p  > 0.10 d  
= 0.23 There were significantly higher response rates found in the RR than in the RI 
schedule for both high, F(3,74) = 20.12,/? < 0.01; d=  1.2, and low, F(3,74) = 3.17,/) 
< 0.05; d=0A 2 ,  PDS scorers.
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A number of findings emerged from the current study that corroborated those 
from the Experiment 3. Firstly, the typical higher response rates on RR schedules 
were observed for the low scorers of the scales used, replicating Experiment 3, and 
previous studies (e.g., Reed, 2001). Importantly, however, high UE scorers did not 
show this pattern of performance replicating the effect noted in Experiment 3 using 
different schedule parameters, and suggesting an effect of some generality.
3.5. General Discussion
The current studies demonstrated the typical RR versus RI response rate 
difference; response rates were higher on the RR than on the RI schedule (Ferster & 
Skinner, 1957; Peele et al., 1984). Although not a novel finding for humans (see 
Raia et al., 2000; Reed, 2001), there are certainly fewer clear demonstrations of this 
effect. Some have suggested that this may reflect species differences in learning (see 
Lowe, 1979), whereas others have suggested that this might reflect procedural 
differences (see Raia et al., 2000, for a discussion).
The current results suggest that personality factors related to sub-clinical 
features of schizophrenia may also play a role in increasing the variance in human 
responding to schedules of reinforcement, although cross-experimental differences 
suggest that schedule parameters also contribute, there are several findings ot 
interest. Firstly, Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 both show higher response rates on 
the RR schedule than on the RI schedule in low but not high UE scorers. This 
suggests that a proneness to UE could be linked to the ability to perform optimally on 
RR and RI schedules of reinforcement. Reasons for this could be a result of 
differences in the sensitivity to timing responses in relation to the previous periods of 
reinforcement between high and low UE scorers, particularly necessary for optimum
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performance on an RI schedule as reinforcement relies, in part, on allowing time to 
pass (see Killeen & Feterman, 1988). Moreover, responses on a VI schedule are 
deemed to be made based on the time elapsed since reinforcement delivery (Catania, 
Matthews, Silverman & Yohalem, 1977). Without over-generalising, such timing 
differences could be linked to theories of source-monitoring that link the formation 
and maintenance of hallucinations to deficits in distinguishing between internally and 
externally generated events (Frith, 1987; Frith & Done, 1989); whereby 
hallucinations are actually mistimed memories and occur in line with ‘seepage’ 
theories of hallucinations (see Bentall, 1990).
Similarly, it may be that disconfirmation deficits in high schizotypy scorers 
are responsible for the distinguishing deficits between the two types of schedule. 
Disconfirmation deficits have been shown in deluded subjects (Hemsley & Garety, 
1986; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988), a key symptom of schizophrenia (Cutting, 
1985). In this instance, high scorers in schizotypy may be insensitive to responses 
that they make where they do not receive reinforcement, and instead lose a point. In 
line with theories that describe deficits in distinguishing between internal and 
external events then, it could be that high schizotypy scorers have difficulty in 
perceiving the relationship between their responses and reinforcement delivery.
Both Experiments 3 and 4 showed higher response rates in the RR schedule 
than in the RI schedule, in both high and low scorers on the PDS scale. This 
suggests a lack of a relationship between proneness to delusions and performance on 
these schedules. Further, in Experiment 3, none of the OLIFE-B subscales showed a 
differential effect of low or high score on schedule performance, suggesting that this 
effect is limited to the UE subscale.
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In summary, the present study aimed to examine potential relationships 
between high or low scorers in schizotypy and performance on two schedules of 
reinforcement. The findings suggest that differences in timing, or perceiving the 
response-reinforcement relationship, between high and low scorers in UE, could be 
responsible for deficits in distinguishing between the two schedules of reinforcement.
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Chapter 4: Timing Differences between High and low Schizotypal 
Individuals Manifested in Differential Performance on Schedules of 
Reinforcement.
4.1. Introduction.
Research reported in Chapter 3, using the short version of the Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (OLIFE-B) as a measure of schizotypy 
(Mason et al, 2005), has shown that low scorers on the schizotypy subscale of 
Unusual Experiences (UE) produce significantly greater rates of responding on 
random ratio (RR) schedules than on random interval (RI) schedules that are yoked 
in terms of reinforcement rate. This pattern of behaviour is characteristic of that 
typically produced on these two types of schedules (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Raia et 
al, 2000; Reed, 2001). However, the same experiment demonstrated that there were 
no reliable differences in response rates between RR and RI schedules for high 
scorers in UE. This result suggested that those with high schizotypy scores (and 
specifically those associated with hallucinations and delusions; i.e., unusual 
experiences) have difficulty in differentiating between the two schedule types. 
Specifically, higher rates of responding emitted by high UE scorers on the RI 
schedule, compared to low UE scorers, accounted for the lack of difference between 
the RI and RR schedules in the high UE scorers (see Chapter 3).
There are several reasons why high scorers in UE could show this pattern of 
behaviour on RR and RI schedules of reinforcement. One potential reason, that has 
received very little investigation in the literature, concerns a possible timing 
differences between high and low schizotypy scorers (and, potentially, affecting 
schizophrenia sufferers). Such differences may lead them to be less sensitive to the
temporal requirements of an interval schedule, which may subsequently impact their 
performance on that schedule.
Research specifically orientated toward exploring timing in schizophrenic 
patients, and in those deemed to be at an increased risk of developing schizophrenia, 
has shown these groups to overestimate the passage of time across different types of 
tasks (Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Sieg, 1980). Although it might be noted that these 
findings are dependent on the modality through which the experimental stimuli are 
presented; with those defined as high-risk to develop schizophrenia showing an 
increased tendency toward shorter time estimations for visual stimuli, when 
compared to auditory stimuli presented for the same duration (Penny et al, 2005). 
Given these findings, it seems that there is some scope for further research into 
timing differences between high and low UE scorers in order to better understand the 
influence of timing within a schizotypal framework.
In the context of performance on RR and RI schedules, if the passage of time 
between deliveries of successive reinforcement is underestimated when an individual 
is responding on a RI schedule, this would have the result of increasing the rate of 
response. This prediction follows in accordance with many theories of RI behaviour, 
such as the Matching Law (e.g., Baum, 1973), which predict that the shorter the 
interval (i.e., the higher the rate of reinforcement; in this case, the perceived rate of 
reinforcement), the faster the rate of response. Increased rates of responding on a RI 
schedule, due to the perception of the interval being shorter than it actually is, and 
would then reduce the typical RR-RI rate difference, as noted in Chapter 3.
In order to examine potential differences in timing between high and low 
schizotypy scorers, and given that differences in schedule performance have given 
rise to these theoretical speculations, it would be useful to further examine human
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performance on schedules of reinforcement, but specifically those schedules that 
differ in their required utilization of the factor of time. In fact, in the context of 
exploring timing behaviour, two schedules have been commonly and extensively 
used; the fixed interval (FI) schedules, and the differential reinforcement of low rate 
(DRL) schedules (e.g., Catania, 1970; Gibbon, 1977).
Typically, FI schedules of reinforcement can produce scalloped patterns of 
behaviour, in which response rates start low immediately after reinforcement, and 
increase across the trial as the time for the next reinforcement approaches. This 
pattern is typically seen in nonhumans (Dews, 1978; Reed, 2009). In humans, 
another common pattern of responding on FI schedules is a constant low rate of 
responding, in line with participants’ perception of a specific amount of time being 
required to pass before a response is made (see Leslie, 1996, for details of schedule 
parameters and response patterns). In either of these cases, timing of the 
reinforcement interval is implicated in the production of the schedule pattern. 
Similarly, DRL schedules produce low response rates, as they provide for strict 
control with regard to the consequences of responding. Responding before the 
required amount of time has elapsed delays the delivery of reinforcement, making 
timing essential on such schedules.
Given that timing is required for optimum performance on both FI and DRL 
schedules, it would be useful to examine potential differences between high and low 
scorers in UE schizotypy on such schedules. Evidence consistent with the timing 
differences account in high UE scorers, outlined above, could be obtained from 
analyses of such schedules. Differences in response patterns between high and low 
UE schizotypy scorers on these schedules could help to outline differences in timing 
between these populations in terms of under- or overestimation of the passage ot
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time required for optimum performance on these schedules. For example, it could be 
that high scorers respond later on average on these schedules than low scorers and as 
such produce lower response rates, or vice versa. Furthermore, comparison of the 
differences in performance between high and low UE scorers on these two schedules 
could also highlight any potential influence on schedule performance of other 
factors, such as ‘disconfirmation insensitivity’ or ‘response-cost’ (e.g., Dickinson, 
1989; Roper & Zentall, 1999). This view suggests that response rates on schedules 
of reinforcement are affected by responses that do not directly give reinforcement. 
This view could also potentially explain the RR and RI response rate differences 
found between high and low schizotypy scorers reported in chapter 3; increased 
responding on the RI trial in high schizotypy scorers being a product of insensitivity 
to responses that are not reinforced, as opposed to low schizotypy scorers 
maintaining a low response rate, and being more efficient in their responding. 
Indeed, disconfirmation deficits have been found in deluded subjects (e.g., Hemsley 
& Garety, 1986; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988), which is a trait incorporated in the 
UE subscale of the OLIFE-B (Mason et al, 2005). In the present context, it could be 
that high and low UE scorers differ in terms of the affect that such non-reinforced 
responses have on their responding. Differences in performance between FI and 
DRL schedules, where instances of disconfirmation either do, or do not, delay the 
reinforcement availability, respectively, could also be highlighted in line with 
schizotypy scores. If this view is correct, then it would be expected that any 
disconfirmation differences between high and low schizotypy scorers would be 
manifest by high schizotypy scorers showing higher response rates than low scorers 
on a DRL schedule of reinforcement; and more so on an FI schedule of
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reinforcement, where responding does not delay the availability of reinforcement, but 
responding before the required interval has passed is not reinforced.
The present studies, therefore, aimed to examine the novel timing hypothesis in 
high scorers in schizotypy, as measured by the OLIFE-B, on two schedules differing 
in their response-timing-reinforcement relationship, namely an FI, and a DRL, 
schedule of reinforcement. It was expected that high scorers in UE would show 
different response patterns than low UE scorers by underestimating the amount of 
time that had passed and responding later on average on these schedules. In addition, 
it was expected that if disconfirmation deficits are responsible for differences in 
performance between high and low scorers, then this would be evident in the 
response rate levels between groups. This pattern of results would not be predicted 
by existing disconfirmation theories (e.g., Dickinson, 1989; Roper & Zentall, 1999).
4.2. Experiments
Prior to exploration of these potential timing effects, Experiment 5 offered a 
replication of the impact of UE schizotypy on RR and RI schedules of reinforcement. 
Previously, those scoring high on the UE scale have shown less differentiation 
between these schedules in terms of their response rate than low UE scorers (see 
chapter 3). In addition to replicating this potentially important effect, the current 
study aimed to explore whether this deficit was also explicit in an inability of high 
UE scorers to describe the contingencies they had experienced. An ability to 
describe the contingencies has been linked to the demonstration of the effects in 
human participants (see Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986). If high UE 
scorers are predicted not to show the typical RR versus RI response rate effects, and
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this is related to timing differences in comparison to low UE scorers, then they might 
be predicted to show less overt ability to describe the RI contingency.
4.2.1. Method
4.2.1.1. Participants
The participants were 50 undergraduate Psychology students (25 males and 25 
females), recruited through the Psychology Department subject-pool system. The age 
range of participants was 19 to 25 with an average age of 21.84 (SD = 1.9). No 
participants reported any history of psychiatric problems.
4.2.1.2. Measures
4.2.1.2.1. Schizotypy
The Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences - Brief Version 
(OLIFE-B; Mason et al., 2005) is a 43 item scale consisting of four subscales (UE, 
CD, IA & IN) designed to measure schizotypy in the normal population. The scale 
has an internal reliability (Cronbach a) of between 0.62 & 0.8, and a concurrent 
validity of between 0.9 and 0.94 (UE a  = 0.8, validity = 0.94; CD, a  = 0.77, validity 
= 0.93; IA, a  = 0.62, validity = 0.91; IN, a  = 0.63, validity = 0.9; Mason et al, 2005). 
For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability (Cronbach a) 
of the OLIFE-B was comparable to the range outlined above a  = 0.69.
4.2.1.2.2. Depression
The Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item questionnaire 
that assesses the clinical symptoms of depression through asking about feelings over
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the past week. The score is a sum of the positive answers, ranging from 0 to 63. The 
internal reliability (Cronbach a).of the scale is between 0.73 & 0.92, and a 
concurrent validity of between 0.55 and 0.73 for non-psychiatric subjects (Beck et al, 
1988). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the BDI was comparable to the range outlined above, a  = 0.75.
4.2.1.2.3. Anxiety
The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983) rates the 
affective, cognitive, and physiological manifestations of anxiety in terms of long­
standing patterns (i.e., trait anxiety). Scores for each question range from 1 = never, 
to 4 = almost always, and the total score can range from 20 to 80. The internal 
reliability (Cronbach a) of the scale is 0.93, and a concurrent validity = 0.52 to 0.8 
(Spielberger et al, 1970). Measures of depression and anxiety were included as a 
controlling measure for statistical analysis on hallucinatory reports and schizotypy 
scores, given that both are associated with the hallucination formation (Freeman & 
Garety, 2003). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the STAI was comparable to that outlined above, a  = 0.89.
4.2.1.3. Procedure
All participants were seated in a quiet room, in front of a desk and computer 
(60cms from the monitor), and gave written consent for their participation. Firstly, 
participants were required to complete the series of questionnaires; this was done to 
avoid any adverse effects caused by the task influencing participant responses. The
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OLIFE-B, STAI-T, and BDI questionnaires were administered and counterbalanced 
across participants.
Participants were then presented with the instructions before continuing with 
the computer task. During the computer task, participants were exposed to an RR-30 
and Rl-yoked pair of schedules four times each. The experimental task was 
programmed in Visual Basic (6.0), and incorporated two main features. Firstly, the 
program incorporated an RR-30 schedule, whereby reinforcement (points) would be 
delivered for any response with equal probability between one response and twice 
the number of responses specified by the mean schedule value. Secondly, the 
program incorporated an RI schedule, whereby reinforcement is delivered for the 
first response following the elapse of the specified period of time. The two schedules 
were yoked together, whereby reinforcement on the RI schedule would be delivered 
only following the passing of the amount of time that it took for the corresponding 
reinforcer to be delivered in the RR schedule. Thus, the two schedules only differed 
on the rule relating responding to reinforcement, not the rate at which reinforcement 
was delivered. The presentation of each schedule was 4 minutes long, and the 
program always presented the RR schedule immediately before the corresponding 
yoked RI schedule, and each pair of schedules (RR then RI) were presented four 
times.
Before the experiment began, the participants were presented with a set of 
minimal instructions for the experimental task: “The next part o f the experiment 
involves completing a computer task. On the screen you will see a coloured box, a 
box showing how many points you have and a command button stating Click here 
Your task is to click the command button in order to gain as many points as you can.
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On each click o f the button you will either gain or lose points. Begin when you are 
ready.
After each exposure to a schedule trial, the participants were asked to 
describe the contingency that they had just experienced. The question was derived 
from previous research into participants’ ability to understand the schedule to which 
they had just been exposed (e.g., Hayes et al., 1986). This question asked: “ What 
was the best approach to gaining points in the previous trial?” The participants then 
wrote down what they believed to be the best way of scoring points for that trial, and 
this response was then taken by the experimenter. These responses were later subject 
to a manifest content analysis. The phases of the content analysis employed were 
conducted in line with well-established procedures used and recommended by 
Osborne and Reed (2008), and Vaughn, Schumm, and Sinagub (1996). If the 
participant’s response accurately described the preceding contingency, then 2 points 
were scored. If the participant’s response was thought to partially describe the 
preceding contingency, then 1 point was scored. Two independent raters completed 
this procedure to verify the reliability of the coding. A Cohen’s kappa analysis was 
used to check the inter-rater reliability. A high mean level of reliability (0.81) was 
identified between their separate judgements of the participants’ responses.
4.2.2. Results and Discussion
Participants were split into high and low scoring groups, according to a 
median split, for the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B, as described in Chapter 3. A 
median split design was used, as opposed to a regression analysis, due to the sample 
size, and also because it is unclear whether or not any relationship between UE and 
response rates would be linear, or a step function. A group design is neutral with
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regard to this issue, but a regression analysis assumes a linear relationship which is 
not certain to be obtained between psychometric functions and performance (see 
Osborne, McHugh, Saunders, & Reed, 2008). Thirty participants (mean UE score = 
0.83 + 0.79), were grouped in the low scoring group; the remaining 20 participants 
(mean UE score = 5.2 + 1.1) were placed in the high scoring group.
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Figure 4.1: Mean number of responses made in each of the 4 ratio and 
interval trials for low UE scorers (left panel) and high UE scorers (right panel).
Figure 4.1 displays the mean response rates for the four trials of both the RR 
and the RI schedule for both groups. Inspection of these data shows that, for the low 
UE group, response rates increased over training for the RR schedule, and decreased 
for the RI schedule. A similar pattern was seen for the high UE group, but with 
much less differentiation between the response rates for the two schedules.
A three-way mixed-model analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) was 
conducted on the response rates displayed in Figure 4.1, with trial and schedule (RR 
or RI) as the within-subject variables, group (high UE v low UE) as the between- 
subject variable, and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates. This analysis showed a
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statistically significant main effect of schedule, F( 1,46) = 6.34; p < 0.05, d = 0.75, 
and a statistically significant three-way interaction between schedule, trial, and 
group, 7^(3,138) = 3.58; p  < 0.05, d=  0.56. There were no other statistically 
significant main effects or interactions, all ps >0.10, and there were no statistically 
significant effects of BDI or STAI-T scores as covariates, both ps > 0.09.
Planned comparisons were conducted on the RR and RI response rates, 
collapsed across all trials, for both low and high UE scorers, using the pooled error 
term from the above ANCOVA, and these comparisons revealed a statistically 
significantly greater response rate on the RR schedule than on the RI schedule in low 
UE scorers, F(l,62) = 6.24;p  < 0.05; d=  0.74, but no statistically significant 
difference in response rates between the RR and RI trial for high UE scorers, p  >
0 .20 .
The results for the low UE scorers replicate previous findings for response 
rates maintained by RR and RI schedules matched for reinforcement rate, showing 
higher response rates for the RR compared to the RI schedule (Raia et al., 2000). 
They also replicate previous results using these schedules for a high versus low UE 
comparison, showing schedule differentiation in low, but not high, UE scorers (as in 
Chapter 3). Thus, the findings that formed the basis of the current investigation were 
corroborated in this study.
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Figure 4.2: Mean contingency awareness scores (CA) made in each of the 4 
ratio and interval trials for low UE scorers (left panel) and high UE scorers (right 
panel).
Figure 4.2 displays the mean contingency awareness scores (CA) across the 
four trials of each schedule for the two groups. Inspection of these data reveals that, 
for the low UE group, the CA scores for both schedules grew over the course of 
training to approximately equal levels. However, for the high UE group, awareness 
of the RR contingency grew over the course of training, but awareness of the RI 
contingency did not show this pattern, and levels of contingency awareness remained 
low relative to that of the RR schedule.
A three-way mixed-model ANCOVA was conducted on the CA scores, with 
trial and schedule type (ratio or interval) as the within-subject variables, group (high 
UE v low UE) as a between-subject variable, and BDI and STAI-T score as 
covariates. This analysis showed a statistically significant two-way interaction 
between schedule type and group, F(l,45) = 5.08;p  < 0.05, d=  0.67, but no 
statistically significant main effects of schedule or trial, no other statistically
112
significant interactions, and no statistically significant effect of the covariate BDI 
and STAI-T scores, all ps >0.10.
Planned comparisons carried out on the CA scores, averaged across all four 
trials, for both low and high UE scorers, and using the pooled error term from the 
above ANCOVA, showed statistically significantly greater CA scores for the ratio 
trials than for the interval trials in high UE scorers, F(l,57) = 4.63;p  < 0.05; d=  064, 
but there was no statistically significant difference in CA scores between the ratio 
and interval trials in low UE scorers.
These results show that low UE scorers were able to accurately identify the 
contingency relating to both the RR and RI schedule. In contrast, high UE scorers 
were capable of identifying the response-reinforcement relationship on the RR 
schedule, but had difficulty in doing so on the RI schedule, where allowing time to 
pass plays a contributory role for optimum performance. Accompanied by the above 
finding, that the response rates of high UE scorers are not so greatly differentiated on 
RR and RI schedules, this suggests that high UE scorers have difficulty in both 
recognizing and incorporating the timing element into their contingency awareness, 
and RI schedule, performance.
This pattern of results is consistent with the suggestion that high and low UE 
scorers differ in timing on timing-related tasks. These differences could be in the 
form of a slower internal clock, memory for the previous periods leading to 
reinforcement when a response is made or decision-making processes involving 
comparisons between the current period since reinforcement and previous periods 
leading to reinforcement, where the periods leading up to reinforcement are judged to 
be shorter than they actually are by high UE scorers, who then respond sooner 
accordingly. As a result, response rates that are not differentiable from that of RR
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schedule performance occurs. It should be noted, however, that the pattern of 
responding across the RR and RI schedules could also be the product of 
disconfirmation deficits (although it is unclear why such deficits would specifically 
impact on contingency awareness related to timing-based schedules). The following 
experiments turned to more fully examine these theoretical suggestions.
4.3. Experiment 6
If high UE scorers have a deficit in their timing performance in comparison to 
low UE scorers, and this deficit manifests in an underestimation of the passage of 
time, then it is predicted that high scorers would display lower rates of response 
on both FI and DRL schedules. However, if a disconfirmation deficit in high UE 
scorers is the key factor underlying their performance, then it is expected that high 
scorers would have a greater overall response rate on both the FI, and on the DRL, 
schedule than low UE scorers; as non-reinforced instances of responding would 
be more readily discounted, leading to worse schedule control over behaviour.
In addition to the overall rates of response, both of these two schedules of 
reinforcement allow for a more detailed analysis of the pattern of behaviour 
displayed, and this more detailed analysis can shed insight into the nature of the 
temporal control being exerted. FI schedules of reinforcement offer the use of the 
index of curvature measure (IoC; Fry, 1960), which is a mathematical index of the 
spread of responding during each FI ‘trial’. An IoC value close to 1, indicates that 
the majority of the responses occurred just before reinforcement, and that 
responding is being emitted later in the ‘trial’; this indicates strong temporal 
control by the schedule in that responding occurs close to the point at which 
reinforcement is available. An IoC score of 0 represents exactly even responding
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throughout the FI interval, and suggests no temporal control of responding.
Finally, an IoC score of -1, indicates that the majority of responses occurred just 
after the previous reinforcement. If there were timing differences for those with 
high UE scores, in comparison to low scorers, in the form of underestimating the 
passage of time, as suggested above, it is predicted that higher UE scorers will 
have lower overall rates of responding, and a higher IoC value, than lower UE 
scorers.
Inter-response-time (IRT) analysis of DRL schedules, such as that used by 
Richards and Seiden (1991), which divides the number of responses across a trial 
into time bins, and then analyzes the mode time bin of responses made, may also 
shed light on the temporal control seen in this schedule -  namely, that a certain 
amount of time must pass with no responding, before reinforcement becomes 
available. If high UE scorers do underestimate the amount of time that has 
passed, then the time bin containing the modal responses will be greater than that 
in low scorer.
4.3.1. Method
4.3.1.1. Participants and Measures
The participants were 40 undergraduate Psychology students (21 males and 
19 females), recruited through the Psychology Department subject-pool system. The 
age range of participants was 18 to 30 with an average age of 21.28 (SD = 1.83). No 
participants reported any history of psychiatric problems. The same measures as 
described in Experiment 5 were employed in Experiment 6.
4.3.1.2. Procedure
115
All participants were seated in a quiet room, in front of a desk and computer 
(60cms from the monitor), and gave written consent for their participation in the 
study. Firstly, participants were required to complete the series of questionnaires; 
this was done to avoid any adverse effects caused by the task influencing the 
participants’ later questionnaire responses. The OLIFE-B, STAI-T, and BDI 
questionnaires were administered, in a counterbalanced fashion, across participants. 
Participants were then presented with the instructions, before continuing with the 
computer task.
The experimental task was programmed in Visual Basic (6.0), and 
incorporated two main features. Firstly, the program incorporated an FI 30-s 
schedule, whereby reinforcement (in the form of points) would be delivered for the 
first response that occurred whenever 30s had passed since the last reinforcement 
was delivered (or since the beginning of the trial for the first reinforcement). 
Secondly, the program incorporated a DRL 10-s schedule, whereby reinforcement 
was delivered for the first response following the passing of every 10s since the last 
reinforcement (or since the beginning of the trial in the first instance), providing that 
no response had occurred within that preceding 10s interval. The presentation of 
each schedule was 10 minutes long, with each schedule task presented once.
Before the experiment began, the participants were presented with a set of 
minimal instructions for the experimental task: “The next part o f the experiment 
involves completing a computer task. On the screen you will see a box showing how 
many points you have and an instruction informing you to “Press the spacebar to 
earn points'’. Your task is to press the spacebar in order to gain as many points as 
you can. On each click o f  the button you will either gain or lose points. Begin when 
you are ready”.
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During the computer task, participants were exposed to the FI 30-s schedule 
followed by the DRL 10s schedule. Finally, participants were fully debriefed, and 
paid in subject pool credit.
4.3.2. Results and Discussion
Participants were split into high and low scoring groups, according to a 
median split, for the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B as described in Experiment 5. 
Twenty participants (mean UE score = 1.2 + 1.06) were grouped in the low scoring 
UE group; the remaining 20 (mean UE score = 6.1 + 2.07) were placed in the high 
scoring UE group.
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Figure 4.3: Mean number of responses made in each 5 second time bins on the FI 
schedule for low and high UE scorers (left panel), and the mean IoC for low and high 
UE scorers (right panel) on the FI schedule in Experiment 5.
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Figure 4.3 displays the mean number of responses made in each 5s time bin 
for the low UE, and high UE scorers (left panel), and the mean IoC for the low and 
high UE scorers (right panel). Inspection of the left panel of Figure 4.3 shows that 
responding in both groups tended to start at a relatively low rate (over the first bin), 
and then become higher across the remaining time bins. In general, the higher UE 
scores tended to have a lower rate of response than the lower UE scorers, although 
this effect was not pronounced. An ANCOVA conducted on these data, with the 
number of responses in each of the six bins on the FI trial as a within-subject variable 
(trial), UE (high versus low) as a between-subject variable, and BDI and STAI-T 
score as covariates, showed no statistically significant difference in the number of 
responses across the six time bins overall, or between high and low scorers in UE, no 
interactions between the two, and no statistically significant effects of the covariates 
STAI-T or BDI, all/? >0.1.
The mean index of curvature (IoC; Fry, 1960) was calculated using Is time 
bins, and this was used as the measure of the spread of responding across each period 
before reinforcement within the trial. The right panel of Figure 4.3 shows that the 
mean IoC value was greater for the high UE scorers compared to the low UE scorers; 
indicating that a greater proportion of the responses emitted by the high UE scorers 
occurred later in the trial (closer to the time for reinforcement). An ANCOVA was 
conducted on these data, with UE (high versus low) as a between-subject variable, 
and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates, and showed a statistically significantly 
higher IoC in the high UE scorers than in the low scorers, F(l,34) = 7.19;/? < 0.02; d 
= 0.87, with no statistically significant effect of BDI or STAI-T as covariates, both 
ps > 0.80.
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Figure 4.4: Mean number of responses made in each 1 second time bin for low and 
high UE scorers (left panel) and the mean Mode bin for low and high UE scorers 
(right panel) on the DRL(IO) schedule in experiment 5.
Figure 4.4 displays the mean number of responses made in each 1 s time bin 
for both low and high UE scorers (left panel), and the mean modal bin for both low 
and high UE scorers (right panel), on the DRL 10-s schedule for Experiment 6. 
Inspection of the response rate data shown in the left panel reveals an increase in the 
number of responses made in each bin following the nine-second bin with a peak 
number of responses emitted in the eleven-second bin for high UE scorers, and a 
peak in the twelve-second bin for low UE scorers. However, an ANCOVA, with the 
number of responses made within each of the Is bins from 5s to 16s as a within- 
subject variable, UE (high versus low) as a between-subject variable, and BDI and 
STAI-T scores as covariates, showed no statistically significant effects of the number
119
of responses made in each bin, of UE group, or of the covariates of BDI and STAI-T 
scores, allp  < 0.3.
For the DRL 10s phase, the bin containing the modal number of responses 
was calculated for each individual participant. For this analysis, the Is to 4s bins 
were removed in order to avoid the effects of burst responses, as the burst 
distribution is considered a different characteristic of behaviour than that involving 
pausing before responding (see Fagen & Young, 1978; Reed, in press). An 
ANCOVA, with the modal bin in which most responses were made as the dependent 
variable, UE (high versus low) as a between-subject variable, and BDI and STAI-T 
scores as covariates, showed no statistically significant difference between high and 
low scorers in UE, BDI or STAI-T, and the time-bin in which they emitted the mode 
of their responses, all p  > 0.10.
Taken together, these results show little support for a disconfirmation view of 
schedule performance in those with high UE scores. Such a view would predict 
higher rates of response on the FI and DRL schedules, which was not observed.
There was some suggestion of timing differences between high and low UE scorers 
in these data, with high scorers having a significantly higher IoC for the FI schedule. 
However, no significant differences in the modal time bin for DRL trial were noted 
between high and low UE scorers. This lack of a DRL effect could be the result of 
different mechanisms operating on the DRL and FI schedules, perhaps connected to 
the stricter temporal parameters for the DRL schedule. In the DRL schedule, 
premature responses delay the availability ot reinforcement, making the response- 
reinforcement relationship less clear. Alternatively, the lack of an effect on the DRL 
schedule may simply have been due to the fact that it was presented following the FI 
schedule. On the FI schedule, responding prior to the time required did not affect the
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availability of reinforcement, and this learning may have carried through to the DRL 
schedule (see Reed & Morgan, 2008) making any effects seen on the DRL schedule 
less clear than they otherwise may have been.
4.4. Experiment?
Experiment 7 sought to replicate Experiment 6, except a counterbalancing 
procedure was adopted with respect to the orders in which the schedules were 
presented. This was done in order to reveal if the presentation of one of these 
schedules before the other plays a role in obscuring potential differences. If this 
were the case, then a stronger effect for the FI schedule, as described in 
Experiment 6 (i.e., higher IoC), should be noticed when this schedule was 
presented first, rather than second. Moreover, an effect of UE on the DRL 
performance might also be noted if this schedule were presented first, rather than 
second (as in Experiment 6). Furthermore, if Experiment 7 were to confirm the 
results of Experiment 6, with respect to response rates, little difference in the 
overall rates of response should be noted between low and high UE scorers, which 
would not support a disconfirmation hypothesis interpretation.
4.4.1. Method
4.4.1.1. Participants and Measures
The participants were 54 undergraduate Psychology students (12 males and 
42 females), recruited through the Psychology Department subject-pool system. The 
age range of participants was 18 to 49 with an average age of 23.17 (SD = 6.26). No 
participants reported any history of psychiatric problems. The same measures were 
employed as described in Experiment 5.
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4.4.1.2. Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 7 was the same as that described for 
Experiment 6, except that the presentation order for the FI 30-s, and DRL 10-s, 
schedules were counterbalanced, with 27 participants receiving the FI 30-s schedule 
before the DRL 10-s schedule and the remaining 27 participants receiving the DRL 
10-s schedule followed by the FI 30-s schedule order.
4.4.2. Results and Discussion
Participants were split into high and low scoring groups, as described in 
Experiment 5. Twenty-eight participants (mean UE = 1.61 + 1.03) were grouped in 
the low scoring group, whilst the remaining 26 participants (mean UE = 6.31 + 2.24) 
were placed in the high scoring group.
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Figure 4.5: Mean number of responses made in each 5 second time bin for low and 
high UE scorers (left panel), and the mean IoC for low and high UE scorers (right 
panel), on the FI(30) schedule, for participants presented with the FI schedule before 
the DRL schedule (top panel) and the DRL schedule before the FI schedule (bottom 
panel), for Experiment 6.
Figure 4.5 displays the mean number of responses made in each 5s time bin 
for the low UE, and high UE, scorers on the FI schedule (left panel), and the mean 
IoC for the low and high UE scorers (right panel). The participants who received the 
schedules in the FI-DRL order are shown in the top panels of this figure, and those
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that had the DRL-FI order in the bottom panels. Inspection of the top panels of 
Figure 4.5, showing the data from those participants who received the FI schedule 
first, shows a higher response rate on the FI schedule for low UE scorers (top left 
panel), and a higher mean IoC for high UE scorers (top right panel), as found in 
Experiment 6. The bottom panels (DRL first) also show a higher mean IoC for high 
UE scorers (bottom right panel), although the response rates are reversed between the 
UE groups, and are also larger than the response rates for the FI 30-s first 
presentation order, compared to the participants who received the opposite 
counterbalancing order (top left panel).
An ANCOVA conducted on the number of responses emitted, with UE (high 
versus low) and presentation order (FI -  DRL, DRL -  FI) as between-subject 
variables, trial as a within-subject variable, and BDI and STAI-T scores as 
covariates, showed a statistically significant within subject effect of time bin, 
F(l,185) = 3.73;/? < 0.01, d = 0.54, but no statistically significant effect of UE,/? > 
0.4, the schedule presentation order,/? > 0.8 , or a significant difference between 
high and low scorers in STAI- T, /? > 0.6 BDI p  > 0.6, or any significant interactions 
between all factors, all p  > 0.4.
An ANCOVA, with IoC as the dependent variable, the presentation order of 
the schedules (FI-DRL, DRL -  FI) and UE group (high versus low) as between- 
subject variables, and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates, showed a statistically 
significant effect of UE score, F(l,41) = 4.99; p  < 0.05; d = 0.62, and presentation 
order, F(l,41) = 5.68;p  < 0.05; d=  0.66, but no statistically significant interactions, 
or effects of BDI or STAI-T scores as covariates, all ps > 0.70. Planned comparison 
analyses, carried out on IoC scores between high and low UE scorers, for both the 
FI-DRL presentation order, and the DRL-FI presentation order, showed a statistically
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significantly greater IoC in high UE scorers, than in low UE scorers, for the FI-DRL 
presentation order, F( 1,14) = 5.09, p  < 0.05, d=  0.9, but not for the DRL-FI 
presentation order, F < 1.
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Figure 4.6: Mean number of responses made in each 1 second time bin leading to 
reinforcement for low and high UE scorers (left panel) and the mean bin in which 
participants made the mode of their response for low and high UE scorers (right 
panel), on the DRL(IO) schedule, for the FI-DRL presentation order (top panel) and 
the DRL-FI presentation order (bottom panel) in experiment 6.
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Figure 4.6 shows the mean number of responses made in each Is time bin for 
both low and high UE scorers (left panel), and the mean modal bin for both low and 
high UE scorers (right panel), on the DRL 10-s schedule for Experiment 7. The 
participants who received the schedules in the FI-DRL order are shown in the top 
panels of this figure, and those that had the DRL-FI order in the bottom panels. As 
in Experiment 6, the responses made within the first 4s bins were removed in order 
to avoid the effects of response bursts. Inspection of the left panels show that, for 
both presentation orders, low UE scorers made more responses until the 12s time bin 
than high UE scorers, at which point high UE scorers made more responses than low 
UE scorers.
An ANCOVA, with the time bins from 5s to 16s as a within-subject variable, 
UE group (high versus low) and the presentation order of the schedules as between- 
subject variables, and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates, showed a statistically 
significant effect of time bin, F(\ 1,451) = 2.25; p  < 0.05, d=  0.42, but no statistically 
significant effect of presentation order, UE group, interactions between the two, or 
BDI or STAI-T scores, on the number of responses in the time bins, all p  > 0.10.
Inspection of the right panels reveals that high UE scorers made the modal 
number of responses in a later time bin than low UE scorers for both presentation 
orders. An ANCOVA conducted on these data, with UE group (high versus low) and 
presentation order (FI-DRL, DRL-FI) as between-subject variables, and BDI and 
STAI-T scores as covariates, showed a statistically significant effect of UE on the 
mean mode-bin, F( 1,41) = 4.1;/? < 0.05; d=  0.56, but no statistically significant 
effect of the presentation order of the schedules, no interactions between the factors, 
and no effect of BDI or STAI-T scores, all p ’s > 0.4. Two planned comparisons 
analyses, carried out on the mean modal time bin between high and low UE scorers,
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for both the FI-DRL presentation order, and the DRL-FI presentation order, showed 
a statistically significantly greater modal time bin in high UE scorers than in low 
ones for the FI-DRL, F(l,14) = 6.13, p  < 0.05, d=  0.99, and for the DRL-FI 
presentation order, F(l,14) = 5.4, p  < 0.05, d = 0.93.
For both the FI and DRL schedule, regardless of the presentation order of 
trials, there were no significant differences in overall response rates between high 
and low scorers in UE. This replicates the findings from Experiment 6, and suggests 
that disconfirmation deficits are not an important factor with regard to differences in 
performance within the present context. Importantly, however, high UE scorers 
showed either a significantly higher IoC for the FI schedule, or produced the 
majority of their responses later on the DRL schedule (an effect that was somewhat 
more pronounced when that schedule was presented first). This would support the 
notion of timing differences between high and low UE scorers. The fact that this 
effect was not observed so strongly when each schedule type was presented second, 
suggests that with pre-exposure to another schedule confounds the impact of high 
and low UE scorers. Thus, the current results also suggest (to some extent) that prior 
learning about one schedule impedes performance on the subsequent schedule (see 
Reed & Morgan, 2008, for a similar suggestion).
4.5. General Discussion
The present series of studies were designed to explore potential reasons for 
performance differences between low and high scoring UE participants on schedules 
of reinforcement. The studies produced several findings of interest. Firstly, 
Experiment 5 replicated the results of the previous chapter (Chapter 3) that show 
high UE scorers are less able to differentiate between a RR and RI schedule. This
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attenuated response rate difference was corroborated by the additional, novel, finding 
of differences in awareness about the RR and RI contingencies; high scorers had 
significantly lower contingency awareness scores for the RI schedule than the RR 
schedule. Secondly, Experiments 6 and 7 showed evidence for a timing difference in 
high UE participants, with high UE scorers making more responses later on an FI 30s 
schedule, and on a DRL 10s schedule, than low UE scorers; as shown through an IoC 
analysis, and an IRT analysis, on these schedules, respectively. Thirdly, there were 
no consistent and reliable differences in response rates between high and low UE 
scorers on the FI 30s and DRL 10s schedules of reinforcement in either Experiments 
6 or 7. This latter result suggests that disconfirmation deficits do not effect 
responding differentially across high and low UE scorers.
The increased responding on the RI schedule in Experiment 5 in high UE 
scorers could be explained in terms of differences in timing, whereby high UE 
scorers, in contrast to low scorers, are unable to recognise the relationship between 
timing, responding, and reinforcement, and, subsequently, respond more on the RI 
schedule. Results from Experiments 6 and 7 showed that high UE scorers have a 
tendency to overestimate time periods, responding later on both schedules than low 
UE scorers. Together, these results suggest that high UE scorers overestimate the 
passage of time, and, as such, emit responses later than low scorers do (at least, in the 
first instance of exposure to a FI or DRL schedule of reinforcement). The timing 
differences hypothesis is supported by the inability of high UE scorers to accurately 
describe the RI contingency, despite being able to do so for the RR schedule 
(Experiment 5). Although somewhat speculative, reasons as to why temporal 
discrimination occurs in high UE scorers can be suggested.
It is possible that these findings reflect an effectively slower timing mechanism in
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high UE scorers; with a slower timing mechanism leading to more actual time 
passing on an FI, and on a DRL, schedule before responding occurred. However, 
this raises questions regarding learning to time regardless of individual differences 
in clock speed, as it is possible that these deficits manifest as a result of a 
breakdown in the processes responsible for comparing the current timed period 
with previous periods. This is because, regardless of any between-subjects 
differences noted between high and low UE scorers, in terms of a timing 
mechanism, the subjective timing experienced by each individual will be the 
same. For example, if a participant leams that reinforcement will occur following 
the first response after 30s on a FI 30s schedule, but, due to a deficit in their 
timing mechanism, they perceive this period as being 25s long, then they will 
respond accordingly every perceived 25s, which will actually equate to 30s, 
regardless of this subjective perception. Alternatively, it may be that the timing 
differences exhibited in the present studies may result from a dysfunction in 
memory for the amount of time associated with the first reinforcement period, or 
the decision-making process where comparisons are made between the current 
timed period and the last period; this will be discussed in more detail later.
Within the context of schizophrenia, it could be speculated that UE- 
associated traits, such as hallucinations, occur due to a breakdown in the relationship 
between memory, timing processes, and perception, whereby slower timing interacts 
with and activates a memory that is misinterpreted as a hallucination in line with 
source monitoring theories of hallucinations (see Bentall, 2003f)- Although this was 
not the main focus of the current thesis, it is worth noting that several other 
symptoms of schizophrenia listed in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) refer to deficits in 
cognitive processing involving memory and attention, and so complex relationships
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between misplaced memories manifesting as hallucinations, as a function of timing 
and perception deficits or bias, such as those shown in experiments involving signal 
detection theory and word recognition (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Celia et al, 2007), 
seems to be related to the current findings. Careful consideration of the UE subscale, 
and associated potential timing differences, may be useful in building a foundation 
for a better understanding of the influence of timing on hallucinatory content.
Although the present study produces some potentially interesting findings, it 
is not without its limitations. In Experiment 7, the presentation order of the 
schedules did affect, to some extent, the findings, but this will be discussed later.
In summary, the present studies demonstrated that high UE scorers showed later 
responding on FI and DRL schedules, suggesting a tendency toward 
underestimating the passage of time between reinforcements. In addition, the 
present experiments failed to show that high UE scorers differed from low UE 
scorers in terms of disconfirmation - which allows for further research, possibly 
using different schedule parameters linking timing, performance, and response 
cost, to explore disconfirmation in schizotypy more thoroughly.
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Chapter 5: Testing for Potential Timing Differences Between High 
and Low Schizotypy Scorers Within Temporal Bisection Tasks.
5.1. Introduction.
In Chapter 3 rates of response were shown to be much higher on a random 
ratio (RR) schedule than on a random interval (RI) schedule, which was matched for 
rate of reinforcement, in participants who scored low in schizotypy. However, rates 
of response did not differ between these two schedules in high schizotypy scorers, 
particularly for those with high scores on the Unusual Experiences (UE) sub-scale of 
the OLIFE-B. In Chapter 4, this effect was replicated, and this latter chapter further 
showed that those who scored high in UE were unable to verbally describe the 
interval nature of the RI schedule. Moreover, high scorers in UE had different 
performance profiles to low UE scorers on both fixed interval (FI), and differential 
reinforcement of low rate (DRL), schedules of reinforcement. In both of these latter 
schedules, high UE scorers started responding later after the delivery of 
reinforcement.
The principal difference between the schedules mentioned above relates to 
their timing properties, that is, whether or not a certain amount of time is required to 
pass before a response will elicit a reinforcement (RR versus RI in experiments 3, 4 
and 5), how much time is required to pass (e.g. 10 or 30 seconds in experiments 6 
and 7), and whether or not responding prior to the required time delays reinforcement 
(e.g. FI versus DRL schedules in experiments 6 and 7). Given the differences 
between high and low UE scorer’s response rates and the differences in the influence 
of the passing of time on these schedules then, it could be that differences in 
responding between these groups emerge as a result of differences in the abilities of
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each group to accurately incorporate timing into schedule performance. Given this 
suggestion, it would be useful to examine the performance of these groups on timing 
tasks outside the context of reinforcement schedules, especially as mechanisms, such 
as response disconfirmation, and reinforcement rates may influence response 
patterns, over and above the various aspects of timing that could be implicated (cf. 
Dickinson, 1989; Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Roper & Zentall, 1999). It is also worth 
noting that, in the schedule tasks used in Chapters 3 and 4, the participants were not 
necessarily aware of any timing component incorporated in the task. Thus, timing 
was not an explicitly studied behaviour on those tasks, and any potential deficits in 
this process are only inferred from patterns of responding, rather than being 
measured directly. Further, timing while performing on a schedule of reinforcement 
occurs concurrently with performance on the task, rather than explicitly requiring 
retrospective timing (see Killeen & Feterman, 1988 for a discussion of the 
differences induced by these different types of timing tasks). Indeed, several theories 
of timing suggest that the differences in these two types of task may produce 
different timing effects (see Wearden, 2001). Given these considerations, it would 
be prudent to examine any potential differences on a timing task by employing a 
procedure that removes many other influences on behaviour, and allows for a clearer 
examination of performance on a timing task between these groups.
Such an approach to the examination of performance on a timing task in high 
UE populations would be to examine timing post-hoc, that is, through the post­
presentation judgements of the presentation length of stimuli. One such approach 
involves the use of a temporal bisection task, such as that developed by Church and 
Deluty (1977; see also Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996). In these tasks, stimuli are 
presented for short (S), or a long (L) standard durations during a training phase. In
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the subsequent experimental phase, the same stimuli are presented for lengths 
ranging between, and including, these S and L stimuli. The participants are required 
to press a button corresponding to SHORT or LONG for each of the stimuli in the 
experimental phase, and the bisection point is then calculated (i.e. the point at which 
50% LONG responses are made, or the point at which the probability of making a 
SHORT or LONG response is equal). Typically, bisection experiments in humans 
have shown that timing is accurate, although where the bisection point is located 
depends on the ratio of the S and L range used: stimulus ranges of an L/S ratio of 
2:1, or less, tend to show that the bisection point falls closer to the geometric mean 
than to the arithmetic mean; whilst ranges with a ratio of greater than 2:1, show that 
the bisection point is to be found closer to the arithmetic mean (Allan & Gibbon, 
1991, Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1996). In addition to the location of the 
bisection point, temporal bisection experiment data also allow for the calculation of 
the Weber Ratio (WR), essentially a measure of timing sensitivity, where smaller 
values indicate greater temporal sensitivity and can be used as an index of the 
variability of participants clock speed through the variability of their SHORT or 
LONG responding for the presented durations (Ferrara, et al, 1997; Wearden, 2004; 
Wearden, et al, 1997). This stems from the notion proposed by scalar expectancy 
theory (SET; Gibbon, 1977), of a Poisson emitter where the pacemaker emits pulses 
at random, but the rate at which this occurs is, on average, accurate (see also, 
Wearden, et al, 1998). As a result of this assumption, slower pacemaker rates have 
been shown to produce more variable temporal estimates from trial to trial and as 
such can be used as an index of pacemaker speed provided that this assumption is 
maintained (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden et al, 1998).
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Performances on several timing tasks have shown differences in the timing 
behaviour between participants according both to their age and their IQ (Droit-Volet 
& Wearden, 2001; Wearden, Wearden, & Rabbitt, 1997). Such findings suggest that 
individual differences may be influential for this aspect of human performance. In 
addition, research has suggested that schizophrenic subjects display timing deficits 
on tasks requiring verbal estimates of presentation durations, compared to controls; 
specifically in the direction of a tendency to overestimate the passage of time across 
different types of task (Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Sieg, 1980), and also on similar 
temporal bisection tasks to the ones described above (Carroll et al, 2008; Elevag, et 
al, 2003). Participants defined as being at ‘high-risk to develop schizophrenia’ also 
show an increased tendency toward shorter time estimations for visual stimuli, 
compared to auditory stimuli presented for the same duration (Penny et al., 2005). 
Given this, and given that previous research suggests a timing difference exists 
between high and low scorers in UE (Chapters 3 and 4), it seems that there is some 
scope for further research into the performance on timing tasks of high UE scorers.
Thus, the present series of studies aimed to examine differences in timing 
judgements between high and low UE scorers on a series of experiments using a 
temporal bisection task. Given the previous results noted above (Carroll et al, 2008; 
Elevag et al, 2003; Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Sieg, 1980; Rammsayer, 1990), and those 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4, the expectation was that, if timing differences between 
high and low UE scorers do exist, these would manifest in differences in the 
observed bisection point of these two groups, and/or differences in the temporal 
sensitivity displayed on this task, as shown by the Weber Ratio values. In addition, it 
is predicted that the bisection point location difference between high and low UE 
scorers would depend on the ratio of the shortest to the longest stimuli that were
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employed as ‘anchor’ points. A larger ratio provides the potential for greater 
differentiation between the longest and shortest stimuli.
These aims were examined through three experiments, utilizing a suitably 
large ratio size (4:1) of the stimulus used to test for bisection point location 
differences between high and low UE scorers (Experiment 8), testing the impact on 
the bisection point of a reduction of the ratio size across two conditions within the 
same sample (3:1 & 2:1; Experiment 9), and, finally, using a further reduced ratio 
size (1.6:1) to examine potential disappearance of any differences between high and 
low UE scorers as the ratio size decreases (Experiment 10). The three larger ratios 
have been used in the temporal bisection literature previously (e.g., Wearden & 
Ferrarra, 1996), whilst the additional ratio choice of 1.6:1 was added by the present 
authors to provide for a ratio size below 2:1.
5.2. Experim ents
Experiment 8 sought to test for differences in bisection point location through 
the use of a relatively large ratio size (4:1) of the stimulus range used. This value 
was therefore employed to examine whether this large ratio produces clear 
differences in the performance on a timing task between high and low schizotypy 
scorers across a sufficiently clear range of stimuli durations, given that stimulus 
spacing and range effects can affect the bisection point location(Wearden & Ferrara, 
1995; 1996). It was predicted that high UE scorers would differ from low UE 
scorers in the location of their bisection point if differences in the underlying timing 
processes of high UE scorers do exist.
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5.2.1. Method
5.2.1.1. Participants
Fifty participants were recruited from the undergraduate population (13 males 
and 37 females) through the Psychology Department subject-pool system, and all 
received course credit for their participation. The age range of participants was 18 to 
39, with an average age of 21 (SD = 3). No participants reported any history of 
psychiatric problems.
5.2.1.2. Measures
5.2.1.2.1. Schizotypy
The Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences - Brief Version 
(OLIFE-B; Mason et al., 2005): is a 43 item scale consisting of four subscales: 
Unusual Experiences (UE), Cognitive Disorganization (CD), Introvertive Anhedonia 
(IA), and Impulsive Nonconformity (IN), designed to measure schizotypy in the 
normal population. The scale has an internal reliability (Cronbach a) of between 
0.62 & 0.8, and a concurrent validity of between 0.9 and 0.94 (UE a  = 0.8, validity = 
0.94; CD, a  = 0.77, validity = 0.93; IA, a  = 0.62, validity = 0.91; IN, a  = 0.63, 
validity = 0.9; Mason et al, 2005). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the 
internal reliability (Cronbach a) of the OLIFE-B was comparable to the range 
outlined above a  = 0.69.
5.2.1.2.2. Depression
Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961): is a 21-item questionnaire that 
assesses the clinical symptoms of depression through asking about feelings over the
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past week. The score is a sum of the positive answers, ranging from 0 to 63. The 
internal reliability (Cronbach a).of the scale is between 0.73 & 0.92, and a 
concurrent validity of between 0.55 and 0.73 for non-psychiatric subjects (Beck et al, 
1988). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the BDI was comparable to the range outlined above, a  = 0.75.
5.2.\ .2.3. Anxiety
The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983): rates the 
affective, cognitive, and physiological manifestations of anxiety in terms of long­
standing patterns (i.e., trait anxiety). Scores for each question range from 1 = never, 
to 4 = almost always, and the total score can range from 20 to 80. The internal 
reliability (Cronbach a) of the scale is 0.93, and a concurrent validity = 0.52 to 0.8 
(Spielberger et al, 1970). Measures of depression and anxiety were included as a 
controlling measure for statistical analysis on hallucinatory reports and schizotypy 
scores, given that both are associated with the hallucination formation (Freeman & 
Garety, 2003). For the current thesis, across the entire sample, the internal reliability 
(Cronbach a) of the STAI was comparable to that outlined above, a  = 0.89.
5.2.1.3. Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room, in front of a desk 
and computer (60cms from the monitor), and gave written consent for their 
participation. Firstly, participants were required to complete the series of 
questionnaires; this was done to avoid any adverse effects caused by the task
137
influencing participant later responses. The OLIFE-B, STAI-T, and BDI 
questionnaires were administered in a counterbalanced fashion across participants.
Participants were then presented with the instructions, before continuing with 
the computer task. Before the experiment began, the participants were presented 
with a set of minimal instructions for the experimental task:
“The next part o f  the experiment involves completing a computer task. For 
the first part you will see a square appear for either a “short” or “long” amount o f  
time, your task is to watch these presentations and familiarise yourself with them. In 
the second part o f  the experiment you will be presented with more squares, but this 
time your task is to choose “short ” or “long” in line with how long you feel each 
square was presented for. This process will repeat five times. Begin when you are 
ready”.
The experimental task was programmed in Visual Basic (version 6.0), and 
incorporated two main phases. In the training phase, participants were presented 
with a blank, white screen for Is. This was followed by the presentation of either the 
word “Short”, or the word “Long”, for 1 s, immediately before the presentation of a 
black square on the screen. The square was 86mm x 54mm in size, and was 
presented in the centre of the screen. The presentation lasted either for 0.2s 
(following the word “Short”), or 0.8s (following the word “Long”), for five 
presentations each. The order of the presentations of the short and long stimuli was 
random. Presentation lengths of less than Is were used to avoid the effects of 
chronometric counting (see Wearden, 1991a).
Following the training phase, participants were exposed to the experimental 
phase. In this phase, following a Is presentation of a blank white screen, the same 
square as described above was presented to participants tor a time that varied
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between 0.2s to 0.8s, at 0.1s second intervals (i.e. 0.3s, 0.4s, etc.). Each of the seven 
possible presentation lengths occurred at random, until each had been presented 10 
times. In addition, for each presentation, the words “Short” and “Long” were 
presented at the bottom of the screen, beneath the letters “z” and “m”, indicating the 
buttons to press if the participants thought the stimulus was either short or long; with 
“z” and “m” being counterbalanced across participants as to which corresponded to S 
or L choices.
This training-experimental phase process was then repeated four times for 
each participant.
5.2.2. Results and Discussion
Participants were split into high and low scoring UE, CD, IA and IN groups, 
according to a median split procedure employed on the entire dataset of the thesis. A 
median split was used, as opposed to a regression procedure, due to the sample size, 
and also because it is unclear whether, or not, any relationship between schizotypy 
and bisection point location would be a linear, or a step function. A regression 
analysis assumes the former, but a median split is theoretically neutral with respect to 
this assumption, and so is statistically more conservative (see Osborne et al., 2008, 
for discussion).
Twenty-six participants were grouped in the low scoring UE group (mean UE 
= 1.04 + 0.81), and the remaining 23 participants were placed in the high scoring UE 
group (mean UE = 5.79 + 2.25 SD). The UE subscale was used for the current 
analysis alone, as it is this subscale that shown consistent findings with regard to 
timing performance on the earlier schedule work throughout the thesis.
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The bisection point (the point at which 50% LONG responses were made) 
was calculated for each individual participant using the regression method outlined 
by Wearden and Ferrara (1996); regressing the data points producing the line of 
steepest slope, so to provide an objective method to determine individual bisection 
points, as opposed to the alternative methods of mean interpolation, or individual 
interpolation of bisection points by eye. LONG responses were used as opposed to 
SHORT responses as this has been traditional preference in the vast majority of 
temporal bisection tasks (Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Church & Deluty, 1977; Wearden, 
1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996).
AM = 500, GM = 
400
Mean Bisection 
Point
Mean Weber Ratio
High UE 423.83 (SD = 42.07) 0.3 (0.03)
Low UE 408.68 (SD = 28.16) 0.29 (0.03)
Table 1
Table 1 shows the arithmetic and geometric means of the stimulus range used 
for this experiment, as well as the bisection point, and Weber ratio values, for high 
and low UE scorers. The current bisection point location for the L/S ratio of 4:1 was 
similar to those found in other temporal bisection experiments that have used the 
same ratio and range of durations (0.2 seconds to 0.8 seconds at 0.1 second spacing; 
see Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996), whilst the Weber ratio value 
in the current experiment is higher for both groups when compared to previous 
experiments that have calculated this value (e.g. Wearden, 1991b), indicating less 
temporal sensitivity for both high and low UE scorers on this experiment. These data 
also indicate that high scorers held numerically greater values for both the mean 
bisection point and Weber ratios than low UE scorers, and both groups bisection 
points fell nearer the geometric mean than the arithmetic mean.
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Figure 5.1: Mean proportion of LONG responses plotted against stimulus duration 
for low (triangle, dashed lines) and high (square, solid lines) UE scorers for a L/S 
ratio of 4:1.
Figure 5.1 shows the psychometric function (the relation between the 
proportion of LONG responses made to a stimulus and stimulus duration) for high 
and low UE scorers.
Separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted on the 
bisection-point, and Weber Ratio, values with the high and low UE scoring group as 
the independent variable, and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates. The ANCOVA 
conducted on the data from the UE subscale showed no statistically significant 
differences between high and low UE scorers in their bisection-point location, or 
Weber Ratio value, and there were no significant effects of depression and anxiety as
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covariates on either value ip > 0.15 for the Weber Ratio, p  > 0.45 for the bisection 
point location and p  > 0.3 for both depression and anxiety scores) .
These results suggest that there are no statistically significant differences in 
bisection-point location between high and low UE scorers, and as such shows no 
evidence for differences in timing processes between these groups, at least when the 
L/S stimulus ratio is 4:1. However, there were numerical differences in the bisection 
point location between high and low UE scorers and reasons why statistical 
significance was not found could relate to a larger variance (as indicated by the 
standard deviations shown in table 1, in the bisection point location for high UE 
scorers than for lows, although the same was not true for the Weber Ratio scores 
between these groups.
5.3. Experiment 9
Experiment 9 sought to further examine the relationship between schizotypy 
and timing as assessed by bisection point location, by reducing the ratio of the 
stimulus range to 3:1, and further still to 2:1, across two conditions. This 
manipulation was used to extend the generality of the findings noted in Experiment 
8. It was expected, in line with previous research showing that a reduced ratio 
provides for some ambiguity in the bisection point location (see Wearden & Ferrarra, 
1996), that the bisection point difference would occur for the 3:1 ratio condition, but 
that it would be reduced, if present at all, in the 2:1 ratio condition.
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5.3.1. Method
5.3.1.1. Participants and Measures
The participants were 50 undergraduate Psychology students (13 males and 
37 females), recruited through the Psychology Department subject-pool system, as 
described in Experiment 8. The age range of participants was 18 to 27 (mean = 
21.17; SD = 2.26). No participants reported any history of psychiatric problems.
The materials and stimuli were as described in Experiment 8.
5.3.1.2. Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 9 was the same as that described for 
Experiment 8, except that all participants performed under two conditions (and, 
hence, the received twice as many presentations of stimuli in total): one consisting of 
a 2:1 ratio for the presentation lengths of the stimulus range; and one consisting of a 
3:1 ratio. The stimulus range was 0.4s to 0.8s for the 2:1 ratio condition, and 0.3s to 
0.9s for the 3:1 ratio condition. The presentation of the 2:1 and 3:1 ratio conditions 
were counterbalanced across participants.
5.3.2. Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 8, participants were split into higher and lower scoring UE, 
according to a median split, with 28 participants grouped in the low scoring group 
(mean UE = 1.07 ± 0.86), and the remaining 22 participants placed in the high 
scoring group (mean UE = 4.82 + 2.22). The UE subscale was used for the current 
analysis alone as it is this subscale that shown consistent findings with regard to 
timing performance on the earlier schedule work throughout the thesis. The 
bisection point (50% LONG responses) for each individual participant, in both the
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2:1 and 3:1 ratio conditions, was calculated using the same regression method as 
described in Experiment 8.
2:1 AM = 600, GM = 
565.68 
3:1 AM = 600, GM = 
519.62
Mean Bisection Point Mean Weber Ratio
High UE 2:1 579.49 (SD = 34.84) 
3:1 561.48 (SD = 32.97)
0.18(0.03) 
0.23 (0.02)
Low UE 2:1 551.33 (SD = 42.56) 
3:1 541.49 (SD = 36.25)
0.19(0.3) 
0.23 (0.03)
Table 2
Table 2 shows arithmetic and geometric means of the stimulus range used for 
this experiment, as well as the bisection point, and Weber ratio, values for high and 
low UE scorers for both the L/S ratio 2:1 and 3:1 conditions. In comparison with 
other temporal bisection experiments that have used an L/S ratio of 2:1 and the same 
range of durations (0.4 seconds to 0.8 seconds at 0.1 second spacing) the bisection 
point values in the current experiment are much similar for both high and low UE 
scorers (e.g. Wearden & Ferrara, 1996;) whilst the Weber ratio value for the L/S ratio 
2:1 condition in the current experiment is higher for both groups in comparison with 
previous experiments (e.g. Wearden et al, 1997). The bisection point location for the 
L/S ratio condition of 3:1 are less comparable with other studies, as these have used a 
stimulus range both smaller (Wearden & Ferrara, 1996) and larger (Penney, Allan, 
Meek, & Gibbon, 1998), and, thus, report a smaller and larger bisection point values 
respectively. High UE scorers showed a greater bisection point value than low UE 
scorers, whilst the Weber ratio was shown to be identical for both high and low UE 
scorers in the 3:1 ratio condition, but slightly higher for low UE scorers in the 2:1 
ratio condition.
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Figure 5.2: Mean proportion of LONG responses plotted against stimulus duration 
for low (triangle, dashed lines) and high (square, solid lines) UE scorers in both the 
2:1 (solid shapes) and 3:1 (hollow shapes) ratio conditions.
Figure 5.2 shows the psychometric function) for high and low UE scorers in 
the 2:1 and 3:1 ratio conditions. Examination of Figure 5.2 show a slight rightward 
shift in the psychophysical functions for high UE scorers compared to low, for both 
the L/S ratio 2:1 and 3:1 conditions. This means that high UE scorers reach the point 
at which SHORT and LONG responses occur with equal probability (the bisection 
point) at later durations than do low UE scorers.
A multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), with the bisection point 
and Weber ratio values for each of the L/S ratio 2:1 and 3:1 conditions as the four 
dependent variables, UE score (high versus low) as the between-subject factor, and
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BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates was performed and revealed a statistically 
significant difference in the bisection point location for both the L/S ratio 2:1,
F { \ M )  = 7.91;p  < 0.01, d=  0.82; and 3:1, F(l,42) = 4.95;p  < 0.05, d=  0.65 
conditions between high and lows UE scorers. Two follow-up Planned comparison 
analyses showed a significantly greater bisection point value for high UE scorers 
than in low UE scorers for both the L/S ratio 2:1, F( 1,42) = 6.49; d=  0.77, and 3:1 
F(l,42) = 4.26; d=  0.63, conditions. However, there were no significant differences 
in Weber Ratio value between high and low UE scorers in either condition.
These results suggest there were differences in the performance of high and 
low UE scorers on this task; high UE scorers showed less tendency toward 
responding LONG for shorter durations than low UE scorers, which could be a 
reflection of differences between these two groups in the degree to which they over- 
or under-estimate timed durations of a particular length. For example, it appears that 
low UE scorers judge shorter durations to be longer than they actually are, whilst 
high UE scorers judge longer presentations to be shorter than they actually are. The 
reasons as to why this may be the case can be explained in line with theories of 
timing, which will be discussed later.
5.4. Experiment 10
The fact that the L/S ratio conditions of 2:1 and 3:1 used in experiment 9 
showed significant differences in the location of the bisection point between high and 
low scorers, but that this was not so in Experiment 8, where the L/S ratio was 4:1, 
could mean that the differences in performance on such tasks between these groups 
only emerge when the L/S ratio is sufficiently low. Experiment 10, therefore, sought 
to further explore the influence of the ratio of the stimulus range in order to discover
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whether a high versus low UE difference would manifest as the ratio of the stimulus 
range decreases below an L/S ratio of 2:1. If the differences shown in the bisection 
point location shown in experiment 9 do emerge, this could have implications for the 
environmental contexts in which the timing difference between high and low UE 
scorers emerge, namely when the timing factors are below a particular threshold.
To this end, a ratio of 1.6:1, with a stimulus range of 0.5s to 0.8s was chosen, 
and it was expected that high UE scorers would produce a later bisection point 
location than low UE scorers once again, if the effect was present. In contrast, a 
difference in bisection point location would not be expected if this range were 
sufficiently small to allow participants to distinguish between the stimuli used (with 
just four presentation lengths, and a difference between S and L being just 0.3s).
This prediction is consistent with the above theoretical interpretation, because where 
a reduction in ratio size, difference in the corresponding stimulus range, or 
subsequent differentiation between the stimuli within the range has been employed 
previously; bisection point location has markedly shifted (Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 
1996).
5.4.1. Method
5.4.1.1. Participants and Measures
The participants were 50 undergraduate Psychology students (10 males and 
40 females), recruited through the Psychology Department subject-pool system, as 
described in Experiment 8. The age range of participants was 18 to 35 (mean = 23; 
SD = 4.33). No participants reported any history of psychiatric problems. The 
materials were the same as described in Experiment 8.
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5.4.1.2. Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 10 was the same as that described for 
Experiment 8, except that the ratio for the stimulus range was 1.6:1, with the 
presentation lengths ranging from 0.5s to 0.8s. This range was chosen in order to 
provide a ratio as close as possible to 1.5:1, but also far enough away from 1 s to 
avoid the potential influence of chronometric counting (see Wearden, 1991a).
5.4.2. Results and Discussion
As in Experiments 8 and 9, participants were split into high and low scoring 
groups; 27 participants were placed in the low scoring UE group (mean UE = 1 +
0.88), and the remaining 23 participants were placed in the high UE scoring group 
(mean UE = 5.35 + 2.21). The UE subscale was used for the current analysis as it is 
this subscale that shown consistent findings with regard to timing performance on the 
earlier schedule work throughout the thesis. The bisection point (50% LONG 
responses) for each individual participant was calculated, using the regression 
method used by Wearden and Ferrara (1996), as in the previous experiments reported 
here.
AM = 650, GM = 632.45 Mean Bisection 
Point
Mean Weber 
Ratio
High UE 640 (SD = 0.06) 0.16(0.08)
Low UE 649.2 (SD = 0.06) 0.16(0.07)
Table 3
Table 3 shows arithmetic and geometric means of the stimulus range used for 
this experiment, as well as the bisection point and Weber ratio values for high and 
low UE scorers. An L/S ratio of 1.6:1 has not apparently been used in temporal 
bisection experiments previously, but a comparable study is that of Allan and Gibbon
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(1991), which showed that the Weber ratio value is considerably lower for an L/S 
ratio of 1.5:1 than that presented here. Unfortunately, the study by Allan & Gibbon 
(1991) used durations ranges of differing lengths to those presented here, making 
bisection point location comparisons difficult. Inspection of these data also shows 
that low UE scorers had a greater bisection point value than high UE scorers, whilst 
the Weber ratio was shown to be identical for both high and low UE scorers.
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Figure 5.3: Mean proportion of LONG responses plotted against stimulus duration 
for low (triangle, dashed lines) and high (square, solid lines) UE scorers for a L/S 
ratio of 1.6:1.
Figure 5.3 shows the psychometric function (the relation between the 
proportion of LONG responses made to a stimulus and stimulus duration) for high 
and low UE scorers.
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A MANCOVA was conducted with the bisection-point, and Weber Ratio 
values as the dependent variables, high and low UE scoring group as the independent 
variable, and BDI and STAI-T scores as covariates and showed no statistically 
significant differences between high and low UE scorers in their bisection-point 
location or Weber Ratio value (both P ’s > 0.3) as well as no significant effect of 
depression and anxiety as covariates on either value (both P ’s > 0.3).
These results suggest that there are no differences in bisection-point location 
between high and low UE scorers and as such shows no evidence for differences in 
timing processes between these groups, at least when the L/S stimulus ratio is 1.6:1.
5.5. General Discussion
The current series of experiments sought to investigate whether high UE 
scorers differ in terms of their performance on an explicit timing task compared to 
low UE scorers. This followed from the results of several studies that implied that 
such a difference might exist (see Carroll, Boggs, O’Donnell, Shekhar & Hetrick, 
2008; Elevag, McCormack, Gilbert, Brown, Weinberger & Goldberg, 2003; Tysk, 
1983; Wahl & Sieg, 1980; Rammsayer, 1990; Chapters 3 and 4). The present results 
produced several findings of potential theoretical significance with regard to: the 
bisection point location differences between higher and lower UE scorers; and the 
relationship between the ratio of the stimulus range used.
For the majority of the L/S ratio conditions presented in Experiments 8, 9 and 
10 the bisection point was located nearer to the geometric mean than to the 
arithmetic mean for both high and low UE scorers, except for when the L/S ratio was 
2:1 and 1.6:1, with high UE scorers had a bisection point closer to the arithmetic
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mean. The location of the bisection point in the current series of experiments is 
similar to those that have used the same L/S stimulus ratios and range, and which 
have also noted that the location of the bisection point generally falls somewhere 
between the geometric and arithmetic means (Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 
1996).
There were no statistically significant differences in the Weber ratio values 
between high and low UE scorers in the current series of experiments suggesting that 
there are no differences in the variability of timing between high and low UE scorers. 
However, the Weber ratio value did decrease as the L/S ratio did in line with 
previous research implying that timing becomes more sensitive as the ratio decreases 
(Ferrara, Lejeune & Wearden, 1997; Wearden, Rogers & Thomas, 1997). High UE 
scorers typically had a greater bisection point location than low UE scorers, although 
this was only statistically significant when the L/S ratio was 2:1 and 3:1 (Experiment 
9). This means that high UE scorers are more likely to reach the point that SHORT 
and LONG responses occur with equal probability later than low UE scorers, and 
that high UE scorers show less of a tendency toward responding LONG, a finding 
typically reported on this type of task where timing has been examined within the 
general population and between-subjects differences such as personality 
characteristics have not been considered (Wearden, 1991a, 1991b; Wearden & 
Ferrera, 1995, 1996). In turn, this suggests that there may be conditions under which 
there are differences in the temporal perception of high and low UE scorers. 
However, the fact that only the L/S ratio 2:1 and 3:1 conditions showed a statistically 
significant difference limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the current series 
of studies as the evidence put forward here relates to very specific and limited 
circumstances.
151
Nonetheless, there is a relatively consistent pattern of a higher bisection point 
value in high UE scorers over low UE scorers on temporal bisection performance 
when the L/S ratio is 2:1, 3:1 and, although not statistically significant, when it is 
4:1, which warrants speculation as to why these differences emerge. According to 
SET, timing takes place through a series of processes, including a clock process, a 
memory process, and a decision-making process (Gibbon, 1977; see also Allan & 
Gibbon, 1991; Wearden, 1991a, 1991b). The clock process itself is made up of a 
pacemaker, which generates pulses at some high rate, a switch activated in the 
presence of a timing signal, which allows these pulses to flow to an accumulator, 
which accrues the pulses emitted for a to-be-timed duration, the value for which is 
then transferred to a working memory component and compared with the 
representations of S and L in reference memory. In addition, this model operates on 
the assumptions that the memories for the S and L standards are on average accurate, 
but have the form of Gaussian distribution of values for each, which may differ from 
the mean, and from each distribution a representation of s* and 1* is sampled 
(Wearden, 1991b).
The current findings cannot be attributed to differences in clock speed given 
the lack of differences shown between groups in the Weber ratio value, suggesting 
no differences in the variability of clock speed between high and low UE scorers 
(Ferrara et al, 1997; Wearden, 2004; Wearden et al, 1997). Differences in the Weber 
ratio value would point toward more variable accumulator values in the current 
experiments, which, in turn, would suggest a greater variation in clock speed 
between high and low UE scorers (Gibbon, Church & Meek, 1984; Droit-Volet & 
Wearden, 2001).
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On a temporal bisection task, the decision to respond SHORT or LONG is 
made by comparing the current value in working memory with the memory 
representation for the standards s* and 1* in reference memory, where the similarities 
of the current duration to the standards are then compared accordingly; if the 
similarity ratio of s* to T is less than the similarity of T to 1* then the subject 
responds LONG and vice versa (Wearden, 1991b). Although there does also appear 
to be some bias toward responding LONG on these types of task (Wearden, 1991b; 
Wearden & Ferrera, 1995). Expressed formally, a SHORT response occurs when:
D(s*,D < D (T ,l*)
Where D(s*, T) is a difference judgement between the memory representation for the 
SHORT standard, s*, and the current duration, T, and the memory representation for 
the LONG standard, 1*, and T. Similarly, a LONG response then occurs when
D (T, 10 < D(s*,T)
Explanations as to why difference in the location of the bisection point exist 
between high and low UE scorers can be explained in line with the memory and 
decision making processes of the SET model. Based on the above equations a 
greater bisection point location would be found if participants are selecting a longer 
memory representation from the s* memory distributions, or shorter memory 
representations from the 1* memory distributions, when making the comparison with 
T. If either of these are occurring, then the differences between 1* and T, or s* and 
T, will be reduced leading to inaccurate SHORT or LONG responses, accordingly. 
Given that the bisection point locations for all of the L/S ratio conditions used in the 
current experiment fell below the arithmetic mean -  meaning that LONG responses 
are more likely to emerge for shorter durations (i.e. below the arithmetic mean) -  it is
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more likely that the latter of these are occurring, that is; a tendency toward sampling 
shorter values from the 1* memory distribution, but slightly less so in high UE 
scorers, who exhibit the emergence of LONG responding for slightly longer stimuli 
durations.
An alternative explanation centres on a bias toward responding LONG when 
the differences between s* or 1* and T are unclear, such that subjects respond LONG 
when:
\D(s*,T) -  D(T,V) | <  x
Where x is some kind of ambiguity value, where a greater x reflects greater 
ambiguity in the similarities of s* and 1* to T, and results in more LONG responses, 
and, thus, lower bisection point values (Wearden, 1991b). With regard to the current 
series of data, this would mean that high UE scorers have a lower value for x than 
low UE scorers and thus produce a higher bisection point by showing less of a bias 
toward responding LONG. Moreover, the bias toward responding LONG in the study 
by Wearden (1991b) was unexplained, and the current results could offer one 
potential explanation for this bias in terms of memory sampling. One approach 
toward answering exploring this notion could be to compare high and low UE 
scorer’s performance on a temporal generalization task (Church & Gibbon, 1982; see 
also Wearden 1991b, 1992). Temporal generalization experiments operate similarly 
to temporal bisection experiments, but, as opposed to identifying the shortest and 
longest durations of a range as the standards and then making comparisons between 
their representations of these durations and the other durations between them, the 
mid-point duration of a range is identified as the standard and participants are then 
required to judge whether the rest of the durations above, below and equal to the 
standard are the same, or not (Church & Gibbon, 1982; see also Wearden 1991 b,
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1992). Conventional analysis of temporal generalization tasks using the “modified 
Church and Gibbon” model (MSG; Wearden, 1992 from Church &Gibbon, 1982) 
utilizing the temporal generalization gradient (proportion of “yes” or “same” 
responses against stimulus duration) of the data identify differences in performance 
on this task as resulting in either differences in the memory representation of the 
standard duration or in a decision threshold of the comparison between the standard 
and current duration (Wearden, 2003). Temporal generalization experiments 
conducted between groups in line with age and IQ show that very old and very young 
participants show less accurate performance on this task than participants in between 
whilst participants with a low IQ also show less precise timing than those with a high 
IQ (Wearden, 2003; Wearden, Wearden & Rabbitt, 1997). Moreover, these results 
are attributed to differences in the memory representation for the standard (Wearden, 
2003; Wearden, Wearden & Rabbitt, 1997), as a result, if high and low UE scorers 
differ in timing due to similar differences in the memory representation for the 
standard then similar results on a temporal generalization task would be expected.
A third explanation involves an alternative suggestion as to what individuals 
are actually comparing the current time, T with; namely, some memory 
representation of the central tendency of all the durations presented as opposed to 
those of the standards S and L (Wearden & Ferrara, 1995). Here, subjects respond 
LONG when:
t - M
 >  b
t
where t is the current duration, M is a measure of the central tendency of all the 
stimuli durations and b is a fixed threshold value. Subjects then respond SHORT 
when:
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t - M
 < - bt
With regard to those instances of ambiguity between t and M the model then 
responds LONG and SHORT with equal probability when:
t - M
-  b < ------- < bt
If comparing the current duration T with a measure of the central tendency of 
all the stimuli durations, then it would be expected that high and low UE scorers 
differ in their representation of that central tendency (M), or again in their ambiguity 
threshold value (b). For example, if high UE scorers have a greater ambiguity 
threshold value, then they would make less LONG responses than low UE scorers. 
Alternatively, it could be that the ambiguity threshold value for both high and low 
UE scorers is the same, but their measure of central tendency differs where, for 
example, a lower value of M for low UE scorers leads to a greater likelihood of a 
LONG responses being emitted for shorter durations.
Whatever the exact nature of the timing processes occurring on temporal 
bisection tasks, it seems that high and low UE scorers show some evidence of 
differing in the memory and/or decision making processes used in performing timing 
judgements on a temporal bisection task. Although this is a potentially interesting 
avenue for further research, the current series of experiments leave several questions 
unanswered. Firstly, if timing differences occur as a result of differences in an 
ambiguity threshold value, then the question remains as to why this may differ 
between high and low UE scorers? Secondly and similarly, if low UE scorers show 
more of a tendency toward selecting a shorter value from the 1* memory distribution 
then again why should this tendency occur and why should high UE scorers show a 
less of a tendency toward this affect? Finally, if subjects are comparing the current
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duration with a central tendency value for all of the durations as opposed to the 
standard S or L values then why should these central tendency values differ?
There is no obvious answer from the current data for any of these questions, 
which are also made more complicated by the conflict between different theories of 
timing, and further still by debate as to the underlying mechanisms for each theory in 
turn. For example, the Learning to Time theory (LeT; Killeen & Feterman, 1988; 
Machado & Keen, 1999), argues that timing occurs in terms of a chain of 
behavioural states initiated by environmental stimuli, with each state holding 
associative links with available responses (see Machado & Keen, 1999). In terms of 
the present bisection task, these associative links are argued to differ in strength 
between each behavioural state and the responses available (i.e., SHORT and 
LONG), with earlier behavioural states in the chain more strongly linked to the 
SHORT response, whilst later behavioural states are more strongly linked to the 
LONG response. In this context, it seems that high UE scorers show stronger 
associative links between the SHORT response and behavioural states later in the 
chain, than low UE scorers, suggesting interesting potential for research into the 
relationship between schizotypy levels and the strength of associative links between 
behavioural states and responding. This suggestion, again, may be useful to examine 
in terms of decision-making as research into delusions have shown that deluded 
subjects make probabilistic judgments more quickly, and with less evidence, than 
non-deluded subjects (Huq et al., 1988), but can also be excessive in changing their 
choices on reasoning tasks (Garety et al., 1991). This apparent deficit in high scorers 
regarding underlying mechanisms that link responses to other factors could extend to 
the relationship between the strength of associations between behavioural states and 
the SHORT and LONG responses made on a temporal bisection experiment,
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although without further examination of this concept, this link should be regarded 
with caution.
However, there is some scope for an exploration of timing in the context of 
SET and schizotypy given that SET proposes memory and decision-making 
components for timing processes and deficits in these areas have been shown in 
schizotypy scorers (Bentall et al., 1991; Brebion et al. 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Rankin & 
O’Carroll, 1995; Heilbrun, 1980; Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000; Morrison & Haddock, 
1997; Tallent & Gooding, 1999). For example, memory deficits have been found in 
studies using participants with both schizotypal personality disorder (Lenzenweger & 
Gold, 2000), and non-clinical schizotypals (Tallent & Gooding, 1999). Moreover, a 
number of studies have shown that individuals prone to hallucinations, such as high 
UE scorers, have difficulty in remembering their own previously emitted statements 
(Heilbrun, 1980), sometimes attributing them to be those of others (Allen et al, 2006; 
Johns & McGuire, 1999), have mistaken the experimental phase in which stimuli 
have been presented (Bentall et al., 1991; Brebion et al., 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Rankin 
& O’Carroll, 1995), and have given lower confidence ratings that they emitted 
previously generated words (Morrison & Haddock, 1997). Given then that memory 
and decision making deficits occur in other experimental areas in individuals prone 
to hallucinations, it could be that similar processes are at work when these 
individuals compare their memories for previously timed durations with the current 
one. Indeed, studies of temporal bisection performance between schizophrenics and 
non-clinical controls have implicated the memory component of SET in performance 
differences on these tasks (Carroll, Boggs, O’Donnell, Shekhar & Hetrick, 2008; 
Elevag, McCormack, Gilbert, Brown, Weinberger & Goldberg, 2003).
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Although producing some interesting findings, there are some further 
questions produced by the present studies that need to be mentioned. The S and L 
standards for each of the experiments were not anchored, with the S standard ranging 
from 0.2s to 0.5s, and the L standard being either 0.8s or 0.9s. This was done to 
allow for the ease of manipulation of the ratio values required for the experiment, 
whilst remaining consistent with the 0.1s stimulus spacing for each experiment. 
Anchoring S and L standards would have resulted in differing stimulus spacing 
between each experiment, which would have made the findings difficult to interpret, 
given the influence of stimulus spacing effects on bisection-point location (see 
Wearden & Ferrarra, 1996). This could be a potentially interesting avenue for 
further research.
However, the present study did show consistent bisection point location 
differences between high and low UE scorers which may suggest an avenue for 
further research to benefit the schizotypy field and the timing field also -  it could be 
that different groups of subjects perform timing tasks in different ways and 
examination of this notion could lead to a clearer idea of exactly which processes are 
correct when measuring temporal bisection performance. On the other hand, the 
statistical differences between high and low UE scorers found here were only present 
under very specific circumstances, namely when the L/S ratio conditions were 2:1 
and 3:1. Why these differences might occur may benefit from further experimental 
manipulation of the bisection procedure used, such as by manipulating the spacing or 
range of the durations presented between the standards whilst keeping the L/S ratio 
values the same.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion,
1. Aims of the thesis
The present thesis aimed to explore potential for differences in timing 
between high and low scorers on a self-report measure of schizotypy, the OLIFE-B, 
with particular focus on the unusual experiences (UE) subscale. This investigation 
was conducted within the context of exploring hallucinations and delusions through a 
neo-realist framework of consciousness, albeit at a tentative foundation level. This 
view suggests that properties of past experiences are strongly temporally linked to 
the current environment, with these properties interacting with those of the current 
environment to produce hallucinations.
Chapter 2 aimed to illustrate the usefulness of the OLIFE-B, within the 
current context, as a tool for examining differences in the number of false word 
reports (a model for hallucinations) between high and low scorers on the UE 
subscale, and the potential relationship between the concreteness/imagery context of 
the presented words, and the content of the false word reports.
Chapter 3 explored differences between random ratio (RR) and random 
interval (RI) schedule response rates between high and low schizotypy scorers when 
performing on yoked RR-RI schedules of reinforcement. In addition, this chapter 
aimed to investigate differences between high and low UE scorers in terms of their 
schedule contingency awareness, as a means of examining the extent to which 
behaviour, within a temporal context, is overtly recognised by individuals, or occurs 
without awareness of the environmental contingency.
Chapter 4 aimed to expand on the findings of Chapter 3 by exploring UE 
differences on two schedules of reinforcement with a strong temporal element (fixed
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interval, FI, and differential reinforcement of low rate, DRL). These schedules were 
employed to establish whether any differences that were noted were, indeed, the 
result of timing differences, as opposed to other deficits implicit in RR and RI 
performance, such as disconfirmation, as the primary factor responsible for any 
response rate differences noted within the schedule context in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 then aimed to explore differences in timing performance between 
high and low UE scorers by removing the schedule context, and focusing on 
performance within a ‘pure’ timing task, in order to highlight the nature of timing 
differences with relation to the Weber ratio and bisection point.
The overall aim of the thesis, thus, was to show that high schizotypy scorers 
differ in their performance on temporal tasks from low schizotypy scorers. As noted 
above, this possibility was examined within a framework of hallucinations and 
delusions, designed to provide a foundation for the future research into these 
experiences, in line with temporal differences in high schizotypy scorers, as a 
contributory mechanism linking previous experiences to the current environment, 
and facilitating hallucinatory and delusional experiences.
2. Results from the thesis.
Chapter 2 examined the occurrence, and content, of auditory hallucinatory 
experiences in non-clinical participants, scoring high or low on the OLIFE-B 
measure of schizotypy. Participants listened to 10, one-minute recordings of white 
noise, some of which contained embedded concrete or abstract words (Experiment 
1), or high or low imagery words (Experiment 2), and the participants recorded the 
words that they thought that they had heard. In Experiment 1, high scorers on the 
UE scale of the OLIFE-B reported hearing more words that were not actually
161
present, relative to low scorers. In addition, high scorers in UE showed a bias toward 
making hallucinatory reports of an abstract type, over a concrete type, of word, 
compared to low UE scorers. In Experiment 2, more low visual imagery false 
reports were made than high ones in high UE scorers, but there were no significant 
differences between high and low UE scorers. In summary, the results from the 
current Chapter 2 suggest a bias toward more hallucinatory reports in high scorers in 
schizotypy, particularly of an abstract or low imagery type. These results are 
somewhat consistent with other reports in that individuals more prone to 
hallucinations make more false reports (Barber & Calverley, 1964; Bentall & Slade, 
1985; Johns & McGuire, 1999), and they are, at least, in line with research that calls 
into question the relationship between imagery and hallucinatory experiences 
(Bentall & Slade, 1985; Heilbrun et al, 1983; Merckelbach and van de Ven, 2001; 
Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Posey & Losch, 1983; Slade, 1976). Regardless of imagery 
levels, however, such differences are usually found in the number of hallucinatory 
reports between high and low schizotypy scorers (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Celia et al, 
2007; Merckelbach and van de Ven, 2001; Posey & Losch, 1983; Tsakanikos & 
Reed, 2004, 2005a; Tsakanikos, 2006).
These findings satisfy the aims of Chapter 2, set out above, in that high 
scorers on the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B were more likely to make false reports 
than low scorers, showing the usefulness of the OLIFE-B in this context. These 
results also shed some light on the relationship between hallucinatory reports and 
imagery/concreteness, with low imagery/abstractness seemingly more associated 
with the tendency to hallucinate.
Chapter 3 examined differences between high and low scorers on four 
schizotypy subscales (unusual experiences, cognitive disorganisation, introvertive
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anhedonia, and impulsive non-conformity) when responding on RR, and yoked RI, 
schedules of reinforcement, as a means to explore the relationship between the 
personality characteristics of schizotypy and performance on schedules of 
reinforcement. The results obtained from these studies showed, overall, a higher rate 
of responding on the RR, than the RI schedule, consistent with differences in 
performance normally observed between these schedules (Catania, Matthews, 
Silverman & Yohalem, 1977; Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Peele et al, 1984).
However, these response rate differences were dependant on whether or not 
the participants scored higher or lower on the schizotypy subscales, as well as the 
specific schedule parameters between the schedules. Specifically, high scorers on 
the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B were the only group in Experiment 3 not to show 
differences in schedule performance, suggesting high scores on this subscale are 
linked to altered RR and RI performance. Experiment 4 explored this finding further 
using different schedule parameters, and confirmed that high scorers in UE did not 
differ in response rates between the two schedules. In particular, this failure to 
display response rate differences was produced by higher rates of responding on the 
RI schedule in high UE scorers. These findings fall in line with theories of 
hallucinations and delusions that argue that these experiences are determined by a 
deficit in distinguishing between internally and externally generated events (Bentall 
et al, 1991; Bentall et al, 1994; Frith, 1992; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), as high 
schizotypy scorers are unable to distinguish between a reinforcement schedule where 
reinforcement depends entirely on their own responding, and one where 
reinforcement depends on an external element that is not under their control. Given 
that the external element required for optimum schedule performance on the RI 
schedule is the passing of time, it could be that the increased likelihood of
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hallucinatory reports to be made in high schizotypy scorers is influenced by deficits 
in timing.
Chapter 4 further explored the issue of timing differences between individuals 
with high and low UE scores within the context of reinforcement schedules. 
Experiment 5 corroborated the results found in Chapter 3, that performance on RR 
and RI schedules of reinforcement differed in participants who scored high and low 
on UE. High scorers showed less differentiation between the schedules, and, in 
addition, it was noted that they could not explicitly describe the interval-based (RI) 
schedule contingency. This means that, not only are high UE participants unable to 
distinguish between schedules that require allowing time to pass from those 
dependent solely on their own responding for optimum performance through their 
response rates, but that these participants are also unable to overtly describe 
reinforcement contingencies with a temporal element, whereas they remain capable 
of doing so for a contingency that relies solely on their own responding. This 
suggests that high UE scorers are less sensitive to the influence of time on such 
schedules, and that this deficit extends beyond response rate differences to conscious 
awareness of temporal requirements.
Experiments 6 and 7 in Chapter 4 further explored the relationship between 
schizotypy, timing and behaviour, by examining responding on both a FI, and a 
DRL, schedule of reinforcement. Index of curvature analysis for the FI schedule, 
and inter-response time analysis for the DRL schedule, demonstrated that high 
scorers in UE responded after a longer period of time had passed than low scorers 
(although this finding was dependent on the presentation order of the schedules). 
Taken together these results are consistent with a timing difference between high and 
low scorers in UE because, in both of the schedules exerting temporal control, high
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UE scorers tended to respond later during the periods leading toward reinforcement, 
suggesting that these participants allow more time to pass before judging that it is 
appropriate to respond. Timing differences were also thought to be a possible result 
of a deficit in the memory or decision-making processes associated with comparing 
the current timed period with those presented previously.
Chapter 5 found, in further examining the nature of timing in high UE 
scorers, as postulated through the differences established in the previous chapters, 
that high scorers in UE showed some evidence of a temporal difference in 
performance when compared to low UE scorers. Stimuli ratio manipulations were 
made across three experiments, and the results showed that high UE scorers on the 
OLIFE-B held a significantly greater bisection point than low UE scorers, but only 
when the stimuli ratio manipulations were 2:1 and 3:1 (Experiment 9). No 
differences were found between high and low UE scorers in the Weber ratio values 
thus indicating that there were no differences in the speed of the internal clock 
between these populations. These findings suggest that high UE scorers have a 
tendency to make less LONG response for shorter timed periods and were discussed 
in line with the scalar expectancy theory of timing (Gibbon, 1977), and the memory 
and decision-making processes that this theory advocates (Wearden, 1991a, 1991b; 
Wearden & Ferrara, 1995).
Performance on the pure timing tasks presented in this chapter provide some 
support for the notion of timing differences between high and low UE scorers, as 
high UE scorers reached the point at which SHORT and LONG responses are 
made with equal probability later than low UE scorers, as shown by the 
psychophysical functions presented in chapter 5. This suggests that, when timing 
stimuli observations, high UE scorers show less of a tendency toward responding
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LONG for shorter stimuli than low UE scorers do. These results were taken to 
reflect potential differences in the way in which memory and decision-making 
processes for the current and previously timed periods occur, through either 
differences in the memory representations of the standard or the decision 
threshold for the current versus previous period comparison. However, it is also 
important to note that the results found in this chapter occurred under a very 
specific set of circumstances, that is, when the stimuli ratios were 2:1 and 3:1, but 
not when they were 1.6:1 or 4:1.
3. Main Conclusions
The current thesis provides some potential indicators regarding several points 
regarding unusual experiences and timing, supporting some areas of previous 
research, and forwarding thinking regarding some existing discrepancies within the 
literature.
3.1 Schizotypy and hallucinations
The experiments presented in Chapter 2 support previous research into the 
occurrence of hallucinatory experiences in a population that report a heightened 
proneness to such experiences as measured by the UE subscale (Mason et al., 2005; 
Stirling, Barkus & Lewis, 2007). In particular, these experiments reflected previous 
findings that utilised a white noise, or similar procedure, that provides perceptual 
ambiguity, and stimulation of the environment, in examining the occurrence of 
hallucinatory experiences. That is; subjects more prone to hallucinatory experiences 
make more hallucinatory reports, compared to those less prone to such experiences,
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within ambiguous sensory situations (Celia et al, 2007; Margo et al,l 981; 
Merckelbach and van de Ven, 2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972).
Consideration of the specific effects of different types of word shown in 
Chapter 2 allows some speculation about the nature of such false positive reports. 
Abstract or low imagery words were more likely to be emitted in their absence than 
concrete or high imagery words, and that this tendency was more pronounced in high 
UE scorers. This suggests that hallucinatory content holds a bias toward being of an 
abstract/low imagery kind. This finding is in line with previous research that has 
called into question the importance of high imagery as an influence on the content of 
hallucinatory experiences (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Merckelbach and van de Ven, 
2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Posey & Losch, 1983). Moreover, it seems, given the 
present results from Chapter 2, that there may be a bias toward hearing words that 
are not tied to the ‘highly visual’ for their meaning (i.e. words which do not activate 
precise visual representations); the added stimulus-bound, or visual, dimension of 
concrete or high imagery words, did not increase the likelihood o f ‘hallucinating’ 
these types of words. Indeed, auditory hallucinations are the most common types of 
hallucinations (Bentall, 2004), and can be experienced under varying complexity, 
such as in the form of meaningful sentences (Stephane et al„ 2003), requiring a 
number of abstract/low imagery words, as opposed to concrete/high imagery words, 
which would mean hallucinations occurring in the form of lists of objects.
These data also support previous findings that suggest that hallucinations 
occur as a result of a bias toward interpreting internally generated verbal events as 
perceptual experiences within the specific experimental context, possibly as a 
function of a “supra-modality” mechanism (Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005b). Although 
found in different modalities to previous work (e.g., Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005b), the
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current experimental context demonstrated a bias toward reporting verbally 
represented words that were not present, within the same word context (i.e. abstract 
hallucinations in the context of abstract words), suggesting a bias toward self­
generated words over those presented. Such a supra-modality mechanism would 
suggest a pre-existing bias toward attributing self-generated events to perceptual 
experiences, which, in turn, has implications for the influence of an individual’s 
previous experiences. It could be that previous experiences of making such false 
attributions account for the re-occurrence of such experiences, which suggests an 
influence of past events on current hallucinatory experiences.
In addition, Chapter 2 further validated the OLIFE-B as a measure of 
schizotypy within this context, illustrating that high UE scorers make more 
hallucinatory-like experiences than low UE scorers, which would be expected. This 
is a useful finding for the OLIFE-B, as it has yet to be thoroughly validated in terms 
of novel experimental contexts, in which high scores would be expected to facilitate 
the occurrence of hallucinatory-like experiences, such as within the current white- 
noise context (cf. Celia et al, 2007; Margo et al, 1981; Merckelbach and van de Ven, 
2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Skirrow et al„ 2002).
3.2 Timing deficits
Previous research into timing with schizophrenic patients has argued that these 
patients tend to overestimate the passage of time during prospective timing tasks, 
such as those requiring the subject to respond when they believe a specified amount 
of time has passed (see Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Seig, 1980). During these tasks, the 
patients tended to overestimate the amount of time that had passed (allowing more 
time to pass than that specified), which has been taken as evidence of a slower timing
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mechanism in the schizophrenic populations (Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Seig, 1980). Such 
a slower timing mechanism in high UE scorers would mean that these subjects allow 
more time to pass during periods before responding than would normally be 
expected.
However, although the results from Chapters 4 and 5 support the notion of timing 
differences between high and low UE scorers in that the high UE scorers tended to 
respond later in the periods prior to reinforcement on the timing schedules in Chapter 
4 than low UE scorers, whilst Chapter 5 showed that high UE scorers tend to make 
less LONG responses than low UE scorers for SHORT stimuli presentations, these 
results cannot be attributed to clock speed. This is because there were no differences 
in the WR values of the bisection experiments in Chapter 5 between high and low 
UE scorers and thus no evidence for clock speed variability between groups and in 
therefore, no evidence for clock speed differences between groups.
However, the findings of Chapter 4 may also be taken to reflect a memory, or a 
decision-making, deficit in high UE scorers, with regard to comparing the current 
timed periods with those presented previously, rather than a slower internal timing 
mechanism per se, as the subjective timing experience of each individual would be 
the same across the schedule employed, regardless of UE score. This would suggest 
that memory and decision-making processes associated with comparing previously 
timed experiences with current ones are influential in producing a timing difference 
in high UE scorers. For example, it could be that high UE scorers over-estimate 
previously timed periods, and match current timed periods accordingly, resulting in 
later responding on temporal schedules of reinforcement. Alternatively, it may be 
that high UE scorers show a bias toward over-estimating timed periods in 
comparison to those presented previously through a tendency to “jump to
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conclusions” in a similar way to delusion formation (Fear & Healey, 1997; Peters et 
al„ 1997; Huq et al, 1988; Garety et al, 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994)
The use of the SET model in explaining timing includes a decision-making 
component, exploration of which might allow for some indication of the similarities 
between decision-making on timing tasks and in terms of delusions. The results from 
Chapter 5, in accordance with arguments derived from SET accounts of temporal 
bisection performance (Wearden, 1991b; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995) offer three 
potential explanations for a greater bisection point in high UE scorers than in lows. 
Firstly, if participants are responding SHORT when
D(s*,T) <  D( T , r )
and LONG when
D(r,r) < D(rX)
where D(s*, T) is a difference judgement between the memory representation for the 
SHORT standard, s*, and the current duration, T, D(T, 1*) is a difference judgement 
between the memory representation for the LONG standard 1* and the current 
duration T, then a greater bisection point for high UE scorers could be due to less of 
a tendency for high UE scorers to sample shorter durations from the 1* memory 
distribution than low UE scorers, where this specific explanation it more likely given 
that all the bisection point locations for the L/S ratios fell below the arithmetic mean 
and thus made LONG responses were more likely to be made for shorter durations. 
Secondly, if participants are responding LONG when
|D(s*,70- D(7M»)|< *
where an ambiguity value x is included in the formal equation; with a greater x 
reflecting greater ambiguity between the two difference judgements (Wearden,
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1991b), then the results observed in Chapter 5 could be due to a lower ambiguity 
value x which results in less of a tendency to respond LONG for SHORT durations. 
A third explanation involves an alternative explanation to what individuals are 
comparing the current duration with on temporal bisection tasks, where the 
comparison of the current time, T, are thought to be made with some central 
tendency value, M, of the whole range of stimuli. Here, individuals respond LONG 
when
t - M
 > bt
or SHORT when
t - M
 < —bt
where t is the current duration, M is a measure of the central tendency of all the 
stimuli durations and b is a fixed threshold value. Here, if high UE scorers have a 
greater threshold value, b, or a greater value of M, than low UE scorers, then less 
LONG responses for shorter durations would emerge. However, these speculations 
as to what could be occurring during temporal bisection performance between high 
and low UE scorers in line with the SET model of timing leave more questions than 
answers. Nonetheless, there is some evidence for timing differences between high 
and low UE scorers and exploration of differences between high and low UE scorers 
on the specifics of these tasks may highlight, or eliminate, the potential for a 
relationship in the underlying mechanisms of decision-making in terms of delusion 
formation and timing.
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Indeed, considering the results of Chapter 5 in line with SET highlights possible 
differences in the memory and decision-making processes associated with the SET 
model and suggest that high and low UE scorers may differ in their memory 
representations for previously timed periods when comparing those periods with that 
in the current environment. More specifically, it could be that, on temporal bisection 
tasks, high UE scorers differ from low UE scorers by having a lower ambiguity 
threshold for LONG responses thus making more LONG responses. Alternatively, it 
could be that, alternatively to comparing the currently timed period with the S and L 
standards, both high and low UE scorers are comparing the currently timed period 
with some central tendency value of the stimuli range, with low UE scorers 
exhibiting a lower central tendency and thus allowing them to make more LONG 
responses for shorter durations than high UE score.
It is also worth noting that there are differences in the types of timing occurring 
between the types of task in these chapters: with schedule performance (Chapter 4) 
requiring participants to respond at the end of a timed period and without prior 
instructions to time; whilst the bisection task (Chapter 5) requires participants to 
view a timed presentation and then make a judgment post-hoc according to a prior 
timing instruction (i.e. to make a SHORT or LONG response in line with how long 
they felt each square was presented for)..
With regard to previous findings in schizophrenic patients, only the former type 
of task was found to highlight a timing deficit in patients, whilst the latter type of 
task has shown mixed results (cf. Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Seig, 1980). However, in 
these previous experiments, participants were asked to estimate, when asked, how 
much time had passed since they had entered the room, during which time they had 
been required to complete several other tasks (Tysk, 1983; Wahl & Seig, 1980). The
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nature of this particular task actually involves no active measuring of time by the 
participant, and may have been influenced by the cognitive demands of the 
concurrent tasks (Wahl & Sieg, 1980). Indeed, cognitive demands such as the 
attention to a situation have been implicated in affecting the perception of time (see 
Wearden, 2001).
The present methodology used in this thesis holds an advantage over these 
previous studies as they implement stricter controls over additional variables that 
may influence temporal processes on timing tasks; for example, by examining timing 
at a level below that of chronometric counting, whereby participants have a pre­
existing representation of a time period, such as Is. Longer periods of time 
estimation, as used previously, have different variance properties of timing 
mechanisms than those implied by SET (Rakitin, Gibbon, Penney, Malapani, Hinton, 
& Meek, 1998), and are considered unique to human timing (Wearden, Denovan, 
Fakhri, & Haworth, 1997).
3.3. Neo-realism and other views o f  bizarre events
The current studies provide some initial support for the, admittedly speculative, 
neo-realist account for consciousness put forward by Tonneau (2004). This view 
suggests that conscious experiences are strongly linked to the importance of the 
objects of attention, their multiple properties, their placement on the temporal path 
(when they were attended to), and the temporal links between these properties and 
the current environment. Similarly, other theories of hallucinations and delusions 
also argue for the influence of previous and current environmental properties, albeit 
using different terminology and slightly different theoretical methodologies (e.g. 
Frith, 1979; Grossberg, 2000).
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The results obtained in Chapter 2 illustrated the influence of the current 
environment on the types of hallucinatory reports, in the terms of word context; with 
abstract/low imagery words being more likely to be reported overall, and, 
particularly, low imagery words being more likely to be reported within the trials 
containing low imagery presentations (see Section 3.1 above). This seems to suggest 
that environmental properties, such as the degree of concreteness, or imagery for 
words in this instance, has some affect on the types of false reports made. However, 
although these findings provide some positive support for this neo-realist (and 
similar approaches), much more exploration is required to give a thorough, and 
convincing, explanation of the influence of environmental properties on 
hallucinatory content, not least because of the limitations of these findings, which 
will be discussed later (section 4.1). Nevertheless, in support of theories that 
highlight the interaction between the current environment and previous experiences, 
the findings presented in Chapter 2 do provide some scope for future research into 
the influence of environmental properties on hallucinatory content.
Secondly, the evidence obtained from Chapters 4 and 5 shows temporal 
differences between high and low UE scorers potentially in the form of differences in 
memory and decision-making processes associated with the SET model of timing. 
This may shed light on the neo-realist account for hallucinations (Tonneau, 2004) in 
two ways. Firstly, it could be that the same types of memory and decision-making 
processes regarding the properties of previous experiences and their relationship with 
the current environment may be involved in timing processes. Secondly, it could be 
that differences in the memory and decision-making processes involved with timing 
between high and low UE scorers contribute to the formation of hallucinations and 
delusions by affecting the interpretation of the current environment and facilitating
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the interference of the properties of previous experiences. This would relate to 
previous explanations of hallucinations, such as that internally generated events are 
mistaken for those of current perceptual experiences in terms of a supra-modality 
mechanism (Frith, 1979; Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005b; West, 1962, 1975). Support for 
this view come in the form of memory and/or decision-making deficits between past 
and present properties possibly facilitating earlier cross-modal experiences emerging 
within the current environment.
The current findings also have implications for other explanations of 
hallucinations. The temporal factor implicated for UE by the current results provides 
an explanation of how hallucinatory content is determined that is in line with 
‘seepage theories’ of hallucinations; whereby, preconscious material intrudes into 
consciousness. Additionally, these data could be construed as support for 
subvocalisation theories that argue for the influence of internal speech on auditory 
hallucinatory content (Frith, 1979; West, 1962, 1975; Gould, 1948, 1949, 1950; 
Green & Preston, 1981; McGuigan, 1966). In both cases, and with reference to the 
current experimental context, it could be that preconscious internal speech intrudes 
on current environmental perceptions, as facilitated by stronger temporal links 
between the current environment and properties of previous experiences.
Perhaps the theory for hallucinations that most benefits from the current research 
however is Grossberg’s (2000) top-down (cognitive representations through sensory 
perception) approach. This theory argues for hallucinatory occurrence as a 
breakdown in the comparison between previously learned mental representations and 
the current environment, where decreased vigilance during the learning of these 
mental representations influences that comparison and subsequent hallucination 
formation. This is somewhat akin to the properties approach of the neo-realist
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account for consciousness, albeit from the internal standpoint of mental 
representations, and attempts to account for how some mental representations are 
more likely to give rise to hallucinations through vigilance during the learning of 
those representations. However, more detailed analysis of Grossberg’s (2000) model 
would require some exploration of the strength of participant’s mental 
representations of particular content, which may prove difficult to measure.
The remaining theories of hallucinations mentioned in Chapter 1, such as the 
simple conditioning, and imagery, theories, are not as well supported by the current 
findings. Simple conditioning theories of hallucinations suggest that such 
experiences can be learned. The current findings do little to support this suggestion, 
but there could be some scope for future examination in line with a temporal 
perspective, in terms of the potentially reinforcing effects of the re-occurrence of 
particular themes or content of hallucinations. Although elaborating on this 
suggestion, at this stage, would be purely speculative. Imagery theories are let down 
somewhat by the tendency for high UE scorers in Chapter 2 to report words that were 
more abstract, or lower in imagery, than concrete of high imagery words. This seems 
to suggest that imagery has little to do with the occurrence of hallucinations, at least 
in the auditory modality, although some researchers have suggested that although 
vivid imagery may not be a sufficient explanation alone for hallucinations, it is a 
necessary component (Merckelbach & van de Ven, 2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972). 
With this in mind, it may be that imagery simply does not feature as an important 
contributor to hallucinations within the current context, but, of course, it may feature 
more prominently in other contexts.
The current thesis also allows some discussion of other views of bizarre 
experiences in terms of human schedule performance, especially in relation to the
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influence of the effects of ‘disconfirmation’ or ‘response cost’ (Dickinson, 1989; 
Roper & Zentall, 1999). The findings reported here could not be regarded as 
advantageous to theories of disconfirmation, but rather, the present series of results, 
suggest that timing processes more influential than disconfirmation in human 
schedule performance, certainly within the context of UE schizotypy.
This suggestion follows most strongly from the findings reported in Chapter 4, in 
that response rates did not differ between high and low UE scorers on FI and DRL 
schedule performance, but there were differences in the spread of responding, with 
high UE scorers making the majority of the responses on these schedules later than 
low UE scorers. This is particularly important with regard to the DRL schedule, as 
each response that is not reinforced has a higher response-cost, as it delays the 
delivery of the next reinforcement. As a result, if high UE scorers were affected by a 
disconfirmation deficit, in contrast to low UE scorers, then they would have 
performed less well on the DRL schedule. However, the fact that response rates did 
not differ between high and low UE scorers suggest no differences between the 
effects of disconfirmation on performance, whilst differences in the spread of 
responding between both groups add support for an increased influence of timing 
within this context.
3.4 Schedules o f  reinforcement
Beyond the findings in terms of unusual experiences and timing, the current 
series of studies also sheds some light on human performance on reinforcement 
schedules. Although schedules of reinforcement produce consistent and reliable 
behaviour patterns in non-humans (Ferster & Skinner, 1957), results from
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experiments with human subjects have shown less consistent results (see Raia et al., 
2000; Reed, 2001).
However, the findings from Experiments 3 and 4 in Chapter 3, and Experiment 5 
in Chapter 4, showed greater response rates on the RR than on RI trials, as is typical 
of response patterns on these schedules in the non-human literature (Ferster & 
Skinner, 1957; Nevin, Grace, Holland, & McClean, 2001; Peele et al, 1984). 
Although schizotypy, and the temporal element of the RI schedule, have been argued 
to be a causal factor of the response rate differences, there are several other 
procedure factors employed in the current studies that may have helped to promote 
this pattern of responding in the human participants. The use of a discriminative 
contextual stimulus, in the form of a different coloured square for the RR and RI 
schedules, may have aided differentiation between the two contingencies (Dack, 
McHugh, & Reed, 2009; Raia et al, 2000). In addition, schedule differentiation, at 
least in the low UE scorers in Experiments 3, 4 and 5, most likely made use of 
meaningful reinforcers in the form of points, negative response cost for those 
responses not reinforced, and minimal instructions given to participants at the 
beginning of the study, all of which have been shown to affect human performance 
on reinforcement schedules (Hayes et al, 1986; Lowe, Beasty & Bentall, 1983; Raia 
et al, 2000; Reed, 1999, 2001; Rosenfarb, Newland, Brannon & Howey, 1992), 
whilst one or more of these features may be inhibited somehow in high UE scorers. 
However, the lack of differences in response rates between high and low UE scorers 
on the DRL and FI schedules used in experiments 6 and 7 in Chapter 4 suggest that 
the contributions of the above mentioned schedule features may be more complex in 
DRL and FI schedules performance in high and low UE scorers.
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In general, however, schedule performance was consistent with other 
experiments using human participants when the schedule contingencies were RR 
yoked to RI, and other influences of schedule performance such as response cost and 
minimal instructions were controlled for (Hayes et al, 1986; Lowe et al, 1983; Raia 
et al, 2000; Reed, 1999, 2001; Rosenfarb et al, 1992). These response patterns were 
also consistent with those of non-human species (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Peele et 
al., 1984).
However, evidence from the current thesis also suggests that differences in 
personality constructs, such as schizotypy (and its underlying mechanisms), may 
account for some inconsistencies in human performance in schedules of 
reinforcement. Chapter 3 showed that low UE scorers could differentiate between a 
RR and RI yoked schedule of reinforcement, in terms of their response rates, having 
a significantly higher response rate for the RR schedule than the RI schedule. 
However, this chapter also showed that high UE scorers could not so differentiate the 
schedules. On the surface, this implies that high UE scorers hold some underlying 
deficit that accounts for an inability to perform accordingly to reinforcement 
schedule parameters. However, it is also important to note here that the level of UE 
score may not be the cause of this tendency to under-perform on reinforcement 
schedules, but this may be a ‘knock on’ effect of some other underlying mechanism, 
such as, in this case, timing processes.
In addition to the observations concerning response rates on these schedules, a 
further discrepancy in terms of the literature on human and nonhuman schedule 
performance is also addressed with regard to the contingency awareness scores seen 
in Chapter 3. One of the reasons put forward as an explanation of the lack of 
consistent and reliable performance on reinforcement schedules in humans is that of
179
the influence of verbal rule formation, over and above contingency shaped behaviour 
(see Hayes et al, 1986). In this context, low UE scorers were able to accurately 
describe the schedule contingencies following their performance within those 
schedules, whilst high UE scorers were only able to accurately describe the RR 
contingency. Taken together, this may suggest that verbal rules are formed as a 
result of contingency shaped behaviour (Rosenfarb et al, 1992; Shimoff et al, 1986), 
and that high UE scorers are unable to correctly describe reinforcement 
contingencies that have a temporal element. Although this seems to support the 
notion that verbal explanations of contingencies are shaped by schedule 
contingencies themselves, further exploration is required beyond the schedule 
context used here and particularly with regard to behaviour and contingency 
awareness across trials. It could be that initial contingency awareness or verbal rule 
formation prior to, or resulting from the first exposure to one type of schedule 
contributes to moderate changes in behaviour upon the next exposure, which, in turn, 
strengthens the verbal explanation, which, again, strengthens performance, and so on, 
providing more of an interactive relationship between contingency shaping and 
verbal rule formation to influence performance (Bentall, Lowe & Beasty, 1985; 
Catania, Matthews & Shimoff, 1982; Hayes et al, 1986; Lowe et al, 1983; Raia et al, 
2000; Rosenfarb et al, 1992; Shimoff et al, 1986).
4. Limitations and Future Studies
The limitations of the current thesis relate to the interpretation of data as 
hallucination-like (see Section 4.1), unanswered questions regarding the mechanisms 
of theories of timing (see 4.2), the theoretical relationship between timing and the
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environment (see 4.3), and with regard to some existing debate on methodological 
issues regarding the categorising of high and low schizotypy scorers (see 4.4). 
Although these concerns are presented as limitations, they do not invalidate the 
current thesis, because, regardless of their interpretation, the studies here shed light 
on the different processes at work in schizotypy scorers, and provide some scope and 
suggestions to further explore the unanswered questions more thoroughly.
4.1 Hallucinations
Findings reported in Chapter 2 suggest that high UE scorers make more false 
reports of words than low UE scorers. This finding has some merit, but requires 
further exploration before drawing firm conclusions. This is because there are some 
issues underlying the validity of participant’s responses, and in defining them as 
‘hallucinations’ in the strictest sense of the word.
Although these false reports appear hallucination-like, in that they are reports of 
words heard that are not actually presented, the underlying mechanisms of the 
occurrence and maintenance of these reports may be more complex than initially 
thought. Each false report occurs as a direct result of a presented word embedded 
within white noise. As a result, and in contrast to the false report being a 
hallucination per se, it could be that false reports are generated as a result of 
mishearing the presented words, and, although participants were given the instruction 
not to guess if they were unsure of the presented word, the results here could simply 
reflect the kind of jumping-to-conclusions bias associated with delusions and the UE 
subscale (Fear & Healey, 1997; Peters et al, 1997; Huq et al, 1988; Garety et al,
1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994), or another cognitive deficit involved with 
processing auditory stimuli. In addition, simply instructing participants not to guess
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may not be sufficient to prevent them from doing so, and, indeed, if cognitive 
processing deficits are at work here, participants may not even be aware that they are 
guessing the words they are hearing.
Furthermore, any conclusions made about the nature of hallucinations as a whole 
are limited, as the words presented in the current Chapter 2 did not occur ‘naturally’, 
but within a specific environmental context, and generalising these findings to 
hallucinatory occurrences outside the laboratory is, therefore, should be undertaken 
with some caution.
4.2 Timins Studies
Although the present series of studies highlighted potential timing differences in 
relation to levels of proneness to UE, these findings are restricted in that, although 
there is a timing difference, they do little to shed more light on competing theories of 
timing that may provide the precise nature of timing differences in high UE scorers. 
However, examining individual differences in timing dependent on schizotypy levels 
could add support to some timing theories, specifically, in a number of ways as 
outlined below.
Firstly, several existing timing theories attempt to account for the influence of 
Weber’s Law, exemplified, in this case, by the requirement that the standard 
deviation of the time estimates made by the participants increases as a linear function 
of the mean (see Wearden, 2003). With this in mind, it would be useful to examine 
the relationship between the standard deviation and the mean time estimates in high 
UE scorers, in comparison with those seen in low UE scorers. This could be done by 
comparing time estimates along larger time scales than used in the current study 
between high and low UE scorers. This could shed light on the existence of a linear
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relationship between the mean and standard deviation in high UE scorers relative to 
low scorers. It could be that any linear relationship is distorted in high UE scorers, 
possibly dependent on the size of the time scales that are used, and this would 
suggest that differences in timing between high and low UE scorers may be 
dependent on the size of the temporal task under scrutiny. For example, differences 
in temporal performance between high and low UE scorers may differ between 
timing tasks that have small time periods, such as those used in the bisection task 
here, and with larger time periods that require timing across seconds or minutes. 
Alternatively, it may be that an interaction between the Weber’s Law function and 
schizotypy could provide a new dimension in human timing research
The present studies do not account for the learning of similarly timed periods, 
such as the presentations of stimuli for the same length on more than one occasion in 
the bisection task here (e.g., learning that each 0.3 second period are the same), and it 
may be that discrepancies between high and low UE scorers arise due to a deficit in 
high UE scorers learning about novel time presentations. It could be that high UE 
scorers will make time estimates closer to that of low UE scorers with greater 
exposure to the experimental presentation lengths, but, although there is some 
evidence for deficits with regard to some types of learning, such as emotion-based 
learning (Celia, Dymond & Cooper, 2009), learning and UE scores remain an 
unexplored area.
Further examination of the initial timing differences between high and low 
schizotypy scorers are necessary to establish the ecological validity of the current 
finding; that is, how far do these timing differences extend to everyday situations, 
such as keeping appointments, and allocating time for tasks? Indeed, the current 
findings may be usefully explored in terms of the types of prospective memory tasks
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that have shown to be affected by high schizotypy scores (Wang et al., 2008). In 
addition, further exploration of timing differences between high and low scorers in 
more ecologically valid tasks may shed light on the circumstances under which these 
differences emerge and effect behaviour. This is particularly pertinent given the very 
specific set of circumstances under which timing differences were found in chapter 
5; when the L/S stimulus ratio were 2:1 and 3:1.
Finally, although the present thesis used the SET model of timing (Gibbon, 1977) 
in exploring the data in Chapter 5, it was not the intention to use the findings of the 
thesis to support a particular theory of timing. However, exploring timing within a 
context of schizophrenia/schizotypy may be useful in examining specific theories of 
timing, such as SET (Gibbon, 1977), or BeT (Killeen & Feterman, 1988), as this may 
have implications for the nature of schizotypy, and also schizophrenia, as a timing 
deficit may underpin some of the perceptual and cognitive deficits noted in these 
populations. For example, differences in timing may explain why hallucinations 
occur, with current perceptual inaccuracies being a product of hallucination sufferers 
needing more time to accurately understand the current environment, or to make 
comparisons between the current perceptual environment and properties of previous 
experiences, or self-generated events (Frith, 1979; Tsakanikos & Reed, 2005a; West, 
1962, 1975). In addition, there are some points that arise from these data that are 
worth a brief note in this regard. Firstly, three of the five timing theories discussed 
in the introduction incorporate a memory function in describing the timing process 
(MTS, Staddon & Higa, 1999; TTM, Staddon et al, 2002; SET, Gibbon, 1977). 
Although these theories differ in terms of the exact nature of the memory function, 
the findings from Chapter 2 could be argued to suggest a role for a memory 
component; hallucinatory experiences were in the form of actual words that were
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known to participants but which were not present in the environment -  more recently 
presented words influenced false reports. The fact that participants made such false 
reports suggests that hallucinatory reports may, to some extent, be dependent on the 
participant’s vocabulary, which may, in turn, depend on memory for timed periods, 
such as that described by SET (Gibbon, 1977). According to SET (Gibbon, 1977), 
judgements of time are made by comparing the current timed period with previous 
periods. If timing is affected in the same way as false reports of words that are not 
presented, but are actual words previously presented, then it could be that memory 
for timed periods of differing lengths interferes with the correct timed perception, 
and the wrong judgements are made as a consequence. This is somewhat supported 
by the findings of chapter 4, where later responding in high UE scorers on FI and 
DRL schedule performance may reflect a deficit in the memory or decision-making 
processes involved in comparing the current timed period since reinforcement and 
those periods that have occurred previously. It could be, then, that the memory and 
decision-making deficits thought to be responsible for hallucinations could also 
manifest during timing tasks. In the case of SET (Gibbon, 1977), then, it may be 
interesting to attempt to tease apart the influence of the memory and decision-making 
components involved with timing, although this approach may be methodologically 
complex in distinguishing between these processes.
4.3 Timing and the environment
Although other theories of timing also consider the relationship between the 
current environment and previous experiences (e.g. Grossberg, 2000), the neo-realist 
account of consciousness is the only one to put an emphasis on the role of timing in
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the occurrence and content of hallucinations. However, in terms of the development 
of future research into the neo-realist account of consciousness, although it appears 
that high UE scorers show evidence for differences in timing, it remains unclear how 
this may interact with the current environment, and the properties of previous 
experiences, to influence hallucinations. This produces questions regarding which 
properties are important in the relationship between the current environment and 
those previously experienced, and why this relationship is important. Chapter 2 used 
stimuli that differed in degrees of concreteness and imagery, yet abstract words, and 
low imagery scoring words, were reported more than concrete, or high imagery, 
words. As a result, one potentially interesting avenue for addressing this issue could 
be to explore similarities of previously presented stimuli on later hallucinatory 
content, perhaps by presenting participants with words differing in degrees of 
concreteness/imagery prior to a task that facilitates hallucinatory-like experiences, 
and then examining similarities in concreteness/imagery with the words reported. 
However, a procedure that deliberately manipulates hallucinatory content in 
individuals who are prone to experiencing them raises ethical questions, particularly 
if the emotional salience of the words are important, as previously suggested 
(Birchwood et al, 1992; Docherty, Van Kammen, Siris, & Marder, 1978; Freeman & 
Garety, 2003; Yung & McGorry, 1996;).
Clarification of the role of the temporal link and its relationship with the 
properties of previous experiences is required, especially in terms of how and why 
memory and decision-making processes mediate the infusion of properties of 
previous experiences and the current environment. The relationship between the 
temporal link, and past and present environmental properties, as currently suggested 
by the neorealist approach, is unclear; specifically, in terms of which properties of
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previous experiences are of most importance when imposing on current 
environmental perceptions, and how this relationship may occur through the role of 
the temporal link, and particularly, the placing of events along the temporal path.
Issues regarding the influence of current environmental stimulation also remain 
open. The fact that a neo-realist, and other (e.g. Grossberg, 2000), explanations for 
hallucinations puts a large degree of importance on both current, and previously, 
experienced events, has implications for those instances where hallucinations occur 
with little, or no, environmental stimulation (Celia et al., 2007; Margo et al, 1981; 
Merckelbach & van de Ven, 2001; Mintz & Alpert, 1972). This approach seems to 
be counter-intuitive as on the one hand, the importance of environmental properties 
is thought to be an important influence on hallucination-formation, whilst on the 
other, an absence of any such properties is considered to facilitate hallucination 
formation. However, the neo-realist account for consciousness argues for a number 
of different types of properties as important in the make-up of conscious experience, 
included in the neo-realist account for consciousness, some beyond the realm of 
physicality, such as when the experience takes place, or even the experience of 
sensory deprivation itself. As a result, the experimental manipulation of such 
abstract properties would be extremely difficult to perform, and, therefore, prohibit 
more detailed exploration of a properties-hallucinations relationship.
4.4 Methodological issues
In addition to the theoretical issues, and unanswered questions, addressed above, 
there are some methodological limitations to the current set of experiments presented 
in this thesis. A general issue involves the likelihood of the reports of schizotypy
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amongst the student samples for each experiment was in fact a model of drug use in 
this population, given that use (and abuse) of recreational drugs have been found to 
be more pronounced in student samples (Webb, Ashton, Kelly & Kamali, 1996), or 
young adults generally (Williams & Parker, 2001), with the effects modelling the 
symptoms of clinical disorders including psychosis (Arendt, Rosenberg, Foldager, 
Perto & Munk-Jorgensen, 2005; Barkus & Lewis, 2008; Cohen, Buckner, Najolia & 
Stewart, 2010; Miller, Lawrie, Hodges, Clafferty, Cosway & Johnstone, 2001). 
However, although the effects of drug use in a student sample may have influenced 
the results accordingly, it is unlikely that the effects of drug use on both the self- 
reports of schizotypy and related performance on the tasks across the thesis is 
mutually exclusive. That is, where drug use effects task performance, it should also 
effect participants self-reports of schizoptypy accordingly, and, as a result the 
characteristics and behaviours that drug use influences should still model schizotypal 
self-report and associated task performance. Moreover, it is also unlikely that drug 
use has influenced the results of the current thesis over and above that of schizotypy, 
especially given the low median split of the entire sample (3) relative to the range of 
the UE subscale (possible total = 12).
All of the experiments reported in this thesis used a median split approach to the 
dataset; defining high UE scorers as those scoring above the median, and low UE 
scorers as those scoring below the median. This method was chosen as it is unclear, 
at this stage, whether or not the progression of the UE subscale, and its relationship 
with experimental findings, are the product of a linear, or a step function. It could be 
that the median-split approach is not without merit in this context, but this point will 
be revisited later. Although this approach did not produce great variation in the 
scores of the groups defined as low and high scorers between experiments (an aim of
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cross-experimental consistency), its use does present an issue that, in one 
experiment, participants scoring around the median may have been included within 
the low UE group, whilst, for other experiments, a participant with the same score, 
may have been included within the high UE group.
One disadvantage of the median split approach is that the range of scores for each 
group may be skewed, with one group (high or low) incorporating a larger range of 
scores relative to the whole UE subscale. This could then mean that relatively low 
(or high) UE scorers are included within the high (or low) UE group. This, of 
course, is problematic in terms of the internal validity of the findings, with 
generalisations of the results to the high and low UE sub-groups, perhaps, not being 
strictly accurate in an absolute sense. Moreover, several researchers argue that 
dichotomising data by categorising continuous variables into high and low scoring 
groups has some statistical disadvantages; such as the loss of statistical power, and 
the increase of type I error probabilities (see Irwin & McClelland, 2003, Maxwell & 
Delaney, 1993; although this argument is not universally accepted, see O’Keamey & 
Nicholson, 2008).
However, a median split approach to the dataset can also be argued to be more 
advantageous for several reasons. Importantly, as noted above, it is unclear whether 
the relationship between UE and timing ability is linear, or better represented as a 
step function. Statistical procedures, such as regression, which are based on an 
assumption of continuous variables, make the former assumption (of linearity), but 
testing differences between high and low scoring groups, does not make any such 
assumptions, and removes the possibility of violating the basic assumptions required 
for the use of such statistical tests; a violation which would negate the above 
argument concerning power. In fact, as there are no reasons to suggest that a
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particular cut-off point would be advantageous, and the sample sizes used within the 
current study were too small to be confident in the power of a regression analysis 
(see Osborne et al, 2008), the median split approach is favoured
Another methodological issue that would benefit from more detailed 
consideration concerns order effects of the schedule presentation in Chapter 4 as 
presentation of the DRL schedule prior to the FI resulted in proactive interference 
(see also Reed & Morgan, 2008) on responding on the FI schedule, resulting in no 
differentiation between the IoC scores for the FI schedule between high and low UE 
scorers. This would suggest that prior exposure to the DRL schedule affects the later 
influence of the temporal factors of the FI schedule. This could be a result of early 
presentation of the strict parameters of the DRL schedule, namely the delaying of 
reinforcement following a non-reinforced response, producing a shift toward later 
responding on the FI schedule in low UE scorers, whilst high UE scorers continue to 
respond at a late stage on the FI schedule. It could be then that prior exposure to a 
DRL schedule reinforces and shifts responding to later on the FI schedule in low UE 
scorers, but simply reinforces the already late responding in high UE scorers, 
producing no shift. With this in mind, it could be that the timing difference in high 
UE scorers is complex, especially where reinforcement contingencies are involved. 
That is, timing may be affected by reinforcement, whereby reward for accurate 
timing influences later temporal performance; this may be further affected by the 
instances where responding delays reinforcement, such as on a DRL schedule, and, 
as a result, later responding across both schedules is reinforced on the whole.
Further exploration of the interacting effects of the schedule may therefore shed 
more light on this issue.
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A final methodological question that requires addressing concerns the anchoring 
of the S and L standard presentation times, and the spacing of the experimental 
presentations between the standards in Chapter 5. Bisection task methods have 
found that experimental manipulations, such as the difference and ratio between the 
S and L standards, influence bisection point production, as do stimulus spacing of the 
experimental stimuli between the two (Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996). 
Manipulating the ratio sizes produced inconsistent differences between the S and L 
standards, meaning that the range of presentation times for the experimental stimuli 
differed between experiments (e.g. 0.6 seconds between the S and L in Experiment 8, 
0.3 seconds in Experiment 10), and although not of direct interest, the differences in 
the range between the S and L standards may have further influenced timing 
judgements. In addition, maintaining a 0.1s stimulus spacing of the experimental 
presentations between the standards meant that linear versus log linear spacing 
effects were also not considered (Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996). It would be 
useful then to consider these methodological factors in future bisection experiments 
with schizotypal subjects, to give a fuller evaluation of timing differences. However, 
such manipulation all of these factors was beyond the scope of the current thesis, 
with the S and L ratio was the sole focus here.
5. Further Implications.
Further implications from the current thesis are both methodological and 
theoretical, in nature, and concern topics such: as the median-split approach to the 
dataset, the nature of the relationship between schizotypy scores and performance on 
the experimental task (linear or step), speculation about the Weber’s Law in timing 
judgements, decision making processes, and human schedule performance, both in
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general, and in relation to schizotypy, and the nature and influence of environmental 
properties, and the temporal link within the neorealist context.
5.1 Schizotypy
It might be noted that the UE subscale is not strictly continuous, as it includes six 
questions regarding hallucinations, and six regarding delusions. This means that 
there is some scope for participants to have the same (for scores of six or below), or 
similar scores, but these scores will reflect subtly different constructs. Although the 
focus in this thesis is on the underlying mechanisms of both hallucinations and 
delusions, which are treated as one factor accordingly, it could be that the underlying 
timing differences highlighted in the present thesis may be more strongly associated 
with hallucinations over delusions, or vice versa. For example, the neo-realism 
approach to consciousness specifies how this may apply to hallucinatory occurrence, 
but not to delusion formation (Tonneau, 2004). In this respect, high scores on the 
OLIFE-B reflect an increased probability of including the underlying factors most 
associated with altered timing, but it may also be that these factors are reflected in 
more conservative scoring in some low UE scorers on questions tapping altered 
timing processes.
The use of the median-split approach to the dataset therefore allows for some 
variation in the spread of low and high UE scorers between experiments, whilst 
remaining true to the use of equal (or as close to as possible) high versus low UE 
groups within each experiment. With this in mind, it may be useful to examine 
scores on the UE subscale in more detail, possibly in terms of separating the items 
most associated with hallucinations and delusions individually or including other
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scales that examine these factors alone, to assess whether one of these constructs is 
more important than the other.
Returning to the issue of using a median split approach, specifically the nature of 
the relationship between scores on the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B and 
hallucinatory experiences, it could be that this relationship is of a step, rather than a 
linear function. If this is true, then it would mean that the frequency of hallucinatory 
reports made during an experimental task would not occur as a linear function of an 
increase in UE score, but would instead remain constant until a certain point on the 
scale, following which the likelihood of hallucinations occurring would increase.
This approach of course veers close to the traditional ‘categorical’ model for 
schizophrenia, if considered in terms of the frequency of such experiences. However, 
it could be that the intensity of the hallucinatory experiences is the key factor here, in 
terms of the difference between maximum intensity hallucinations, such as the kind 
reported by schizophrenic patients, and lesser, but similar, hallucination-like 
experiences, such as mistaking a stranger for someone you know at a glance, 
occurring across the schizotypal continuum (van de Ven & Merckelbach, 2003).
This has methodological implications in terms of the probabilities of including 
participants that have valid experiences to the task. For example, individuals who 
score low on the UE subscale may only have ever experienced one hallucination-like 
experience, in one modality, the intensity of which may have been strong, but no 
measure of this is included in the OLIFE-B. In contrast, a high UE scorer may have 
had a large number of hallucination-like experiences, across a variety of modalities, 
but all of which were of low intensity. With these examples in mind, it could be that 
the former individual is a more useful research participant in examining the 
mechanisms of hallucinations, as their experience is closer to a hallucination per se.
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Increased scores on the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B, then, do not necessarily 
point toward optimum participants linearly, as subjects at the high end of the 
subscale do not necessarily reflect hallucinatory experiences akin to those presented 
in a given task. However, the UE subscale of the OLIFE-B does measure 
hallucinatory proneness in accordance with a continuum of psychosis (Mason et ah, 
2005), with higher scores indicating an increased likelihood to experience 
hallucinations, and, although a greater probability does not necessarily mean 
hallucinations are certain to occur, higher scores do represent a greater likelihood of 
hallucinatory experiences.
Given all of the above, grouping these participants through a high versus low 
method (step) may be more beneficial in obtaining participants who have 
experienced a hallucination of the necessary type, and strength, directly associated 
with the task, and increases the probability of including those participants most likely 
to experience strong hallucination, whilst avoiding the pitfalls that may come with a 
linear approach. Similarly, it may also be that the association between deficits in an 
underlying timing mechanism, and hallucinatory experiences, exist in line with 
particular hallucination intensities, and, thus, may be better explored within the 
context of a step function.
The implications of a step function model, discussed thus far, have been of a 
methodological nature; however, there are also theoretical implications for the study 
of hallucinations if a step function is indeed operative. Firstly, a step function 
suggests that a point is reached prior to which hallucination-like experiences have 
been reported, but are of less significance, then, following this point, a jump occurs 
toward more significant hallucinatory experiences. Although speculative, at this 
point, the significance of this suggestion is in terms of hallucinatory intensity,
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whereby hallucination-like experiences reach a point that contribute to greater 
intensity of these experiences, shifting the relationship between frequency reports, 
and hallucinatory experiences perceived through task performance, accordingly.
Secondly, a step function would explain the relationship between hallucinations 
and contributory negative emotional factors, such as stress and anxiety (Freeman & 
Garety, 2003; Honig et al., 1998; Morrison et al, 2003; Read & Argyle, 1999), 
suggesting a point at which stress leads to break down in ‘normal’ mental 
functioning, and, potentially, lead to psychosis. Certainly, there is some element of 
understanding one’s experiences, as measured by the OLIFE-B, with each question 
orientated to the participants’ understanding of experiences of misperception, as 
opposed to unawareness of hallucinatory experiences, for example “In the dark do 
you sometimes see shapes and forms even though you know nothing is there?” 
(Mason et al., 2005).
5.2 Specific timing deficits
Each of the theories of timing (see section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) incorporates an 
explanation for the phenomenon of Weber’s Law, typically found in timing 
experiments (see Lejeune et al., 2006), as discussed in section 5.2.2, concerning the 
standard deviation increasing as a function of the mean for time estimations and 
levels of UE.. Alongside insights into differences between high and low UE scorers, 
the exploration of the relationship between timing differences in line with schizotypy 
score may also add a new dimension to the occurrence of this phenomenon in the 
timing literature.
Discussion of the Weber’s law function associated with timing tasks leads to 
the question of how the results here reflect on real-world timing situations, such as
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arriving on time for appointments, or allocating time to perform tasks to deadlines.
In relation to Weber’s law, as the time period increases, so to does the mean and 
standard deviation of the timed estimations (Lejeune et al., 2006). Taken at face 
value, given that high UE scorers show some evidence of timing deficit on the 
current set of studies that use stimuli presentations of less than 1 s, it would be 
expected that, during longer real-world timing scenarios, this deficit would become 
more pronounced. Although there is some evidence for poor time keeping in 
schizophrenic patients (Tysk, 1983; Wahl and Sieg, 1980), more detailed analysis is 
required to uncover further information of the extension of a timing deficit across 
larger timed periods and in high scorers in schizotypy. In addition, the timing 
differences between high and low UE scorers in the current thesis were only found 
under very specific circumstances, when the presentation length ratio of the temporal 
bisection experiments were 2:1 and 3:1, but not at 1.6:1 and 4:1 (Chapter 5). With 
relation to Weber’s law then, and that differences between high and low UE scorers 
should become more pronounced across longer durations, it may be interesting to 
explore timing differences between these groups where the ratio values of 2:1 and 
3:1 are maintained, but across stimuli presented for larger durations. If these 
differences still occur and are perhaps more pronounced when the 2:1 and 3:1 ratios 
are maintained but are presented across longer presentation lengths, then this may 
shed light on the circumstances under which hallucinations are likely to occur; that 
is, when under specific conditions of duration presentation, timing differences 
between high and low UE scorers emerge or are more pronounced, and 
hallucinations become more likely to manifest.
Chapters 3 and 4 have implications for learning in high UE scorers, according to 
their performance on reinforcement schedules incorporating a temporal element. On
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the RR-RI yoked schedules, used in Chapter 3, high UE scorers were unable to 
incorporate the temporal element of the contingency in order to perform optimally on 
the RI schedule, nor were they able to accurately describe the contingency in 
comparison to their own scores on the RR schedule. This would suggest that high 
UE scorers are deficient in learning about the behaviours typically associated with 
these types of schedules, and, although this would account for inconsistent 
performance in human responding on reinforcement schedules (see Section 3.4 
above), this finding holds further implications for learning and behaviour, extending 
to timing behaviours beyond the current experimental setting, as well as having 
implications for reinforcement-dependent learning in high UE scorers.
For example, inconsistencies between humans and non-humans in performance 
on reinforcement schedules often have been attributed to verbal rule formation, 
which is deemed to shape behaviour independently of reinforcement contingencies 
(see Hayes et al., 1986). With this in mind, it could be that the same types of 
mechanisms that are associated with the kind of processes thought to influence 
hallucinations and delusions, namely inaccurate interpretations of the immediate 
environment (Bentall, 1990; Bentall et al, 1991; Bentall, et al, 1994; Frith, 1992; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), could also be involved in the verbal rule formation that 
contributes to response patterns on these schedules (Hayes et al., 1986). That is, 
inaccurate verbal rules for schedule performance may be formed through the same 
mechanisms that facilitate inaccurate environmental interpretation in the form of 
delusions. This would suggest that poor performance on schedules of reinforcement 
in humans may be a result of deficits in the processes associated with verbal rule 
formation, over and above contingency shaping, but further research would be 
required using the same techniques that separate contingency shaped behaviour and
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verbal rule following on schedule work that have been used previously (Hayes et al, 
1986; Shimoff et al., 1986).
An alternative explanation, however, would be that high schizotypy scorers have 
a diminished ability to learn about operant conditioning on reinforcement schedules, 
especially when timing is involved. One reason why this may be the case comes 
from a second argument regarding why humans perform differently on reinforcement 
schedules to non-humans; that is, because the reinforcement histories of humans 
cannot be controlled (Lattal & Neef, 1996; Lowe, 1979). This would imply that high 
schizotypy scorers have always had a difficulty in operant learning within this 
context, and, previously, in real-life contingencies, when compared to low scorers, 
with this deficit extending to the current schedule response patterns. As a result then, 
it could be that responding based on previous real-life reinforcement contingencies 
may influence the way in which an individual may perform on the types of 
reinforcement schedules used in laboratory experiments. Exploration of 
reinforcement histories, however, would be incredibly difficult to perform, but it may 
be useful to explore differences between high and low schizotypy scorers on 
reinforcement schedules that use real-life factors, especially with a temporal element, 
such as taking medication, or performing other specific tasks at different times of the 
day. It would be useful, then, to further examine timing, in terms of reinforcement 
schedules, but also in real-life timing scenarios, as well as the effects of 
reinforcement on high UE scorers, to shed further light on the potential deficits in, 
and influence of, timing, on individuals scoring high in schizotypy.
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5.3 Decision-makinz and schizophrenia
Theories of timing that suggest a memory component tend to express this in 
terms of comparing memory for a timed period with that of a current environmental 
event (Dragoi et al., 2003; Gibbon, 1977, 1991; Lejeune et al., 2006; Staddon and 
Higa, 1999; Staddon et al, 2002; Wearden, 2003). A deficit in such a memory 
component could lead to inaccurate timing, when subjective memories for a timed 
period do not match the current period in question, despite the fact that they are 
actually the same length. Similarly, it could be argued that high UE scorers, who 
tend to make more hallucinatory reports then low UE scorers, are comparing the 
presentation of current words with that of existing words previously presented to 
them, with the remembered word being preferred in the subsequent report 
production. This would suggest an increased tendency in high UE scorers toward 
favouring properties of previous experiences over current environmental stimulation. 
If such considerations were extended to the memory component implicated in 
theories of timing, then, in the bisection task as used in Chapter 5, it could be that 
memory for the short standard is favoured over the current time period, which results 
in a tendency toward reporting longer time presentations compared to short 
presentations. Similarly, later responding on the FI and DRL schedules in Chapter 4 
is thought to be more reflective of a memory or decision-making deficit in comparing 
current and previously timed periods as the subjective timing experience would be 
constant throughout the schedule regardless of differences in a timing mechanism 
between high and low UE scorers. In this case, it could be that the decision-making 
deficit produces a bias toward later responding as the current timed period is 
favoured over memory for those previously presented.
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Moreover, the SET model of timing also incorporates a decision making process 
between the number of ‘pulses’ for the current timed period stored in the 
accumulator and those stored for timed periods in memory. This process is similar to 
those implicated in the manifestation of hallucinations, in that a decision regarding 
the interpretation of the current environment is made based on sensory input, and 
internally generated properties (more specifically, for delusions, where those prone 
to UE jump to conclusions, or make incorrect inferences about the environment; Fear 
& Healey, 1997; Peters et al, 1997; Huq et a ll988; Garety et al, 1991; Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994). It may be then that the same kind of processes involved in 
‘jumping to conclusions’, biases, and incorrect environmental interpretations, are 
associated with timing; in that high UE scorers ‘jump to conclusions’ when making 
timing judgements. That is, when presented with the option to classify one of several 
timed presentations as SHORT or LONG; high UE scorers tend to make quick, 
inaccurate judgements of the length of the current presentation in the same way that 
they make quick and inaccurate judgements of their environment in line with 
delusions. As a result, decision making processes associated with comparing timed 
periods in high UE scorers may effectively produce a deluded perception of those 
timed periods.
The specific findings of Chapter 5, depending on the exact nature of the 
comparisons being made between the current timed period and memory for the 
standards (i.e. S, L or some central tendency of the range), suggest that the bisection 
point differences between high and low UE scorers may emerge due to either 
differences in memory sampling from the s* and 1* range when making a comparison 
with the current timed period, some form of an ambiguity threshold value for 
comparing difference judgements for the current timed period T, with the s* and 1*
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memory representations or a central tendency value for the L/S range, or a greater 
central tendency value itself (see Chapter 6, section 3.2). Relating these results to a 
“jumping to conclusions” bias in high UE scorers would perhaps suggest that these 
individuals are “jumping to conclusions” when selecting s* and 1* memory samples 
or perhaps the notion of an ambiguity threshold value for decision-making between 
the current and previously timed periods extends to the thought processes involved 
with hallucination and delusion formation; that is, it could be that, individuals highly 
prone to hallucinations and delusions could hold altered threshold values that 
somehow mediate the accuracy of environmental interpretations.
Given the existing implications of memory and decision-making issues in 
schizotypy, exploration of these factors in line with SET (Gibbon, 1977; Wearden, 
2003), may shed light both on the underlying processes at work in individuals prone 
to UE, and to the SET model of timing. Similarly, the ATM, MTS and TTM models 
may also benefit from research into the relationship between schizotypy, memory, 
and timing, though these models do not emphasize a decision-making process 
(Dragoi, Staddon, & Palmer, 2003; Lejeune et al., 2006; Staddon & Higa, 1999; 
Staddon et al, 2002). Moreover, research into schizotypy, memory, decision-making 
processes and timing may also help to clarify which of the timing models mentioned 
above is most accurate in explaining human timing.
5.4 Neo-realism
Evidence for a timing difference broadly supports the notion of hallucination 
formation and maintenance according to the neo-realist account of consciousness 
(Tonneau, 2004), but the relationship between this account, and how, and why, 
hallucinations occur, remains somewhat cloudy. Presumably, in line with the neo­
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realist account, hallucinations occur as a result of stronger temporal links between 
properties of the current environment and previous experiences, and these properties 
of previous experiences are then inaccurately favoured in interpreting the current 
environment. However, further research into the specifics of the relationship 
between past and present properties, and their temporal link, is required in several 
areas.
Firstly, in terms of why some properties of previous experiences, and not others, 
contribute to hallucinations if the temporal link does not discriminate between 
different properties of an experience, and provides a strong link with all previous 
experiences, then why do some properties seem to be favoured during re-occurrence 
of hallucinatory experiences, such as when auditory hallucinations follow a specific 
theme (Romme & Escher, 2003). It could be that differing properties somehow carry 
more weight than others, perhaps through more strength or salience at the time they 
are experienced, due to differences in the temporal links between different properties, 
and, as such, are more likely to contribute to hallucinations. Certainly, individual 
differences in emotional states have been implicated in contributing to hallucinations 
formation previously (Birchwood et al, 1992; Docherty et al, 1978; Yung &
McGorry, 1996; Freeman & Garety, 2003). However, these findings provoke an 
additional question regarding how these properties acquire weightings, or how 
stronger temporal links are acquired for certain properties in the first instance.
Secondly, and similarly, if the temporal link provides a strong link with all 
previous experiences, then why do hallucinations only occur in some situations, and 
not others? Again, this could be a result of differences in the weightings of 
properties of previous experiences and their relationship to those of the current 
environment which further suggest the need for more research into the relationship
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between past and present properties of events, currently not included in the current 
neo-realist account.
Thirdly, the nature of the temporal path, defined as the timeline on which the 
organism’s previous experience rests, needs addressing within this context, in terms 
of whether the relationship between previous experiences is a linear or a step 
function. If linear, it could be that the strength of the temporal links between the 
current environment and previous experiences later on the temporal path (and 
subsequently closer to the current environment), are stronger than experiences earlier 
along the temporal path. This would suggest that later properties, more closely 
linked (temporally) to the current environment, are more likely to contribute to 
hallucinations. In turn, this could provide insight into the episodic and themed nature 
of hallucinatory occurrences in the schizophrenic population (APA, 1994; Bentall, 
1990; Romme & Escher, 1993; Skirrow et al, 2002). For example, it could be that, 
following the first hallucinatory occurrence, properties of that experience will hold 
strong temporal links with the current environment, and increase the likelihood of 
those properties, leading to hallucinatory re-occurrence, which, in turn, leads to 
stronger temporal links of those properties, and so on. However, although interesting 
theoretically, this approach does little to explain how the first hallucinatory 
experiences occurs, and, moreover, how an episode of hallucinatory experiences 
would come to end. Moreover, the application of events on the temporal path imply 
some influence of an internal timing mechanism, such as a clock, that is responsible 
for a subjective timeline between the current environment and recent events. 
However, the experiments in Chapter 5 showed no differences in the Weber ratio 
values between high and low UE scorers on the bisection task, therefore showing no 
evidence for differences in clock speed between these two groups. This implies that
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any differences in timing performance, or hallucinatory and delusional reports 
between these groups is not related to clock speed, again raising the question of how 
and why particular properties of previous experiences come to merge with the 
current environment when they do.
Alternatively, the relationship between properties of previous experiences on the 
temporal path and hallucinatory content could be in the form of a step function, 
which would also account for the episodic nature of hallucinations in schizophrenic 
patients, as a number of properties from a portion of the temporal path would be 
equally as likely to contribute to hallucinatory content, possibly with the current 
environment dictating which properties would contribute. Tentatively, a step 
function for the temporal elements could also explain the first and last occurrences of 
hallucinations of each episode, should the step function for temporal links between 
properties coincide with a similar function related to episodes of psychosis 
themselves.
6. Summary
In summary, the present series of studies provide some interesting findings 
with regard to individual differences in UE within a timing context, along with some 
scope for further exploration of hallucinatory like experiences and environmental 
properties. Chapter 2 illustrated that high UE scorers made more false reports of the 
words within white noise recordings than low UE scorers. In addition, the 
importance of the context (i.e. concrete/abstract, high/low imagery) of the presented 
words was also shown to relate to hallucinatory reports, albeit with some cross- 
experimental differences between concreteness/imagery characteristics. This latter 
finding implies a role for the environmental context in influencing hallucinatory
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content, possibly with regard to further word-properties not scrutinized here, but that 
provide an interesting avenue for future research. Chapter 3 showed that high UE 
scorers were not able to make the distinction between a RR and RI schedule of 
reinforcement, whilst low UE scorers were; having a significantly higher response 
rate on the RR schedule than on the RI schedule. This difference between schedules 
suggested either a disconfirmation (lack of sensitivity to those responses that did not 
receive reinforcement), or a timing issue with regard to allowing enough time to pass 
on the RI schedule for reinforcement to become available. Chapter 4 found evidence 
for the influence of timing, as opposed to disconfirmation, as response rates on the FI 
and DRL schedule used did not differ, whilst more complex analysis on the spread of 
participants’ responses within each schedule showed that high UE scorers tended to 
make more of their responses later within each reinforcement period than low UE 
scorers. Chapter 5 then removed the timing exploration from the schedule context, 
and found that, on a ‘pure’ timing task, high UE scorers had a greater bisection point 
than low UE scorers, but only when the L/S stimuli ratios were 2:1 and 3:1, 
highlighting less of a tendency to judge shorter time presentations as LONG than low 
UE scorers. Exploration of this finding through the SET model of timing suggested 
that the differences may lie in some aspect of the memory and decision-making 
processes involved with comparing current durations to those previously presented. 
However, these results were not held when the L/S ratio was 1.6:1 and 4:1, limiting 
the generality of the effect.
Overall, the present thesis shows some evidence for timing differences 
between high and low UE scorers, which could contribute to the occurrence and 
content of both hallucinations and delusions. These differences are largely 
considered within a neo-realist account of consciousness, and how and why UE may
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occur within this framework. Although future research is required to shed more light 
on the relationship between differences in timing, properties of the past and present 
environments, and the occurrence of hallucinations and delusions, the present series 
of studies provide a foundation for this research to continue from a timing 
perspective.
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